National Research Council Report on Nuclear Forensics Exposes the Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Policy
The following blog entry has also been cross-posted at my Maxim international relations blog published at The Analyst.
The National Research Council in the United States has published a very important study on the current status of nuclear forensics. Only the executive summary has been declassified. Nuclear forensics has often been described as an “art.” I am currently writing a book on al-Qaeda and nuclear terrorism, so the topic interests me greatly. Of course, the revival of interest in nuclear forensics is due to increasing alarm and anxiety about the prospect of nuclear terror.
Nuclear forensics involves both the pre-and-post detonation attribution of nuclear materials employed in a nuclear terror plot. Of the two post-detonation nuclear forensics gets the most attention. In so far as nuclear security policy is concerned the key issue revolves around the deterrence of nuclear terrorism; nuclear forensics is taken to be central to the deterrence of nuclear terror.
Post 9/11 much political rhetoric, followed on in academic analysis, tended to advance the view that new terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be deterred because they lie outside of the rationality criteria of traditional deterrence theory. I use the term “theory” here with reluctance, but let's leave that aside (for now). However, a growing body of literature in the nuclear security field saw reason to fault this oft stated claim. Assuming that a successful nuclear attack by a non-state group would involve a state being involved in the causal loop, such analyses opened up the prospect of deterring nuclear terrorism, at least, without relaxing the assumption that al-Qaeda lies outside the bounds of rationality.
The latter part is important for nuclear terrorism is said to be a feature of the new terrorism due to the irrational nature of religious based terrorist groups. In this way, one keeps deterrence without ditching the argument for nuclear terror. It's a neat one-two not commonly discussed by analysts. For more; don't forget the book!
If it is possible to deter a state sponsoring or assisting an al-Qaeda nuclear attack then we can bring deterrence into the nuclear terrorism policy conversation. I personally don't subscribe to the view that al-Qaeda is not instrumentally rational, but that's another story.
The idea behind nuclear forensics, then, is to successfully attribute nuclear materials used in a nuclear terror plot back to its state of origin. If such a capability can be brought into being then this opens up the prospect of deterring the state sponsorship of nuclear terror. If nuclear terror plots require state support to succeed then at least the provision of nuclear materials by states to non-state groups can be deterred.
Stated very crudely; nuclear forensics involves matching nuclear materials seized pre-detonation or nuclear materials detected post-detonation with an extensive database of global nuclear materials. A successful match between field and database nuclear materials leads to successful attribution, whereupon deterrence is said to follow.
Much can be learnt from nuclear forensics work. For example, after North Korea's 2006 nuclear test radionuclide analysis would have given the US intelligence community insight into North Korea's nuclear capabilities. There is an interesting story on how, during the cold war, Hans Bethe brilliantly used nuclear forensic work, on the fly so to speak, to draw a fairly accurate picture of the Soviet Union's version of the “layer cake” bomb, known as “the sloika.” Nuclear forensic work in cases involving terrorism are much more challenging, however, than cold war era forensics.
The National Research Council report states,
...The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline...
In fact, later on in the executive summary, the report finds that these capabilities are in decline. The report states,
...although US nuclear forensics capabilities are substantial and can be improved, right now they are fragile, under resourced, and, in some respects, deteriorating...
Every major US presidential candidate since 9/11 has asserted that nuclear terrorism is the gravest security threat that the US faces. The Obama administration echoed these assertions during this year's nuclear security summit. Indeed, Obama officials even went so far as to state that the threat is serious, real and growing.
So, why is nuclear forensics “under resourced?” Why are US nuclear forensic capabilities, in some respects, “deteriorating?”
Before looking at this issue it would pay to have a look at the Obama administration's policy on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. The Obama policy, which essentially reaffirms Bush era policy, was articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The 2010 NPR states that the US will,
...hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts...
The use of nuclear weapons are not excluded. In addition, contrary to the National Research Council report, the 2010 NPR states
...In addition, the United States and the international community have improving but currently insufficient capabilities to detect, interdict, and defeat efforts to covertly deliver nuclear materials or weapons—and if an attack occurs, to respond to minimize casualties and economic impact as well as to attribute the source of the attack and take strong action...
The above statement encompasses nuclear forensics.
The NPR recognises that nuclear forensics is “currently insufficient”, but nonetheless these capabilities are “improving.” That doesn't square with the National Research Council finding that “in some respects” forensic capabilities are “deteriorating.” Given current trends, furthermore, nuclear forensic capabilities will further “decline.”
The US deterrence posture is robust, but the nuclear forensic capabilities needed to match declaratory policy are not sufficient and might well decline further, a point to which we return.
It is not easy from the above to appreciate just how robust US nuclear deterrence policy is.
It is not just that a deliberate transfer of nuclear materials by a state to a terrorist group is being deterred through the threat of nuclear attack. The Bush-Obama policy adopts what is called a “negligence doctrine.” If a state is negligent in its oversight of nuclear materials, and should a terrorist group acquire nuclear materials due to such negligence, then a nuclear attack upon the negligent state falls within the ambit of the policy.
