Obama’s BMD Policy Comes Under a Two-Pronged Assault
As I have noted previously the Obama administration's approach to Ballistic Missile Defense has a number of flaws. Two very important critical analyses have emerged just recently that have re-ignited the debate on BMD. These analyses are worth exploring a tad. The first, by Yousaf Butt, is a mix of strategic-conceptual critique and technical critique. The second, from Ted Postol and George Lewis, is primarily technical. But the purpose of the latter critique is to demonstrate BMD's conceptual flaws through revelation of its technical shortcomings.
The second, i.e. Postol and Lewis, critique has attracted a lot of attention because it seeks to rebut claims that the administration has made about the technical effectiveness of the SM-3 based Aegis BMD system. Even arms control advocates, such as the ArmsControlWonk, have at times looked favourably upon Aegis BMD.
If Postol and Lewis are right then the ACW analysis of Obama's Euro BMD policy is way off base.
I have a new designation that I will now use for centrist Democrat analysts; FOO Fighters, after the band. FOO is shorthand for Friends Of Obama. I notice that most attention in the recent primaries in the US focused on how successful the Tea Party would be in the GOP primaries, but the FOO Fighters are facing a grassroots insurgency in the Democratic Party too. Hopefully labor unionists and grass roots activists will take back their party from the establishment, whom Obama serves. But that, alas, is another issue.
I think it is important that we first focus on a few remarks made by Butt. I say this because I think he has made a major mistake. I'll introduce my remarks by retelling something I once read about the Battle of Berlin. The Soviets (now Russians) have always had a liking for overwhelming firepower, especially the laying down of mass artillery fire. Wehrmacht General Heinrici was noted for his defensive skills. He was, naturally, well aware of the Soviet fondness for massive artillery preparation. He therefore developed two distinct trench lines, aft and rear for the Battle of the Seelow Heights. Here Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front was to open up the road to Berlin. Just prior to the Soviet artillery assault Heinrici moved his forces to the rear line of trenches. In this way the Soviet artillery preparation fell on empty trenches.
I think that Butt's analysis is impressive, but it's hitting empty trenches. It's clear that his conceptual critique focuses on the question of deterrence
...Setting aside the fact that there haven't been any realistic testsindicating "major improvements in missile defenses," such logic is questionable on three levels...
The "logic" in the above citation refers to the logic of deterrence. One of those three levels is of especial interest
...Second, even if reducing the U.S. stockpile did affect U.S. deterrent posture, missile defense couldn't replace any lost deterrent value because missile defense doesn't deter nuclear attacks. The purpose of missile defense is to defend--or, more accurately, attempt to defend. An adversary wouldn't be deterred from launching a nuclear attack because of the existence of missile defense; rather, it's the credible threat of overwhelming nuclear retaliation that deters an adversary. If the enemy is irrational and suicidal enough to discount the threat of massive nuclear retaliation, then a missile defense system that can theoretically intercept only some of the attacking missiles most certainly isn't going to be a deterrent. In wonk parlance, the NPR conveniently conflates reprisal deterrence with denial deterrence. Reprisal deterrence is the 800-pound gorilla, and denial deterrence is the flea. If our adversaries are thinking twice about using nuclear weapons it's because they're scared of reprisal deterrence. And if they aren't sufficiently scared of reprisal, fractional denial certainly isn't going to stop them. To borrow an analogy used by Thomas Schelling, a Nobel laureate with a deep knowledge of arms control and game theory: Denial deterrence adds to reprisal deterrence like tying an extra cotton string adds to the strength of an aircraft carrier's anchor chain...
This is a major error. BMD does not function strategically as either a deterrent or a defence. The best explanation for the strategic rationale behind BMD can be found in the work of the conservative strategic analyst Colin Gray. Now Gray has the habit of really calling things as he seems them. You can disagree with his calls, as I most certainly do, but one thing is clear. You'll get no BS from Gray. In his book (which I got at Canberra airport) Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare he states, p125, that BMD is a "defensive counterforce" strategic capability, meant to work in conjunction with offensive counterforce.
