The Red Line on Iran’s Nuclear Activities and NATO Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe
Though there has been a clear escalation in tension between Iran and the United States recently, there have also been subtle attempts at diffusion. President Obama’s comments on Iran in the State of the Union, in my opinion, belong in the latter category. The President stated,
…And we will safeguard America’s own security against those who threaten our citizens, our friends, and our interests. Look at Iran. Through the power of our diplomacy, a world that was once divided about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program now stands as one. The regime is more isolated than ever before; its leaders are faced with crippling sanctions, and as long as they shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent.
Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal. (Applause.)
But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better, and if Iran changes course and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations…
The content in the last sentence is crucial given the debate on striking Iran, in part sparked by a three pronged debate at the website of the journal Foreign Affairs. A military attack on Iran is not expected any time soon, given the above remarks (unless things get of control).
I would like to focus a little here on another area, very much Iran related, where there has been a bit of an increase in tension, namely in regards to relations between Russia and the US. Ballistic Missile Defence is an issue here, as this good little Arms Control Today primer on recent BMD related events indicates. There has also been the protests in Moscow and Michael McFaul’s meeting with opposition figures that has seen many question the status of President Obama’s “reset “policy. Some liberal figures in Russia have stated on Ekho Moskvy radio that BMD isn’t really a problem for Russia, sparking a forceful nationalist rejoinder from Vladimir Putin.
Of course, there are internal political dynamics at work here.
As an aside, Obama’s economy focused comment on Russia in the State of the Union was interesting because of the way he contrasted Russia with China.
Additionally, note that the final phase of the “phased adaptive” approach to BMD in Europe, that is the introduction of the SM3 Block IIB interceptor system, has been front and centre recently in official Russian commentary. I had stated after the BMD Policy Review was released by the Pentagon that this would be an issue as time progressed, especially for the future of strategic arms control.
OK, back to Iran.
We know that there is supposed to be a “red line” that Iran cannot cross. That being, of course, manufacturing a nuclear weapon. Obama clearly states that military force is still an option and strongly implies that it will be used if necessary to prevent Iran from crossing the red line.
The United States will not tolerate and accept a nuclear armed Iran.
Think about this red line policy in the context of Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe. In the Arms Control Today article linked above Hillary Clinton states,
…At a Dec. 8 NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said NATO would not “give any other country outside the alliance a veto” over whether to build a missile interceptor system. The system is “not directed at Russia, it’s not about Russia, it’s frankly about Iran,” she said…
Nothing new there. BMD in Europe is designed to counter a nuclear threat from Iran.
But, hang on. That’s a policy that is premised on Iran crossing the red line.
If the United States is committed to engaging in preventive strikes to prevent Iran from going nuclear, why then the big investment in BMD which is premised on the notion that Iran will cross the red line?
That seems to me a tad contradictory, unless BMD is viewed as a hugely expensive insurance policy hedging against the failure of preventive military action.
Income and Tax Inequality in America: Newt Gingrich More to Blame than Mitt Romney.
President Obama in his State of the Union made a reference to "class warfare," a reflection of the increasing importance that inequality is taking in American politics. It is a theme that Obama has focused on in recent times and, of course, his statements in the State of the Union follow on from Newt Gingrich's successful campaign against Mitt Romney in the South Carolina primary where Romney's taxes figured highly.
The main issue is the tax differentials between investors and wage and salary earners.
But, really, for that you gotta blame Gingrich more than Romney.
Say you've got $200 million or whatever it is. Odds are that you are gonna use that to generate a handy income and to do everything you can to minimise your taxes.
So that's what Romney has done.
He's taken advantage of the system to the extent, it would seem, that the system allows.
But who helped to actually create that system? People like Phil Gramm, Dick Armey and, yes, Newt Gingrich.
The laws and regulations they helped to create was used by Romney to maximise his wealth and income.
Way I look at it the guys who made the system are more to blame than the guys who took advantage of it.
Sanctions, 20% Enrichment at Fordow, The Debate on Bombing Iran: Escalating Tensions Between Iran and the United States.
I have written an essay on the above topics. It is available at On Line Opinion.
The Threat That leaves Something To Chance: Is Iran Doing A North Korea In The Persian Gulf?