This is what that seemingly innocuous word, “enables”, in the NPR deterrence policy refers to. In the lexicon of US counter-terrorism policy “enables” has a pretty precise meaning. This meaning encompasses negligence. I will have more discussion of this in my book.
A negligence doctrine is pretty extreme. Such a policy leaves open any state to nuclear attack if the US decides that that state was negligent in its oversight over nuclear materials.
A robust deterrence policy requires a robust nuclear forensics capability. There is a big mismatch, quite clearly, between declaratory policy and forensic capabilities.
Things are actually a little bit more grubby than that. Take say an important op-ed, for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, written up by a group of researchers working for the Fissile Materials Panel Working Group. They observe that the June 2010 G8 Summit did not extend the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction initially agreed to in 2002. The researchers claim that this put global security at risk,
...By not extending the G-8 Global Partnership, which is an effort that is specifically designed to lock down or eliminate weapons and materials of mass destruction that threaten every corner of the globe, the world's leaders opted to put global security at risk ... With the G-8 nations representing 44 percent of global GDP, the financial commitment they needed to make to extend the program is more than affordable, especially in terms of preventing a WMD terrorist attack. In fact, with the U.S. already covering about $1.5 billion of the annual $2 billion pledge, the rest of the G-8 nations would have only been responsible for contributing a half a billion per year collectively--or $ 5 billion over 10 years...
The authors report that they do not know the reasons accounting for this. This particular G8 summit focused on the sovereign debt “crisis.” During the Summit we saw the head of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, trot out the old neoclassical economic arguments on public debt and the crowding out of private investment. The debt crisis is being used the world over in the service of the reassertion of neoliberal ideology.
Maybe this matters more than nuclear security. Just thinking out loud. Consider. If the risk of nuclear terrorism is high, and indeed growing, but the response to that claimed risk trails rhetoric then we might make a couple of hypotheses. Notice that this just nor applies to the non-US member states of the G8. The National Research Council report finds that nuclear forensics is under-resourced.
Maybe, the risk isn't really nearly so high as Obama and the others would have us believe?The mismatch arises because risk is being inflated, perhaps. If so, nuclear terrorism might provide an interesting case study for those interested in the social construction of risk. Perhaps, instead, the risk is real but policy makers have higher short-term priorities, such as the reassertion of neoliberal ideology?
Could there be a mixture involving both of these factors?
Actually the National Research Council report makes some interesting statements about the international relations of nuclear forensics. The report states, accurately, that international collaboration is vital for nuclear forensics to work. It calls for greater international database sharing and linkages, and additionally, calls for the US to develop a policy to facilitate this.
The problem with this is the more robust the US nuclear deterrence posture is the less incentive states have to cooperate on international coordination. Why would a state want to collaborate with the US when deterrence encompasses negligence? US deterrence policy acts as a disincentive for international coordination, but international coordination is essential for nuclear forensics. Without forensics what then remains of deterrence? That's a bit of a nuclear Cartesian circle.
US policy is ill conceived and self defeating. If we must have deterrence then it should be limited to the explicit state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism. The US would not even need to have an explicit deterrence policy to achieve this. Realist international relations theorists argue that deterrence works existentially; “I have the bomb, therefore I deter.” The mere existence of the bomb acts as a deterrent. Elaborate statements of declaratory policy, thereby, are superfluous for the purposes of deterrence.
Under existential deterrence all the US would need, in so far as fissile material transfer goes, is the capability to attribute nuclear materials through nuclear forensics. No explicit statements or policies of deterrence are further required.
I tend to think that there is nothing about nuclear terrorism that undermines traditional, that is basic common sense, conceptions of deterrence. During the cold war the quants at the Rand Corporation needlessly racked their brains over the finer points of deterrence “theory.” It seems as if al-Qaeda is having the same affect today. Really, it shouldn't.
The Turkey-Brazil Deal on Iran’s LEU is not Perfect, But it Can be Turned Into a Circuit Breaker
The previous week was a big one on the Iranian nuclear front, with a one-two punch consisting of an agreement reached between Iran, Turkey and Brazil on the transfer of Iranian lightly enriched uranium for enrichment to 20% U-235 outside of Iran and the circulation of a draft agreement, essentially reached between the P5 members of the Security Council and Germany, on a fourth round of economic sanctions against Iran.
The latter development came a day after the announcement of the Turkey-Brazil deal reached with Iran.
I would like to start with my own “two cents worth”, so to speak, by not focusing on Iran at all. It would be instructive to consider some other developments, most especially those on the North Korean front. South Korea has formerly accused North Korea of torpedoing one of its warships, killing 40 odd of its sailors. The accusation is based on a report drawn up by international experts. The report is highly credible and well argued.