That is correct.
The purpose of BMD is not deterrence nor defence but is a back up for offensive counterforce capabilities, to the extent that we can discern any strategic rationale. You can see the importance of this when you take on board Butt's comment in the above, namely, that "a missile defense system that can theoretically intercept only some of the attacking missiles most certainly isn't going to be a deterrent." A defensive counterforce capability that is meant to back up an offensive counterforce capability is, strategically speaking, designed to "theoretically intercept only some of the attacking missiles."
Of course that's not how the White House and the FOO Fighters strategically justify BMD. But that's because they don't have the same intellectual honesty as Gray. Any purely strategic critique of BMD, no matter how impressive, that focuses on deterrence and/or defence I am afraid is just hitting empty trenches. The real trenches to be hit are in the rear.
The defensive counterforce rationale makes perfect sense. The US has been the strategic enforcer of a certain conception of world order since the end of World War Two. As the global order's enforcing power a defensive counterforce capability makes perfect sense and is without reproach, so long as you accept that underlying operating assumption. By sticking to the operating assumption there can be no purely strategic critique of BMD. The critique of BMD can be made by both technical and normative arguments. The technical arguments need not bring the underlying assumption to relief; if a strategic capability simply cannot work under any feasible operational conditions then it won't work, period. The same can't be said for normative arguments that focus on the type of world order that is most appropriate.
Of course, Butt does not limit himself to questions of strategy. He also has a technical critique. But let us bring in Postol and Lewis at this point. What is interesting about Postol and Lewis's paper is that it also goes after a BMD strategic rationale, but uses purely a technical argument. Now the great thing here is that Postol and Lewis are going after dissuasion (one of those Bush era concepts that is now "don't ask, don't tell" under Obama)
...According to the report, the technologies now in hand will make it possible for the United States to build a global missile defense system that is so capable, flexible, and reliable that potential adversaries will see that they have no choice but to de-emphasize their efforts to use ballistic missiles as a way to obtain their political goals...
The policy that Postol and Lewis describe is, basically, precisely what Team Bush called "dissuasion."
Postol and Lewis take issue with the Obama claim that the current deployment of GMD interceptors protect the US from "rogue state" ICBMs. But their real beef is with the SM-3 and claims made by the FOO Fighters that Aegis based BMD, and future land based SM-3 systems, are able to provide a mid-course defence against IRBMs. They state
...However, the Defense Department’s own test data show that, in combat, the vast majority of “successful” SM-3 experiments would have failed to destroy attacking warheads. The data also show potential adversaries how to defeat both the SM-3 and the GMD systems, which share the same serious flaws that can be readily exploited by adversaries. The long record of tests of the GMD system, and the most recent test in January of this year, shows that it has only been tested in carefully orchestrated scenarios that have been designed to hide fundamental flaws and produce appearances of success...
Their analysis is divided into two parts. The first deals with sensors external to the Aegis warship. They argue that the forward based X-Band radars to be used by the Aegis system will not be able to distinguish between all the objects that are deployed by a ballistic missile at the end of its flight. That means that the forward X-Band radars would not be able to discern warheads from decoys, even though they would be able detect missiles deploying their payload. This is because they would not be able to track warheads after separation from the bus, Postol and Lewis argue. They also point out that if enemy missiles should fly into the line of sight of any high powered early warning radar then enemy warheads could be tracked, but alas they would not be able distinguish the radar reflections from warheads and decoys. They assert that early warning radar would not be able to distinguish between warheads and two foot long wire.
