The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the Scope of Deterrence
One of the things that I was hoping to see in the 2010 nuclear posture review was a discussion of tailored deterrence and dissuasion. Both were very important aspects to the Bush approach to nuclear strategy and need to be considered when thinking about the scope of deterrence.
This applies especially to tailored deterrence. For example see how tailored deterrence is interweaved into the narrative of the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review
...Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries...
This citation is significant because it shows two things; (1) how tailored deterrence, which is what the last sentence is about, influenced the way in which the Bush administration viewed the scope of deterrence and (2) the role that tailored deterrence played in the RNEP, ACI and finally RRW and Complex Transformation.
We associate an expansion in the scope of deterrence with the Bush administration because of tailored deterrence. That was the key concept that opened the flood gates, so to speak. Those who adhere to tailored deterrence think that deterrence is “hard” so it needs to be tailored to various adversaries and contingencies. Realists think that deterrence is easy. That's why tailored deterrence sits very neatly within constructivist theories of international relations.
The Obama 2010 nuclear posture review doesn't even discuss the concept. It is in the 2010 QDR, however. So I can only infer that tailored deterrence continues to obtain. Others like to grade the NPR with respect to transparency.
Completely keeping us in the dark about the fate of a central strategic doctrine that was introduced by the previous administration is pretty poor transparency.
See if you can find any arms control analyst that looks at that when speaking of the 2010 NPR's transparency. Don't bother wasting your time.
Now the 2010 NPR has a chapter on “strengthening regional deterrence”, which is mostly about extended deterrence. I thought maybe there would be something here. Alas the chapter is pretty bland. The 2010 QDR actually had a more useful line on regional deterrence
...To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely with them on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent...
My guess is that we will hear more about tailored deterrence in future. One way this might happen is in the context of stockpile stewardship. You can see that RRW was all about tailored deterrence from the above Bush era quote, which nobody in the RRW debate cites from, so as the debate on stockpile stewardship picks up we will tend to learn more about tailored deterrence I think.
In the absence of doctrinal clarity a good analytical strategy is to infer doctrine from capabilities.
The big thing in so far as the scope of deterrence goes, in most commentary, is not tailored deterrence at all but rather negative security assurances. Maybe I'm missing a brain cell or few, but tailored deterrence matters more.
The 2010 nuclear posture review offered up the following NSA
...the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat...
This is how the NSA previously read
...The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state...
Despite this NSA it is widely viewed that the US did in fact include chemical and biological weapons within the scope of deterrence. It is often stated that this was enabled by this NSA, given its commonly ascribed ambiguous nature. But notice that it isn't all that ambiguous. The old NSA states that the US will not use nuclear weapons against a non nuclear weapon state party to the NPT unless such a state carries out an attack, it need not be nuclear, against the US, its forces or allies if that attack is carried out in association with a nuclear weapon state.
Don't be fooled by commentary on this topic. The old NSA is stronger than the 2010 assurance. This is because the new assurance speaks of a non-nuclear weapon state in good standing with the NPT. Good standing is not defined so could include safeguards violations, but it need not be so formal. Good standing is ambiguous. The new assurance does explicitly mention the case of chemical and biological weapons, but we need to consider the above caveat and the one that appears in the last paragraph of the new assurance.
The old NSA had no ambiguity and no caveat, other than the allied attack caveat, yet the US still expanded the scope of deterrence regardless. In a realist world the unipolar strategic power will do what it feels it must when it feels it must, period. Assurances like this carry little weight in international relations, as the realist scholar Stephen Walt has pointed out. What is given can be taken away.
One way in which the unipolar power could be better constrained would be through a binding NSA, but that is very much off the agenda.
Now readers of this blog will know that I have always felt that a lot of what Obama is doing on the nuclear front are political moves to get multilateral agreement for non-proliferation reforms favourable to the US.
Even Iran is calling for strengthening the NPT, but most of Iran's proposals are not on compliance. They are directed toward formalising the NPT's disarmament provision. That suits Iran. The US is doing the same, only, naturally, US proposals focus on compliance.
Both parties are not interested in enhancing the NPT as such. Again, the realist world intrudes.
But let's get back on point. You will see that my long standing and very much lone view is actually affirmed in the very text that I have cited. I of course refer to this bit just in case you missed it
...persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime...