A former US North Korea negotiator, Joel Wit, had also written up a very important op-ed piece at The New York Times on North Korea last week. It is worth reflecting upon. He states,
...In the 16 years I have worked with North Korea, I have made 18 trips there, and I remain convinced that sustained diplomatic engagement is the only way to encourage the North to moderate its threatening behavior. The alternative is far worse: an isolated North Korea that is heading down a path of defiance.
This lesson has been forgotten. When President Obama took office he pledged to engage rogue states in dialogue, but he didn’t follow through with North Korea. Confronted by its provocative nuclear and missile tests, he secured international sanctions, stepped up cooperation with South Korea and Japan and even garnered some support from China, the North’s closest friend. All that made sense as far as it went.
But then American officials neglected to re-engage Pyongyang. Instead of using last summer’s extraordinary meeting between former President Clinton and Kim Jong-il to jump-start dialogue, they lashed themselves to a set of hard and fast preconditions for talks, demanding that Pyongyang pledge to give up its nuclear arsenal and return to multilateral nuclear negotiations. Last December, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth was sent to North Korea to keep communications open, but his visit was wasted as Washington spent months debating about whether to hold another meeting...
The attack on the South Korean warship only reinforces the point that Wit makes. I believe that the same reasoning should also be applied in the case of Iran.
The deal that was drawn up by Turkey and Brazil is hardly ideal. It involves the transfer of 1,200 kg of lightly enriched uranium, 3-5% U-235, (LEU) to Russia following an initial transfer to Turkey for enrichment to 20% U-235 (the highly enriched, HEU, level) and its further fabrication into fuel rods for Iran's medical reactor, which is used for the production of medical radioisotopes (120Kg of U-235). It is in this sense a renewed version of a previous agreement that Iran scuttled, ostensibly on grounds of assurance of supply. For Iran the inclusion of Turkey and Brazil in the terms of the agreement doubtless is seen as a measure that increases Tehran's sense that supply is assured.
Just prior to the successful negotiation of the Turkey-Brazil deal the US, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reportedly demanded that Turkey back-off from concluding a deal. The original accord that Iran backtracked off from was not in fact welcomed by the Obama administration either, we might recall.
The purpose of the original deal from the perspective of interested outside parties was that it constrained Iran's "break out capacity" and thereby was seen as buying time for further negotiations on Iran's nuclear activities.
There are a few issues that now arise given the passage of time. Firstly when the original deal was first hatched the amount of LEU to be transferred constituted two-thirds of Iran's total supply. Now the amount to be transferred constitutes about a half. Originally the transfer deal envisaged that Iran would not enrich uranium to 20% U-235. Enriching uranium to 20% U-235 increases break-out capacity, because enriching to weapons grade level, i.e. 90% U-235 and above, becomes much easier. Although since the last IAEA safeguards report on Iran was released reports continue to indicate that Iran's enrichment program appears to have met technical difficulties. In the wake of the Turkey-Brazil deal this latter aspect has not been emphasised. This is important because so far as we are aware Iran's stock of UF6 gas, the feedstock for gas centrifuges, is contaminated with molybdenum. Such impurities impose technical hurdles for enrichment to weapons grade that Iran probably cannot yet overcome, this is especially so given the reports on the current state of enrichment activities in Iran.
Although Iran would now retain 50% of its current stock of LEU, rather than a 1/3 as previously, under the terms of the Turkey-Brazil deal we should be mindful that the remaining amount would be sufficient, theoretically, to build one bomb. Given the technical difficulties in enrichment to weapons grade, in addition to Iran's current enrichment status and the matter of impurities, this imposes very tight constraints for a theoretical Iranian break out. Furthermore even if successful that theoretical bomb could not be tested, for the test would require using up all the subsequently produced fissile material. Given Iran's missile capabilities the only conceivable target for that one bomb, of uncertain reliability, would be Israel. One bomb would not destroy Israel, but any Israeli and/or US response would be curtains for Iran. That's an important strategic asymmetry to consider. I don't believe that concerns about "break out" constitute sufficient reason to reject the terms of this arrangement outright.
To be certain the Turkey-Brazil deal does not preclude Iran enriching to 20% U-235. Some statements from Iranian officials, initially carried by the Xinhua news agency, suggested that Iran would enrich to 20% U-235 regardless. Other subsequent statements suggest otherwise. Regardless of this, it remains the case that under the Turkey-Brazil deal further enrichment is left to the discretion of Iran. Critics of the deal in the US are correct in pointing out that this is a significant downside to the agreement, but we should be mindful of the above points on "break out."
President Obama has asserted that nuclear terrorism is the leading security threat to the US homeland. Many supporters of strong action against Iran point to the possible transfer of fissile materials by Iran to terrorist groups. I do not know how much knowledge the US has of Iran's nuclear materials. The IAEA regularly conducts inspections, although how closely the Agency guards its information in house is anyone's guess.
Presumably transferring Iranian nuclear materials to Russia for enrichment would enable the thorough analysis of Iranian nuclear material and Iranian industrial processes therein. This could be highly useful for US nuclear scientists working on nuclear forensics, which would probably lead to any future terrorist devices using Iranian origin fissile material being positively attributed to Iran following a terrorist attack. Following this potential transfer of UF6 enriched to 3-5% U-235 to Russia, and if the above analysis should be correct, Iran would be deterred from direct support for nuclear terrorism that involves transfer of fissile material.