They then focus on the sensors on the SM-3 hit-to-kill vehicle itself. Postol and Lewis further argue that if an Aegis warship has adequate tracking information of an enemy missile, i.e. from external sensors, then an SM-3 blind launched into space would not be able to destroy the enemy warhead. The idea would be for the SM-3 hit-to-kill vehicle to use on board sensors to locate and destroy the warhead in the vacuum of space. They state
...At this range, the objects in the search volume look like points of light to the infrared sensor on the kill vehicle, so it is not possible for the kill vehicle to obtain information about the shape or size of different objects ahead of it. These substantial limits on what the SM-3 kill vehicle can see makes distinguishing the warhead from other objects a considerable challenge....
They stipulate that no actual test of the SM-3 hit-to-kill vehicle has successfully demonstrated such a capability under realistic combat conditions. They go on and make an additional point. They state that even if the hit-to-kill vehicle
...hits the body of the rocket, the kill vehicle will tend to shatter and pass through the rocket body much like a bullet hitting a thin-walled drinking glass or an empty soda can, leaving the warhead undamaged and still falling on a nearly unchanged trajectory toward its target...
In sum, Postol and Lewis present a pretty devastating critique. Now the MDA has issued a rejoinder and the two and fro is well covered by an article in The New York Times. It matters here whether the warheads used in tests are not dummies and what MDA means precisely by "conclusively proven." The metric for this should be set by, say, the GAO.
Because of these technical difficulties Ballistic Missile Defense, Postol and Lewis thereby argue, cannot act as a dissuasion capability. That is, it would not dissuade potential regional adversaries of the US, i.e. Iran and North Korea, from investing in ballistic missile defence capabilities in hope of deterring the US. They don't put in those terms (they speak of "aggression"), but I'm afraid that is how it is.
Now Postol does have an alternative. He alludes to it in footnote 15. He speaks here of drones to hit liquid fueled ICBMs in boost-phase. Notice that in making this suggestion that Postol does not subject the underlying strategic rationale to critique, unlike Butt. Postol and Lewis, at least in this article, accept the rationale but point to technical hurdles, and offer an alternative approach. Butt, however, at least attempts to go further.
I have an even better suggestion. If you accept my defensive counterforce rationale, that is.
Offer meaningful bilateral and multilateral diplomatic talks with no preconditions with Iran and North Korea in hope of reaching comprehensive regional political settlements.
The US can insist in such talks that any deal is conditional upon abandoning long range missile programs.
That is a type of dissuasion, is it not? Why should dissuasion be looked on purely in military terms?
One more point. These critiques are limited in another sense. If BMD doesn't have a proper strategic rationale, if it won't work, then what is going on? Let us assume rationality, as we must; strategic planners in the US are highly capable and very intelligent. Why is the policy pursued despite the difficulties that critics point out?
Notice that the critics usually don't attempt to answer this question. Because I am not a FOO Fighter i'll give you my suggestion.
It's a boondoggle for the aerospace industry, pure and simple.
The US aerospace industry has always been "too big to fail." If the insurgents in the Democratic Party win then I suspect many will be starting to question whether such military Keynesianism is justified given the challenges faced by the urban working-poor in the US, no thanks to Obama's pals in Wall Street.
Tractor Beams for Space Junk Could Also Be Used as Space Weapons
We all know that space junk is a problem. Now it appears that laser “tractor beam” technologies are being developed to deal with the problem. According to a New Scientist report on the topic
...How about using a tractor beam to simply steer future junk aside, says space-flight engineer John Sinko of Nagoya University, Japan.
Sinko's idea is based on an experimental type of spacecraft engine called a laser thruster. Inside these motors, laser pulses fired into a mass of solid propellant cause a jet of material to be released, pushing the craft in the opposite direction.
Sinko realised that the laser did not necessarily have to be on the same craft. "These on-board motors could also be targeted remotely by lasers for tractor beaming," he says...
...He imagines spacecraft being fitted with remotely operated thrusters before launch, so that once they reach the end of their lives it is simple to alter their orbit or even shove them into the atmosphere to burn up - even if they have lost all power...
The report states that the Russians are working on similar ideas as well.