Recall my point about the US and Iran above. The NSA is offered up in order to garner changes to the NPT favourable to the US and in a way that does not really constrain the US strategically. It is like Iran calling for movement on the disarmament provision, but rejecting efforts to constrain a states ability under the NPT to be a latent nuclear state in the meantime.
The NSA is part and parcel of that campaign. If the campaign fails, then forget about the NSA. This can be taken to be an unspoken corollary. Again, the realist world.
It is at the this point that we should make a few points about strategic nuclear targeting, even though I would like to treat this on its own in a subsequent blog post. Consider the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review again
...In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected...
...North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have long standing hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs...
These are the states that figured, including Russia and China of course, in US nuclear strike planning during the Bush administration until Saddam was ousted and Gaddafi changed tack.
That makes North Korea, Iran, Syria , Russia and China as being Bush era nuclear strike targets. Notice that all of these are not covered by the NSA, but Iran and Syria should not have been so targeted according to the old one. They are both party to the NPT and are not allies with a nuclear weapon state.
Because the above 5 states are not covered by the new NSA that means the new NSA doesn't really impact US nuclear war planning a jot. The NSA is an interesting twist in declaratory policy, but the active policy, i.e. war plans and attack options, are not affected by this NSA. Perhaps Walt's use of “nuclear public relations” to describe the NPR is accurate.
The manner in which these states are targeted hasn't been changed by the 2010 NPR either. You can see this when you take on board the following citation from the text
...Detailed NPR analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, conducted in spring 2009, concluded that the United States could sustain stable deterrence with significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming parallel Russian reductions. The NPR analysis considered several specific levels of nuclear weapons, all below current levels of approximately 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Its conclusions, approved by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, formed the basis for U.S. negotiations with Russia on New START. Because New START is intended to be only an initial step in a continuing process of bilateral nuclear reductions, this initial analysis used conservative assumptions to determine acceptable reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons...
In other words the 1550 New Start number is consistent with NSPD-14, the Presidential Guidance that the administration inherited from the Bush era. States not covered by the NSA, which just so happens to be those states that figured in previous planning, will be targeted in the manner in which they were targeted by Bush. Absent further arms control accords, which is not likely (more on that later), this is locked in. That means no change to active policy.
The 2010 nuclear posture review reaffirms one noteworthy Bush era expansion in the scope of deterrence. I speak of the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction terrorism. The NPR states,
...Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts...
“Enables” is a direct reference to the so-called negligence doctrine. That is what “enables” means in the lexicon of US counterterrorism policy. To appreciate this you need only consider Paul Pillar's, a former senior counterterrorism official, book on the topic and the book by Daniel Byman on state sponsorship of terrorism. You can also throw in the mix the 2010 QDR
...Improving our ability to attribute nuclear threats to their source can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter state and non-state actors that may provide direct or indirect support of nuclear terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker...
Notice the NPR emphasis on "any state". That is a further caveat to the NSA.
When it comes to the scope of deterrence nothing much, so far as I am concerned, has really changed. You might want to argue that the Obama administration has made the right statements about the low likelihood that the US would really use nuclear weapons and the role of conventional capabilities in lowering the role of nuclear weapons in US defence policy, but that isn't really that much of a big change either.
So the Bush NPR stated, to quote from the excerpts
...U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes.” A “new mix” of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities “is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades...
The 2010 NPR statements are on the same wavelength.
It is not accurate to state that the 2010 nuclear posture review has instituted “sweeping” changes to the scope of nuclear deterrence.
Does Defending Earth From Near Earth Objects Require Thermonuclear Weapons?
A previous blog post was devoted to nuclear weapons as a means for neutralising threatening Near Earth Objects.
Interesting research on this question, reported by New Scientist, sheds some light on the issue.
...If a sizeable asteroid is found heading towards Earth, one option is to nuke it. But too small a bomb would cause the fragments to fly apart only slowly, allowing them to clump together under their mutual gravity. Simulations now show this can happen in an alarmingly short time...
Furthermore,
...Don Korycansky of the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Catherine Plesko of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico simulated blowing up asteroids 1 kilometre across. When the speed of dispersal was relatively low, it took only hours for the fragments to coalesce into a new rock...
However,
...Reassuringly, a 2009 study led by David Dearborn of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California showed that a 900-kiloton nuclear device – which is within our capability – would permanently disperse a 1-kilometre asteroid...