I’m sure that the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear standoff have attracted the attention of analysts. A good summary can be found today at the Global Security Newswire.
What we have seen is an escalation in tension.
Don’t forget that it is necessary to also throw into the mix the latest US arms deals with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE. The latter has been sold with respect to Iran. Without question these are related to Iran, however the Arab Spring is just as significant. It could well be of more significance. The deals demonstrate US support for the conservative authoritarian regimes of the Gulf and so should be seen as a form of hedging; they also shore up support for the respective military establishments so that they don’t switch sides during any domestic upheavals. I tend to think that the latter internal aspect is more important here than the external Iranian aspect; but that’s just a hunch.
Iran’s war games and missile firings in the Persian Gulf, accompanied by all sorts of bellicose rhetoric about closing the Strait of Hormuz, have got analysts thinking. The situation seems rather similar to that of the standoff on the Korean peninsula.
Clearly Obama inherited a strategy of regime change, for both North Korea and Iran, through graduated pressure from the Bush administration. Though commentary during the Obama campaign suggested otherwise I tend to think that Obama has basically continued with that strategy.
One question now being asked is whether the US will abandon that strategy and launch a military strike against Iran. We’ll see.
The Iranians are probably doing a North Korea. They may well have figured that their best bet is to foster concern and heightened anxiety by playing a game of brinkmanship designed to influence the price of oil. Nouriel Roubini has argued that the absurd world oil price in 2007 partially helped to prick asset price bubbles in much of the western world, especially the US. As the advanced major industrial economies continue on their sluggish course, with talk about a double dip recession forever present, the Iranians might be calculating that manipulating the world oil price is an effective means of both deterring US military action and hitting the western economies.
For this strategy to work the Iranians would need to credibly present a Thomas Schelling style “threat that leaves something to chance.” As sanctions are tightened and as they start to bite escalating brinkmanship in order to impact the economy of the west certainly is a “rational” strategic policy option.
Of course, the whole thing could get out of hand and lead to conflict in the Gulf. But that’s the whole idea is it not?
Paul Pillar at The National Interest has a pretty sensible article on Iran and US diplomacy. Pillar is a great analyst, but I think that his operating assumption, which is standard, is fallacious. Namely, that this is in essence a nuclear non-proliferation standoff. It isn’t. Nuclear non-proliferation is a shield or rationale used to support a policy of regime change. Policy will not change so long as that assumption holds.
Superterrorism After Osama bin Laden
I have an article on superterrorism published at On Line Opinion.
The North Korea Nuclear Standoff After Kim Jong Il
Analysts continue to speculate on what affect the death of Kim Jong il, and the transfer of power to his son, will have on the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula.
Most of the attention has been focused on what will happen next in North Korea, but it is surely just as important to think about what will happen next in Washington. For a sober and well thought out analysis of the first type one can't really do much better than this Foreign Affairs Snapshot put together by Michael Green.
What about Washington, then?
I think that the death of Kim Jong il will likely enhance the underlying policy assumption adopted on North Korea. Most assert that assumption to be the prevailing view that North Korea is not interested in trading away its nuclear capacity in exchange for normalised relations with the United States.
That is not, and has not been, the underlying policy assumption.
Rather, the operative assumption has been the view that North Korea is on the verge of collapse and maintaining a tough line with North Korea will eventually result in the implosion of the regime or as it used to be called; "regime change."
A lot of the commentary that I have seen, especially from Hawkish analysts such as Victor Cha, adopts the position that the North Korean regime now is on its last legs. The transfer of power cannot possibly succeed and there surely, thereby, will be an implosion from within, perhaps even a Pyongyang Spring.
If that is the conclusion being made in high policy circles then the current standoff, with its inherent risk of getting out of control, will continue and may well worsen.
In the Obama administration's early national security and defence planning documents a lot of emphasis was put on "risk management." Naturally, every bird in every pet shop was talking about risk and risk management at the time given the global financial crisis.
However, if policy on the Korean nuclear standoff were truly reflective of "risk management" a much more concerted effort would have been made to establish normalised bilateral relations. The time might well have now passed for all that.