It's quite clear that such a device could be used as a space weapon. This is important because the idea requires outfitting satellites with the appropriate motors. Because satellites can be used in dual civil-military roles one could envisage tractor beaming for military purposes. In the absence of international cooperation on space weaponisation, who would want to put in space satellites that are vulnerable to attack in this way?
I'm thinkin' X-37B.
I think space arms control is needed to get this idea off the ground. It wouldn't make sense to put in space satellites with great commercial value, and that can be employed in military roles (for instance communication), that are sitting ducks by virtue of these in placed thrusters. You could even, apparently, knock a satellite employing a laser beam from the Earth by using a mirror placed in space for the purpose.
.
Astronomers Should Forget About SETI and Focus on Near Earth Objects Instead
The X-37B space plan and FALCON, more so the former, have put space security firmly into the spotlight. So let me go out on a tangent.
I have always been pretty much opposed to the search for extra terrestrial intelligence. The way I see it SETI is one of those dangerous things that naïve idealistic types seem to have a fondness for. I have never seen any reason to suppose that the consequences of successful alien contact would be in any way beneficial for us. Indeed, aliens might decide to wipe humans out.
Apparently Stephen Hawking agrees as reported in The Times Of London
...THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out, at least according to Stephen Hawking. He has suggested that extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact...
The report goes on to quote Hawking as stating, amongst other things,
...“We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet...
...“If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans”...
This reasoning should resonate, especially when SBS is repeating its ground breaking documentary series First Australians.
SETI is too risky. It would be better, and more rational in my view, to channel all the resources, both human and capital, that has been granted to SETI and redirect it to cataloguing Near Earth Objects and developing strategies and technologies to counter impacts on the Earth from space.
SETI is irrational.
Proponents of SETI might want to argue that an advanced technological species of alien would be advanced morally. This seems to be a tacit assumption. There is no logical connection between the two. The scientific and industrial revolution occurred in Europe, the most backward part of the world morally. The scientific and technological prowess of the West wasn't matched morally, and that disconnect between scientific achievement and moral progress still is very much a real one, as most of the world's population easily recognises.
Science in the West has advanced in leaps and bounds. Moral progress has advanced at a glacial pace. Disconnects between the two are dangerous and perhaps the most important feature of modernity.
We should also note that moral cognition is pretty much a human attribute. No other species on Earth is able to reason morally as we do. To be sure some studies suggest that some species have an understanding of fairness and reciprocal justice, but this doesn't come close to our ability to engage in moral reason. We can reason ethically in relation to not only our own tribes but of all humanity as a whole; we can do so with respect to future generations; we can do so with respect to other species and the ecosystem as a whole moreover. The latter the great biologist Edward Wilson calls “biophilia.”
An alien species might have no moral faculty at all. It could be argued that an advanced species would not be able to survive without a strong dose of sociality and morality i.e. such a species would destroy itself before it would reach the capacity to explore deep space. We might find out whether this dynamic applies to us experimentally in due course.
Even if so, whatever moral sense aliens would have evolved would be peculiar to them. There is no guarantee that our welfare would have any moral consequence for them. This could be countered on grounds of evolutionary convergence. The type of sociality and morality exhibited by humans would be adaptive for any intelligent species anywhere; an intelligent species needs cooperative norms in order to avoid self destruction. One might also argue on platonic grounds; the logic of morality is like the universality of mathematics. However, it is possible to show that moral intuitions can be “wrong”. If for aliens moral reason is “but the slave of the passions” then all bets are off.
Perhaps we should not speculate like this.
Perhaps it's better to worry about our own problems and forget about potentially catastrophic projects like SETI.
X-37B Is A Go For launch: Does That Mean Space Weapons Are Too?
The US Air Force is set to launch the X-37B Space Plane. She looks a bit like the Space Shuttle and like with the Shuttle early speculation focuses on its possible military applications.
A number of reports exist on this, the best of which can be found at Space.com.