The super oralloy bomb, the lead designer of which was Ted Taylor, is the highest yielding fission bomb developed. It had a yield of 500Kt.
It would seem that, should we seek to retain some form of nuclear explosive capability in order to meet the NEO threat, we must retain the capability to develop thermonuclear explosive devices.
Thought I might add that part to the story. True this applies to when the speed of dispersal is low, but all bases, given the mission, must be covered.
See, the US nuclear weapons labs do get up to some really interesting stuff.
One day they may even save humanity.
When is a New Nuclear Weapon, Like, Really New?
Hans Kristensen has a pretty important post up at the FAS Strategic Security blog, dealing with Obama's old "no new nuclear weapons" pledge. His post suggests that Obama might be adopting a Reliable Replacement Warhead type program
...the Air Force nuclear weapons support program includes “Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Studies & Analysis” in both 2010 and 2011...
This refers to just study and analysis, but its funded at any rate. Its not exactly consistent with the pledge, Kristensen is surely correct in pointing this out.
Kristensen also makes some points about the follow up to the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
...Another apparent contradictions with the administration’s no new nuclear weapons pledge is a new nuclear cruise missile to replace the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) that expires in 2030. The new weapon is known as the Enhanced Cruise Missile (ECM), and development of nuclear weapons requirements documents are planned for 2010 and 2011, along with a Phase 6.2 Study, also known as a Feasibility Study and Option Down Select study.......
He goes on,
...One question is whether the new cruise missile will use a modified version of the existing W80-1 warhead currently deployed on the ALCM for B-52 delivery, or require development of a new warhead...
...The remaining W80-1 warheads are scheduled to receive new neutron generators in 2015-2017, but a refurbishment of the nuclear explosive package is not planned until 2036-2039, according to the NNSA’s FY09 refurbishment planning schedule (no schedule exists yet for FY2010 or FY2011). No life-extension is planned for the W80-0, which will be retired...
This then leads Kristensen to ask,
...Does a new “weapon” refer to the warhead on the missile or the delivery vehicle itself or both? And how new must a weapon be to be considered “new” – does it require an entirely new design or can a modified design be considered a “new” weapon?...
The above all constitute, in my opinion, good points. For what it is worth here is what I think. If the Enhanced Cruise Missile, even with a very moderately refurbished W80-1 warhead, enhances the range of military options available to STRATCOM planners and any such enhancement is reflected in the US nuclear war plan/s then, yes, we are talking about a "new" nuclear weapon. The reason why people are concerned about "new" nuclear weapons is not because the weapons themselves are "new" but that new weapons would expand the military options for strategic planners
That's the rub. A new weapon that bounces the rubble in downtown Moscow is something, really, nobody should give too much a shit about. It would be a new weapon for an old mission. A new weapon, say that is supposed to have an agent defeat capability, is more of concern because it codifies, at the level of concrete capability, expanding mission sets for nuclear weapons.
The very term "enhanced" in the Enhanced Cruise Missile concept naturally arouses the curious.
The RRW debate in the US must focus on the nexus between missions and capabilities.
Obama’s 2010 QDR and BMD Review Reports Released.
Both the QDR Report and the BMD Review Report have been released. I cannot say much more about them until I have read both of them in full. However there is a potentially revealing statement on countering weapons of mass destruction in the QDR
...The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat...
...Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves...
As the QDR points out the Nuclear and Space Posture Reviews are to come. But if deterrence above is not limited to conventional deterrence then the NPR is going to be pretty conservative. Deterrence won't even be limited to nuclear weapons and "agent defeat", at the outer edge of speculation, could even mean agent defeat warheads hence the reliable refurbished warhead.
That's the outer edge though.
The statement on nuclear forensics really did grab my attention. I mean, really, really grabbed my attention. I am finding it difficult to stop myself from getting a cup of tea again
...Improving our ability to attribute nuclear threats to their source can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter state and non-state actors that may provide direct or indirect support of nuclear terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker. Research is underway to identify new means by which we can arrive more quickly at reliable technical nuclear forensic assessments. Improving the ability to determine the source of material used in a nuclear attack will strengthen deterrence. Additional resources will enhance DoD’s air and ground sample collection mission as well as augmenting current laboratory assessment capabilities. In this regard, the Department is examining new platforms for conducting nuclear/radiological air and ground sampling...