This angle has not been adequately addressed in commentary. One would feel that any development that would make deterrence so robust would be welcomed, given the emphasis put on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Perhaps we ought to conclude that despite the rhetoric nuclear terrorism is not really a policy priority in Washington.
It should be stressed that the above analysis rests on "break out" scenarios that have been oversold. Break out, as this blog has argued, is not the real issue with respect to Iran. The real issue is the possibility of, and potential for, a parallel military fuel cycle. The Turkey-Brazil deal does not address this issue at all.
It is clear that Iran seeks to avoid a further round of sanctions without suspending its enrichment activities. Many analysts have, rightly, focused on this aspect. However, we cannot also neglect the internal political dynamics. The announcement of the Turkey-Brazil deal came a day before the announcement of the draft sanctions resolution. One of the main criticisms of the liberal opposition to the hard-line leadership in Tehran is that it has pursued irrational external policies to the detriment of Iran's interests. If the Turkey-Brazil deal is rejected, and a further round of UN sanctions are enacted, then the hard-liners will use this against the liberal opposition, further cementing their grip on power. The hard-liners will argue that they sought to lower tensions by offering concessions, all to no avail. This would be used to blunt the main line of attack previously used by the liberal opposition.
I believe that we need to be mindful of the North Korean case. I suggest, along with the brilliant realist analyst Stephen Walt, that the Turkey-Iran deal be accepted with a view to engaging Iran on nuclear diplomacy. Mindful of the higher value to be attached to a parallel fuel cycle, rather than a theoretical break out capability or enrichment at Natanz, this diplomacy should be focused on getting Iran to adhere to the additional protocol as a matter of the highest priority.
The adoption of the additional protocol will enable the IAEA to learn more about Iran's entire nuclear activities. This will require taking the threat of force, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, off the table. So long as the threat of force remains, a very real one given reports that Washington would like to transfer the Massive Ordnance Penetrator to Diego Garcia, Iran has zero incentive to adopt the additional protocol.
I do not know how successful diplomacy with Iran would be. I suspect that Washington's position would be to have Iran blunt the political power of Moqtada al Sadr in Iraq, for Iran to disarm Hezbollah and to support the US position on the peace process which is based on a rejection of Palestinian national rights and thus the wishes of the international community (the real one that is). In other words, Washington would demand of Iran that it acquiesce to US plans for the region and the fact of US hegemony therein; a return to something like the regional pillar of order under the Nixon doctrine. Iran would like to limit diplomacy to its nuclear activities and the dismantlement of all multilateral and bilateral sanctions.
The best quote, funny enough, that I saw all last week came from Henry Kissinger. He stated that the Obama administration appeared to be pursuing sanctions "as an end in themselves." He has a point. Although Obama during the campaign stressed that he would open up diplomacy with Iran what has happened is pretty much similar to what Wit describes with respect to North Korea. I believe that the perceived success of the surge in Iraq played a very important role in this reversal. Though the political success of Moqtada al Sadr in Iraq must be concentrating the mind in Washington nowadays. The fallout following the disputed elections in Iran probably has Washington viewing the regime in Iran as being susceptible to a graduated "squeezing" policy that could lead to regime change. Sanctions on Iran would be pursued in the context of such a strategy, not because of Iran's nuclear activities. I believe Kissinger's comments should be seen in that context. This, again, immediately brings to mind North Korea.
The proposed sanctions are interesting enough. They contain a pretty serious arms embargo. This matters. Iran's ability to conduct large-scale military operations will erode over time if these sanctions are adopted. It will weaken Iran's ability meet any US military action against it. Prior to the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq military sanctions played an important role in degrading the military capabilities of these two states, this is especially the case in regard to maintenance and spare parts. For instance I recall watching a documentary on the 1999 bombing, produced by Serb TV, which made the point that the Yugoslav air force's fleet of MIG29's were required to undergo general maintenance years before the outset of the war. The first designated MIG 29 to take-off could not do so for it lost contact with ground control whilst still on the runway!
The draft sanctions resolution calls for the banning of sales to Iran of main battle tanks, heavy artillery and so on and their associated spare parts. Media attention has focused on whether these provisions also include the sale of S300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran. That's appropriate, but don't forget the rest. Consider this. Iran's military planners will know that if the draft UN resolution is adopted then Tehran's conventional strategic capabilities will erode over time . Given that it appears that Tehran and Washington are on a collision course, it follows that the salience of nuclear deterrence for Iran can only grow as Tehran's conventional capacity declines.
That's a curious feature of last week's developments rarely discussed.
Some of the potential nasties, such as energy sector sanctions, were alluded to in the draft's preamble. I ask; is this Russia's response to Obama putting BMD in the preamble of New Start, in violation of the Obama-Medvedev Memorandum of Understanding?