I would like to focus on three things, two of which have been discussed in reports. The one thing missing is the X-37B's implications for the Space Posture Review, which has been delayed and is not due out any time soon. Obama had previously pledged that the US would not weaponize space, so the obvious question becomes; does the X-37B demonstrate to us that the Space Posture Review will not affirm these pledges?
Maybe, maybe not. One line in the Space.com report linked above is telling
...Viewing the X-37B as a fascinating project, and one that fuels speculation is Everett Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.
"It is not possible to tell yet whether the program is an example of the output of bureaucratic inertia or the beginning of something much bigger, Dolman advised...
Either we have bureaucratic inertia or the X-37B is giving us a window into the Space Posture Review.
Certainly the external perceptions of this won't be pretty
...Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island sees the upcoming flight as a glass half-full, half-empty enterprise...
..."In any case, it is likely that other countries will see it as another capability intended to assure the United States will be able to dominate access to and the use of space," Johnson-Freese concluded...
This has led some to argue for a type of space arms control accord to deal with such perceptions. If the idea behind the X-37B (which is highly classified) is to provide an unmanned space vehicle for traditional civil space missions the suggestion has been made to develop a series of demarcation accords.
...Mark Gubrud is a physicist in the Laboratory for Physical Sciences at the University of Maryland in College Park, and a proponent of space arms control...
...Gubrud pointed out there is a realistic way to limit the threat posed by the X-37 or similar vehicles produced by any country. That is, to account for their numbers and demand that they be kept either in verifiable storage or in use for declared non-weapons purposes, and that the numbers be commensurate with their declared purposes.
To that end, "basic information about the payload mass and volume, burnout velocity, orbital maneuver capability and remotely observable characteristics, as well as the numbers of such vehicles, should be required to be reported," Gubrud suggested...
This has its implications for the Space Posture Review. Such demarcation accords would not be consistent with the current national space policy of the US, inherited from the Bush administration. The Obama SPR would have to change that.
The military aspects to these reports tend to focus on two types of mission. One is launching weapons, such as “rods from god” anywhere on the surface of the Earth. As such the X-37B becomes a type of space based prompt global strike. Two potential features of the X-37B are seen as being particularly advantageous therein
...Launch-on-demand: Ideally, a small fleet of these space planes would be available for immediate launch, backed by a supply of specialized small satellites that could be pulled off the shelf and loaded into the space plane to perform critical missions. The ultimate would be having these vehicles in an "alert" status, similar to how fighters and bombers sat alert, during the Cold War, ready to deploy at-will...
...Flexibility: A space plane could be launched into any orbit, at any inclination, providing prompt "eyes-on" of virtually any area of the world. Altitude could be varied, as well. A space plane might also be used in a sub-orbital "arc" flight profile, perform its duties, then be recovered at a remote air field half-way around the globe...
If accurate it's clear we are speaking here of prompt global strike like capabilities.
Secondly, we have the X-37B's potential capability to engage in offensive counterspace operations and space proximity operations.
..."Regardless of its original intent, the most obvious and formidable is in service as a space fighter - a remotely piloted craft capable of disabling multiple satellites in orbit on a single mission and staying on orbit for months to engage newly orbited platforms," Dolman said. That capability "would be a tremendous tactical advantage”...
So we might well have a type of space based Predator drone.
On proximity
...Even if it were not used to engage and disable satellites, Dolman said, it could be maneuvered up close and personal to inspect orbiting satellites at a level of detail currently unimaginable. "With the anticipated increase in networked-microsatellites in the next few years, such a platform might be the best – and only – means of collecting technical intelligence in space”...
At the outer edge of speculation there was some interesting comments the X-37B as a platform for laser and directed energy weapons in a counterspace context. That's interesting when you combine that with the X-37B's potential to reach any orbit and
...Surprise factor: On the first orbit, a space plane could capture data, before the "target" knew it was coming. Not as predictable as a satellite's orbit - at least on the first pass...