Yep, my attention was directed towards deterring "indirect support" of nuclear terrorism. That's basically the negligence doctrine for the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. I submit that we now know, at the very least, that Obama has adopted a type of conventional negligence doctrine.
Bring on the NPR.
A Strategic Rationale for B61 Modification?
The Federation of American Scientists has got a very good blog entry on the JASON LEP study.
They also have a link to STRATCOM briefing slides on something that looks a lot like the Reliable Replacement Warhead. There is much that can be said here. Even concerns about nuclear terrorism are being used to prop up the case for RRW!
I love that bit.
However, in going through the slides I got interested in what it had to say about the B61 "modification". It's another late night, so beware.
The slide at page 6 states that many features of US nuclear weapons cannot incorporate up to date requirements for reliability and surety. Notice that the nifty little picture depicts the B61 nuclear bomb.
One area singled out on the B61 schematic is the tail section.
OK.
Take a look at page 10. This depicts the B61 program in greater detail. Firstly, notice the silly nonsense about improving the assurance of NATO's extended deterrent. The Germans have recently made noises about wanting US nuclear weapons (i.e. the B61) to be taken out of the country, yet here STRATCOM would have us believe that the B61 needs to be upgraded to ensure the credibility of extended deterrence in order to assure NATO allies!!!
Let's put that aside and concentrate on the B61 tail. Notice the "no smoking type" picture over the B61 tail kit.
At page 19 "actions needed to be taken now" are listed. The list focuses on the W76 and the B61 in so far as warheads go. This is the slide that got me interested. On the B61 it states that an action that needs to be taken now is "support B61 tail kit modification program."
This is interesting in light of previous B61 modification programs, which also focused on the tail kit. According to the Nuclear Weapon Archive primer on the B61 the tail kit was modified for the B61 Mod 11 in order to develop an earth penetrating warhead
...Mod 11: Tactical or strategic bomb with multiple yield options presumably ranging from 10 Kt (and possibly lower yields) to 340 Kt. This is a modified Mod 7 with a one-piece case hardened steel center case, and a new nose piece and rear subassembly to provide ground penetration capability for defeating buried targets ("bunker busting"). The parachute assembly has also been removed, and new aerodynamic fins added for high-velocity, accurate delivery. The B61-11 buries itself 3-6 meters underground before detonation, transfering a much higher proportion of the explosion energy to ground shock, compared to surface bursts. The actual warhead itself is identical to the Mod 7. This is the first new model of a U.S. warhead to go into service since warhead production was suspended in 1989. It is being produced by field modification of existing Mod 7s....
It also has some interesting information on B61 modifications that were previously planned, but did not get up
...Efforts are currently underway at Sandia to develop a new weapon using the B61 warhead package. This is the BIOS (Bomb Impact Optimization System), a guided glide bomb that would permit release of nuclear weapons at a greater range from the target, and by using the GPS satellite system would permit delivery with 1 meter accuracy....
Could the current push for B61 modification be also an attempt to rejuvenate the previous BIOS program? Could we be talking here of a glided earth penetrating warhead with GPS accuracy?
The Global Security Org primer on the B61 is also interesting
...The B61-11 is a new Mod of the B61 being converted from existing B61 Mod 7s. The basic differences in the two Mods are in the nose and tail configurations, and the elimination of the B61-7 parachute and gas generator. The similarities are that all B61-11 internal case hardware and components, including the IHE physics package and warhead electrical system, are from the B61-7...
...The new modification and proposed design of the B61 nose assembly incorporates new radar hardware and sophisticated structured elements to withstand the high-shock environments. Sandia’s work involved repackaging the B61-7 nuclear and electrical systems into an earth penetrator case. The aft portion of the bomb was outfitted with ballast and a drag flare....
It might well be the case that STRATCOM wants to modify the tail kit of the B61 in order to enhance its capacity to act as an earth penetrating warhead. There is precedent for this, clearly.
If so, this would be important. This would show, if true, that the current drive on warhead component replacement is partly driven by the desire to enhance military effectiveness; concerns which follow on from post cold war changes to US conceptions of nuclear deterrence that are focused on regional contingencies. Glide bombs are for high air defence battlespaces, i.e. Russia and China, it might also be added.
The B61 tail kit modification might be the first empirical hint that RRW is driven by strategic considerations, not reliability and the like. This looks a bit like the RNEP, does it not?
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.