Various reports focused on two aspects of the draft text in particular; the first is the potential boarding of cargo ships to and from Iran and potential financial sanctions. The draft text does not specifically mandate multilateral measures on these two fronts, but they are seen as providing a cover for further action on these fronts unilaterally by member states. Do not under estimate the power and possible consequences of such actions. Aggressive boarding of North Korean cargo surely has played a role in increasing Pyongyang's belligerency at sea. Furthermore, the emplacement of unilateral financial sanctions on North Korea by the United States right after a key agreement was reached in six party talks played a crucial role in North Korea's overt adoption of nuclear deterrence.
If the US acts upon this resolution expect trouble ahead in the Persian Gulf. Iran might play spoiler by harassing shipping through the Straits of Hormuz which could hit world oil prices. This would come at a crucial time in the fragile economic recovery. Nouriel Roubini has argued that high oil prices played an important role in pricking the US housing bubble. Authorities in China are concerned that they now have an asset price bubble on their hands, and the last thing they need is imported inflation. Serious conflict could tip a finely balanced global economy into a double dip recession.
One annoying aspect to last week developments was the endless mantra about "the international community." The P5+1 (Germany) do not constitute "the international community." Brazil is probably the most highly regarded state in the G77, the non-aligned states, and that probably is an indication of the prospects that the draft sanctions resolution would have if sent to the General Assembly.
So the bottom line is; the Turkey-Brazil deal is hardly ideal, it doesn't even address the real issues, but nonetheless it does constrict Iran's ability to break out to a militarily useful nuclear capability (i.e. more than just one bomb) and would be better if it included an express provision precluding any enrichment in Iran to 20% U-235. The main value of the deal is that it could be made to act as a circuit breaker, lowering tensions and opening up the prospect for further talks on Iran's nuclear program especially on adoption of an additional protocol.
I myself believe that we are on a collision course. As I have stated previously, things going a tad pear shaped in Iraq, a potential third intifada in Palestine, the offensives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with an escalation in the Iran crisis are very,very serious strategic developments. We stand on the cusp of a major crisis in the Middle East; the US faces the prospect of a regional insurgency that must have al Qaeda planners licking their lips in anticipation.
There is still time to reverse course on Iran.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the Scope of Deterrence
One of the things that I was hoping to see in the 2010 nuclear posture review was a discussion of tailored deterrence and dissuasion. Both were very important aspects to the Bush approach to nuclear strategy and need to be considered when thinking about the scope of deterrence.
This applies especially to tailored deterrence. For example see how tailored deterrence is interweaved into the narrative of the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review
...Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries...
This citation is significant because it shows two things; (1) how tailored deterrence, which is what the last sentence is about, influenced the way in which the Bush administration viewed the scope of deterrence and (2) the role that tailored deterrence played in the RNEP, ACI and finally RRW and Complex Transformation.
We associate an expansion in the scope of deterrence with the Bush administration because of tailored deterrence. That was the key concept that opened the flood gates, so to speak. Those who adhere to tailored deterrence think that deterrence is “hard” so it needs to be tailored to various adversaries and contingencies. Realists think that deterrence is easy. That's why tailored deterrence sits very neatly within constructivist theories of international relations.
The Obama 2010 nuclear posture review doesn't even discuss the concept. It is in the 2010 QDR, however. So I can only infer that tailored deterrence continues to obtain. Others like to grade the NPR with respect to transparency.
Completely keeping us in the dark about the fate of a central strategic doctrine that was introduced by the previous administration is pretty poor transparency.
See if you can find any arms control analyst that looks at that when speaking of the 2010 NPR's transparency. Don't bother wasting your time.
Now the 2010 NPR has a chapter on “strengthening regional deterrence”, which is mostly about extended deterrence. I thought maybe there would be something here. Alas the chapter is pretty bland. The 2010 QDR actually had a more useful line on regional deterrence
...To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely with them on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent...
My guess is that we will hear more about tailored deterrence in future. One way this might happen is in the context of stockpile stewardship. You can see that RRW was all about tailored deterrence from the above Bush era quote, which nobody in the RRW debate cites from, so as the debate on stockpile stewardship picks up we will tend to learn more about tailored deterrence I think.
In the absence of doctrinal clarity a good analytical strategy is to infer doctrine from capabilities.
The big thing in so far as the scope of deterrence goes, in most commentary, is not tailored deterrence at all but rather negative security assurances. Maybe I'm missing a brain cell or few, but tailored deterrence matters more.
The 2010 nuclear posture review offered up the following NSA
...the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat...
This is how the NSA previously read
...The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state...
Despite this NSA it is widely viewed that the US did in fact include chemical and biological weapons within the scope of deterrence. It is often stated that this was enabled by this NSA, given its commonly ascribed ambiguous nature. But notice that it isn't all that ambiguous. The old NSA states that the US will not use nuclear weapons against a non nuclear weapon state party to the NPT unless such a state carries out an attack, it need not be nuclear, against the US, its forces or allies if that attack is carried out in association with a nuclear weapon state.