Any capability that is on alert ready to launch at any time, that can manoeuvre to its target with stealth and engage space based assets with lasers and directed energy weapons can't be good for strategic stability.
That could well make space based early warning satellites vulnerable to attack.
Remember all that talk about strategic stability and warning time in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review?
Will Improvements in the SM3 Interceptor Turn New Start into a False Start?
I think maybe I am blogging a bit too much since the Nuclear Posture Review came out, but alas I cannot help myself. I refer to my post below on New Start. Russia has released a unilateral statement on Ballistic Missile Defence and strategic arms control. It is worth reflecting upon. According to the following AFP report Russia has declared that
..."The treaty... can only function and be capable of life in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative expansion of a possible US missile defence system," the Kremlin said.
One of the "exceptional circumstances" that would undermine the treaty would be "an expansion of the possible US missile defence system that would threaten the potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces," it said...
New Start contains a liberal withdrawal provision.
The emphasis on qualitative expansion of BMD is what is of interest here. We might recall the Obama administration's phased approach to European BMD. This is how this policy was described in the BMD posture review report
...In Phase 2 (2015 time frame) our capabilities will be enhanced by the fielding of a more advanced interceptor (the SM-3 Block IB) and additional sensors. Phase 2 will include land based SM-3s in southern Europe, in addition to their sea-based locations, expanding coverage to additional NATO allies. In Phase 3 (2018 time frame) coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats will be improved with a second land-based SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, as well as an upgraded Standard Missile 3 (the SM-3 Block IIA, which is already under development) at sea and land-based sites. These changes will extend coverage to all NATO allies in Europe. In Phase 4 (2020 time frame) an additional capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United States will be available. This phase will take advantage of yet another upgrade to the Standard Missile 3, the Block IIB. All four phases will include upgrades to the missile defense command and control system...
Phase 3 is when things will start to get tricky. Here we will have SM3 Block IIA's based in north Europe. The Block IIA has a greater advertised ability to discern decoys. Some accounts of the Block IIA claim an ability to engage some ICBM's. Again these are claims. However, the SM3 IIB according to the BMD policy review will have noteworthy, again advertised, features
...Toward the end of the decade, more capable interceptors and sensors will become available. The SM-3 Block IIA will have a higher burnout velocity and a more advanced seeker. These features will make it much more capable than the SM-3 Block IA or IB and will provide greater regional coverage. A follow-on missile, the SM-3 Block IIB, is in the initial phase of technology assessment and development. It is expected to be even more capable than the IIA. With a higher burnout velocity and greater divert capability, the SM-3 Block IIB will have some early-intercept capability against a long-range missile. Matched against regional medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the SM-3 IIB will defend a greater area than the SM-3 IIA.
Investments are also being made to develop an “engage on remote” technology that includes not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater ranges. A further long-term effort seeks to develop persistent overhead sensors to detect and track large raid sizes of ballistic missiles over their entire trajectories from space. Such an ability would greatly reduce the need for terrestrial sensors and the size of deployable missile defense systems. This Precision Tracking and Space System” (PTSS) is an important funding priority in the President’s Budget for FY 2011 and the Future Years Defense Program...
Take that Moscow! The SM3 IIB, and improved sensors and battle management systems, will enable the KV to "engage the threat missile at greater ranges." Moreover, it will be able to "detect and track large sizes of ballistic missiles over their entire trajectories from space."
Notice that Phase 3 kicks in during the projected lifetime of New Start and Phase 4 kicks in when New Start is supposed to expire.
I submit that if Russia abides by its policy then expanding qualitative improvements in the SM3 might turn New Start into a False Start.
Further strategic arms control is not consistent, politically speaking, with the Obama administration's policy on Ballistic Missile Defence.
Oops, that doesn't fit the narrative too now does it?
Contact.
Categories
Archives
About the Author
Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.