Maybe the death of Kim Jong il will result in policy being more reflective of risk management and mitigation than it has hitherto. That is a logical possibility and, from what I can gather, the most rational policy approach. Hopefully policy is being reviewed, and hopefully there are sober heads arguing for a change in approach.
Just another small point. Most analysis hitherto seems to view the greatest security danger to be a desperate North Korea transferring its nuclear knowledge (especially "know how") and technology to aspiring proliferators, including micro proliferators such as terrorists, in order to earn much needed hard currency and other economic resources.
I don't agree with that. As much as I respect analysts such as Sigfried Hecker, who is perhaps the most well known advocate of this position, that make this claim I think, nonetheless, that really isn't an accurate reading of the situation.
The leading security threat is that the continued nuclear standoff and mutual games of brinkmanship, and they are mutual, will escalate and will eventually result in a large scale war on the Korean peninsula. This is a very real, and awful, prospect.
What about North Korea? I mean, who knows? The continued standoff might well see the new leader or leadership team basically moving forward with its "Army First" policy stance and augmenting its strategic capabilities in order to improve its leverage in international relations.
An alternative means to end the deadlock would be for North Korea to engage in a bold Gorbachev style domestic reform programme and so thereby improve relations with the other significant economic powers in the region, especially South Korea and Japan. Would Kim the Younger have the authority to pull that off?
That would depend on whether there is a significant constituency within the party-state elite for a policy u-turn. Is there? I don't know. I bet neither does the CIA 
US Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Is Still NSPD-14
OK, the stuff on strategic nuclear arms control and presidential guidance is a little bit old, but still I think we can make a few quick points about that before we kick start the blog again. Quite a bit has been said about the issue in the last couple of months. Surely the authoritative analysis is due to Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen
...When the administration of George W. Bush sought to reduce the stockpile, it issued an updated nuclear employment policy (National Security Presidential Directive-14, or NSPD-14) in June 2002. That directive lowered the planning requirement against Russia, allowing for a stockpile decrease of nearly 50 percent while increasing planning against regional proliferators. The force levels set by New START, which entered into force earlier this year, also are based on the Bush administration's guidance...
In other words despite tonnes of rhetoric and shoddy analysis the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and New Start did not lead to a change in US presidential guidance on nuclear weapons policy. The Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy inherited by Obama, NSPD-14, remains in force. That means that the underlying strategic constructs of the Bush administration, most especially tailored deterrence and dissuasion, are surely still operative despite the lack of detailed discussion of these in the 2010 NPR.
I had stated before both New Start and the 2010 NPR that all the signs, readily discernible to those with eyes wide open, were pointing to this being the most plausible outcome of both the arms control talks and the policy review process. This confirms that my hypothesis was correct.
The interesting question, naturally, is whether this new review will alter the current situation significantly. That would depend a lot on how deep the US, but the same applies to Moscow in reverse, would like to cut its strategic arsenal in the context of mutual and balanced force reductions with Russia. In turn, the more inclined the US is to compromise on ballistic missile defence and prompt global strike the more likely are deep cuts.
On the latter Yousaf Butt has a useful discussion at The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
We've had a few reviews now since the end of the cold war and each have promised transformational changes in the direction of minimum deterrence. It hasn't happened. That does not mean it will not happen this time.
However, that said, I must disagree a tad with this bit in the Norris and Kristensen paper
...The review is probably Obama's most important and perhaps last chance to change the role that nuclear weapons have traditionally played in U.S. national security strategy...
...How different the new guidance will be depends in no small measure on how efficiently the president is able to steer the review through a morass of interservice competition, institutional inertia, Cold War mind-sets, defense contractor lobbying, and personal preferences.
Like all policy reviews, this one will trigger fierce battles among departments, agencies, and individuals who support or disagree with the president's vision...
The picture given is of a president dedicated to the vision of nuclear disarmament, but hobbled by bureaucratic inertia and partisan politics. Maybe no real progress has been made because Obama isn't really dedicated to the vision? If so, don't expect massive changes in the underlying strategic constructs of US nuclear weapons policy. One can see that these are still operative, and probably will remain so, given administration support for warhead, and nuclear weapons complex, modernisation. That isn't even to speak of missile defence and prompt global strike.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.