Don't be fooled by commentary on this topic. The old NSA is stronger than the 2010 assurance. This is because the new assurance speaks of a non-nuclear weapon state in good standing with the NPT. Good standing is not defined so could include safeguards violations, but it need not be so formal. Good standing is ambiguous. The new assurance does explicitly mention the case of chemical and biological weapons, but we need to consider the above caveat and the one that appears in the last paragraph of the new assurance.
The old NSA had no ambiguity and no caveat, other than the allied attack caveat, yet the US still expanded the scope of deterrence regardless. In a realist world the unipolar strategic power will do what it feels it must when it feels it must, period. Assurances like this carry little weight in international relations, as the realist scholar Stephen Walt has pointed out. What is given can be taken away.
One way in which the unipolar power could be better constrained would be through a binding NSA, but that is very much off the agenda.
Now readers of this blog will know that I have always felt that a lot of what Obama is doing on the nuclear front are political moves to get multilateral agreement for non-proliferation reforms favourable to the US.
Even Iran is calling for strengthening the NPT, but most of Iran's proposals are not on compliance. They are directed toward formalising the NPT's disarmament provision. That suits Iran. The US is doing the same, only, naturally, US proposals focus on compliance.
Both parties are not interested in enhancing the NPT as such. Again, the realist world intrudes.
But let's get back on point. You will see that my long standing and very much lone view is actually affirmed in the very text that I have cited. I of course refer to this bit just in case you missed it
...persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime...
Recall my point about the US and Iran above. The NSA is offered up in order to garner changes to the NPT favourable to the US and in a way that does not really constrain the US strategically. It is like Iran calling for movement on the disarmament provision, but rejecting efforts to constrain a states ability under the NPT to be a latent nuclear state in the meantime.
The NSA is part and parcel of that campaign. If the campaign fails, then forget about the NSA. This can be taken to be an unspoken corollary. Again, the realist world.
It is at the this point that we should make a few points about strategic nuclear targeting, even though I would like to treat this on its own in a subsequent blog post. Consider the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review again
...In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected...
...North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have long standing hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs...
These are the states that figured, including Russia and China of course, in US nuclear strike planning during the Bush administration until Saddam was ousted and Gaddafi changed tack.
That makes North Korea, Iran, Syria , Russia and China as being Bush era nuclear strike targets. Notice that all of these are not covered by the NSA, but Iran and Syria should not have been so targeted according to the old one. They are both party to the NPT and are not allies with a nuclear weapon state.
Because the above 5 states are not covered by the new NSA that means the new NSA doesn't really impact US nuclear war planning a jot. The NSA is an interesting twist in declaratory policy, but the active policy, i.e. war plans and attack options, are not affected by this NSA. Perhaps Walt's use of “nuclear public relations” to describe the NPR is accurate.
The manner in which these states are targeted hasn't been changed by the 2010 NPR either. You can see this when you take on board the following citation from the text
...Detailed NPR analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, conducted in spring 2009, concluded that the United States could sustain stable deterrence with significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming parallel Russian reductions. The NPR analysis considered several specific levels of nuclear weapons, all below current levels of approximately 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Its conclusions, approved by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, formed the basis for U.S. negotiations with Russia on New START. Because New START is intended to be only an initial step in a continuing process of bilateral nuclear reductions, this initial analysis used conservative assumptions to determine acceptable reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons...
In other words the 1550 New Start number is consistent with NSPD-14, the Presidential Guidance that the administration inherited from the Bush era. States not covered by the NSA, which just so happens to be those states that figured in previous planning, will be targeted in the manner in which they were targeted by Bush. Absent further arms control accords, which is not likely (more on that later), this is locked in. That means no change to active policy.
The 2010 nuclear posture review reaffirms one noteworthy Bush era expansion in the scope of deterrence. I speak of the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction terrorism. The NPR states,
...Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts...
“Enables” is a direct reference to the so-called negligence doctrine. That is what “enables” means in the lexicon of US counterterrorism policy. To appreciate this you need only consider Paul Pillar's, a former senior counterterrorism official, book on the topic and the book by Daniel Byman on state sponsorship of terrorism. You can also throw in the mix the 2010 QDR
...Improving our ability to attribute nuclear threats to their source can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter state and non-state actors that may provide direct or indirect support of nuclear terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker...
Notice the NPR emphasis on "any state". That is a further caveat to the NSA.
When it comes to the scope of deterrence nothing much, so far as I am concerned, has really changed. You might want to argue that the Obama administration has made the right statements about the low likelihood that the US would really use nuclear weapons and the role of conventional capabilities in lowering the role of nuclear weapons in US defence policy, but that isn't really that much of a big change either.
So the Bush NPR stated, to quote from the excerpts
...U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes.” A “new mix” of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities “is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades...
The 2010 NPR statements are on the same wavelength.
It is not accurate to state that the 2010 nuclear posture review has instituted “sweeping” changes to the scope of nuclear deterrence.
2010 Nuclear Posture Review Construct
The following post will be of a type that once was routine for this blog. I hope to return to posts like this soon.
I would now like to make more substantive and considered posts on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. I have decided that I will not have one large post that covers all bases. Rather, I will have a series of discrete posts each focusing on a particular topic.
I should first start with the overall construct. The administration is to be commended for adopting a capacious conception of nuclear security. If this NPR will truly end up being some sort of nuclear policy pivot or inflection point it will be more for developing a capacious view of nuclear security and less for how this was done specifically.
This is at odds with the armscontrolwonk's view that this NPR might well be seen as the NPR that put proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the centre of nuclear security from here on.
The way in which the Obama administration has constructed nuclear security is not so good. The way in which this was done was by putting a clear emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism. The conception of nuclear security presented, of course, goes beyond just proliferation and terrorism.
It includes developing strategic stability with respect to Russia and China , it includes assurance of allies, it includes deterring regional adversaries, and it includes stockpile stewardship. These are all topics for other posts.
Then of course we have “the vision”. This I will leave for the very last post.
Let us concentrate on the main topic of non-proliferation and terrorism. This is what the NPR has to say on this
...The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon...
I'm at a pretty advanced stage on my book on nuclear terrorism, so I suppose more people will read it following the NPR. There is a lot in the above that can be questioned, and will be in my book. So I will put a lot of that aside for now, except for one point. Notice the emphasis on the greater risk of nuclear attack by way of terrorism. At another place in the text the threat is described as being “extreme”. This could be interpreted as being either extreme because of the consequences or extreme because of its relatively high probability. I think the latter view is the one promoted.
During the cold war the probability of nuclear war was always more a function of accidental nuclear launch rather than a bolt out of the blue first strike. This was especially the case during superpower crises. I agree with Bruce Blair on this topic. The technical basis for accidental nuclear war remains. The end of the cold war did take away the crisis context, but even that has emerged to some extent due to NATO expansion. Russia started to really reconsider its nuclear doctrine following NATO expansion and the 1999 expansion in NATO's mission.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is inflated. I don't accept the construct of any nuclear security document that inflates the risk of nuclear terrorism. It leads me to question; just what is going on here? To which we return.
Immediately below this statement the NPR then states
...Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community –may acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through
diplomatic means the crises they have created...
There are two points to emphasise here. Firstly non-proliferation is indeed elevated in the more capacious conception of nuclear security. That, in itself, should be a good thing and is something that should be supported by all interested in greater nuclear security.
However, notice the emphasis on “especially those at odds with the United States.” The US opposes proliferation because of its deterrent effect upon the United States. In the 2010 QDR the Obama administration reaffirmed that it would employ, if necessary, military firepower unilaterally to secure Washington's “vital interests.” The US is not opposed to proliferation in principle. This remains so.
Consider. Just recently India signed off with the US a plutonium reprocessing deal made possible by the relaxation of Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines which Obama, obviously, full supports. In response it is reported that China is close to making a similar deal with Pakistan, following a recent reactor deal between the two states. This both weakens the non-proliferation regime and will help to fuel a nuclear arms race in the very region currently cited as being of central concern with respect to nuclear terrorism.
So much then for the construct.
The other part of this quote is simply outrageous. There is no way that anybody can say that the current Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises are solely the creation of Iran and North Korea. The purpose here is to support, and to gather multilateral support, for a further “get tough” policy on both Iran and North Korea, but especially Iran.
If proliferation were a priority then the administration would pursue meaningful bilateral talks with both states. But policy here is motivated by other concerns. Both North Korea and Iran have reacted harshly to the NPR, with the North threatening to “strengthen” its “deterrent.” The immediate effect on non-proliferation is not all together positive in these two crucial cases of immediate proliferation concern.
So, you see, proliferation and terrorism is not that a high priority.
Given that, what is the construct of the NPR? Here it might do to go back to Stephen Walt and his usage of the phrase “nuclear public relations” to designate the NPR. I think this is a good characterisation of the construct. The NPR text appears meaty and detailed, but shorn of the executive summary and a lot of the campaign like rhetoric there is actually not a lot of detail in the declassified text. This I do not mean to come across as a joke. The tone and feel of the NPR really does come across as a campaign manifesto.
The reason for that should be obvious. It is a campaign manifesto. What is the campaign? Washington seeks to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in ways which are conducive for state policy, using nuclear terrorism and rogue states as a pretext. As the NPR text makes clear a big objective for the US in the near term, especially at the upcoming NPT Rev Con, is to develop non-proliferation regime compliance measures, make it harder to withdraw from the NPT and to multilateralise the nuclear fuel cycle in ways which preserves selective monopolisation of the fuel cycle, rather than to truly internationalise it. It also means putting in place a fissile material cutoff treaty that preserves Russia and America's fissile material overhang.
In fact this is, in a round about way, conceded in the NPR text. The citation to follow also tells us a lot about the New Start treaty.
...By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons – and thereby demonstrating that we are meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear
disarmament – we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT
partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the nonproliferation
regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide against theft or seizure by terrorist groups...
Consider the following quote from Hillary Clinton after the signing of New Start
...By ratifying this treaty, the United States won’t give up anything of strategic importance. But in return, we will receive significant, tangible benefits...
That's the idea. The US is currently engaged in a campaign to secure multilateral reforms to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in ways which are favourable to the pursuit of state policy. This is done in a way that will not limit US strategic prerogatives. That's a strategy of retaining US freedom of action , but securing multilateral constraints for others. So it is that the NPR reads like a campaign document. It is a central part of this two-pronged plan.
Dear reader, that is the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review's construct.
I would put a capacious conception of nuclear security at the centre of things as well. However, I would put promoting strategic stability with Russia and China as the highest priority. This I would do first and foremost by de-alerting strategic nuclear forces, working to end mutual launch on warning together with Moscow, and adopting a policy of minimum deterrence.
This is more important than nuclear terrorism.
What says the NPR?
Well, we have
...The NPR concluded that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces – with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present...
De-alerting is ruled out. There was a point made that de-alerting would actually promote strategic instability, which is simply not credible. This is stated thus
...The NPR considered the possibility of reducing alert rates for ICBMs and at-sea
rates of SSBNs, and concluded that such steps could reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack before “re-alerting” was complete. At the same time, the NPR concluded that returning heavy bombers to full-time nuclear alert was not necessary, assuming the other two Triad legs retained a significant alert rate...
The US has an assured second strike capability because it has the ability to deliver a return blow to any first strike irrespective of alert levels. Russia knows this. Maintaining alert levels is related to retaining the ability to launch a pre-emptive counterforce attack.
Notice also that the NPR openly concedes that the US and Russia retain nuclear forces that go beyond deterrence. That I take to be a tacit admission that for deterrence you don't really need to go beyond minimum deterrence.
There were comments made about increasing presidential warning time through command and control reforms. This I will leave aside for now, but claims made here do not necessarily follow. I will speak more of this in a post on strategic war planning and nuclear targeting.
The construct is not what it seems. In fact, for nuclear security, top of the agenda should be de-alerting and strategic stability.
More to follow in due course.
New Start Treaty Text Released. Obama’s Emerging Nuclear Security Agenda.
The New Start Treaty text, including the protocol (an integral part of the text) has been released following the formal treaty signing in Prague. I think my previous theory that both New Start and the Nuclear Posture Review were tracking each other was correct, given that they both became public at just about the same time.
The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has delivered a speech on nuclear policy. It has an interesting little statement that, in my opinion, tells us heaps
...By ratifying this treaty, the United States won’t give up anything of strategic importance. But in return, we will receive significant, tangible benefits...
That's a quote worth filing away for further use. The administration seeks to strengthen the NPT regime in ways it likes without giving up "anything of strategic importance".
Notice in the speech that she claims that a 10 kiloton terrorist nuclear weapon detonated in Times Square could kill a million people.
The interesting thing about the emerging nuclear security construct of the administration is that it, at least to me, is based on two key pillars
(1) That there is a link between nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This is pretty much the standard view presented in the academic literature too. Is this really true though? Is there a logical link between the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst states and nuclear terrorism?
(2) The dominance of locking down fissile materials. The Obama administration very much is dominated by the "supply side" approach to mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Locking down fissile materials is important, no doubt, but the proper response is a systemic layered response. Focusing on fissile materials might make us miss the bigger picture.
Just two quick things. Notice that both pillars ignore what we might call demand side factors. Consider the first. If Iran gets the bomb then a key driver would be the deterrence of the US. For North Korea this was a major consideration. If you want to stop nuclear proliferation then why not a conventional negative security assurance? That's off the agenda. Why? Because Washington reserves the right to project power to secure its "vital interests". Even unilaterally, as reaffirmed in the 2010 QDR.
What happened to that million in Times Square?
Some things have a higher priority. Or perhaps the threat is not so stark.
In fact Obama's nuclear security agenda is still dominated by what has been the dominant nuclear policy consideration since the end of World War Two. Namely, providing a shield for the employment of conventional firepower.
To do that now requires retooling nuclear security policy toward proliferation and terrorism. Bush did this too, but without the same emphasis on multilateral regimes. Team Bush wanted the same policies, i.e. formal compliance provisions and tougher withdrawal mechanisms but never had a hope of getting this up multilaterally. Nuclear proliferation is opposed because of the affect that it has for power projection. Notice also that even here the regime can be weakened, i.e. India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, when it is judged to be of interest. It is reported that China is close to developing a similar deal with Pakistan in response.
So much then for the link between nuclear proliferation and terrorism as presented in the NPR.
The dominant consideration is invariant. The strategic circumstances are variable.
The closer one is to D.C. the more one is blinded by "the vision". Because I'm near the South Pole all is clear.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.