Why Darwin BondGraham is Right About Nuclear Weapons Abolition
I have not seen the movie Countdown to Zero, a doco on nuclear weapons abolition, so I cannot comment about the specifics of the film. I have seen the promo, but one doesn't make conclusions about a book after reading the blurb and the same applies to promos for movies.
But I do know a bit about nuclear abolition and nuclear terrorism, which seem to be key features of the film. So, without endorsing Darwin BondGraham's specific charges against the film, which is creating a bit of a storm, I whole heartedly support the underlying thrust of his comments. I would actually go further than BondGraham, on the push for abolition not the film, and say that I do not support the abolition of nuclear weapons.
I don't support abolition for much the same reasons that Henry Kissinger and George Schultz support it. For them, nuclear abolition is meant to make the world a safer stage for the projection of conventional military power. We don't live in an ideal world. It is what it is. Given the way international relations is structured nuclear abolition would most likely lead to more military interventions by the world's sole remaining strategic superpower, and other great powers regionally. This, in turn, would create large strategic incentives for nuclear proliferation.
Just because nuclear weapons disappear does not mean that nuclear insecurity and nuclear proliferation disappears. Those who argue that we stand on the cusp of a major proliferation cascade, who tend to be pretty vocal in their support for going to zero, actually might well create a cascade should their policy preference be enacted.
BondGraham's piece appeared in the Monthly Review, so let me use some Marxist lingo; those in the peace movement who support nuclear abolition are "reckless adventurers".
They are also especially reckless when it comes to nuclear terrorism. For example The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons likes to repeat unduly alarmist rhetoric about proliferation cascades and nuclear terrorism. There is no difference between what they do and what the neoconservatives do when they spin alarming tales about nuclear security.
Why is it the same?
It's the same because the effect is the same. The neocons use nuclear alarmism to support a strategic policy geared toward the projection of military power. If the abolitionists get their way the US, and other regional powers, would have a greater margin of safety for the projection of power. Judged in terms of results there is no difference. That's what matters, not the moral posturing.
It's easy to parade in public as an idealist, but I think those who do so on the nuclear issue are not idealists at all. They are dangerous people.
I agree that mutually interacting nuclear command and control systems are a worry, but that's why I support minimum deterrence. This type of deterrence can significantly mitigate this problem without at the same time opening up another can of worms. Getting to minumum deterrence can serve as a springboard for a wider set of strategic reforms geared toward ameliorating the role of military power in international relations.
When we get to this point then we can go for zero. This would not be just "zero." This would be "sustainable zero." The difference between the two is huge.
IAEA May Safeguards Report on Iran
The IAEA has circulated its latest safeguards report on Iran and Syria. Let us stick to the Iran report. I did not blog on the previous, more juicy, Iran safeguards report. This is because I want to write a small essay on a crucial aspect of it, but because I have been slack I haven't gotten around to it yet.
Anyway at the time reports made mention of what some regard as technical difficulties that Iran appears to be having in running large numbers of centrifuges in cascade. As The New York Times reported at the time
...It said the number of operating centrifuges had dropped to 3,772 from nearly 4,000. This was well under half of all the machines installed in Natanz, the report indicated. Analysts and diplomats close to the IAEA say Iran may be having serious mechanical problems in keeping thousands of antiquated centrifuges running in unison...
The May Report states that of 8528 installed centrifuges 3936 are being feed with UF6 gas. That's still under 50% of the total installed. Previously reports mentioned that the bulk of Iran's LEU was being earmarked for enrichment to 20% U-235. The May Safeguards Report nonetheless states that the Natanz plant continues to enrich to 3-5% as per its design specification. The May Report also states that Iran is connecting a second 164 IR-1 machine to the first 164 IR-1 machine cascade at the pilot plant. The second IR-1 cascade constitutes the last of the six 164 machine cascades at the pilot plant.
The May Safeguards Report states
...In reply to Iran’s letter of 10 March 2010, the Agency informed Iran, in a letter dated 12 March 2010, that the introduction of the second 164-machine cascade and its interconnection with the first 164-machine cascade would constitute a new and significant development in the design and operation of PFEP that required a full revision of the previous safeguards approach proposed by the Agency and communicated to Iran in February 2010...
On this it is further stated that
...Following meetings held in Iran in April 2010, the Agency provided, in a letter dated 6 May 2010, a revised safeguards approach to Iran, to which, in a letter dated 12 May 2010, Iran agreed. The approach takes into account, inter alia, the enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 and the installation of the second cascade, and includes the following measures: a monthly interim inventory verification (IIV), a monthly design information verification (DIV), and two unannounced inspections per month; the application of seals on all possible exit routes for UF6 and on all pipework connections between the areas used for testing new centrifuges and the areas used for the production of uranium enriched up to 20%; an enhanced surveillance system in the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal area; the use of load cell data; and the taking of destructive analysis samples, including from the cascades. On 24–25 April 2010, the Agency applied all the seals and installed all the surveillance cameras as required under the revised safeguards approach. As of 15 May 2010, the Agency has been implementing the revised approach, and has, since then, conducted two unannounced inspections...
So the issue does not appear as stark as presented earlier. We might say this because enrichment to 20% U-235 will occur in two connected 164 IR-1 machine cascades at the pilot plant. The Natanz plant continues to enrich per its design specification. What's more Iran has accepted the revised safeguards arrangements for the pilot plant and those revised arrangements appear to be going into place.
Iran has enriched to 20% U-235 in the first cascade. According to the report Iran has produced 5.7kg of UF6 enriched to 20%. It is under IAEA containment and surveillance, as is all of Iran's enriched uranium.
However, there are a number of matters for concern that are interspersed throughout the May Safeguards Report. Media accounts are right to focus on it. You can see throughout the document that Iran is adopting a more hard line approach to its safeguards obligations in a range of areas. Even my old pal the Code 3.1 gets a run in the Report. Iran is interpreting its safeguards obligations in ways that the IAEA considers to be contrary to its safeguards obligations.
With safeguards there is always a sovereignty-verification trade-off. The greater the emphasis on sovereignty the less on verification. That's why the classical model of safeguards was pretty crap. You can see in the May Report that Iran is putting more emphasis on sovereignty in the above trade-off in a range of areas.
We can only speculate as to why this is so. I personally would not be surprised if this is a manifestation of a tendency towards escalation in the underlying air of crisis between the US and Iran. As US-Iran relations deteriorates perhaps Tehran is putting greater emphasis on sovereignty in the above trade-off as a result. This might be one way that Iran counter-escalates.
The IAEA stresses in the May Report that this emphasis on sovereignty on the part of Iran means that the Agency cannot verify the peaceful nature of Iran's past and current nuclear activities. That follows given the sovereignty-verification trade-off. However, if this is a manifestation of the underlying escalation in the US-Iran conflict then we might have a predictable consequence of that escalation, namely decreasing knowledge of the scope of Iran's activities.
If external actors have non-proliferation as their priority numero uno then the implication is clear; try and de-escalate the underlying conflict. However, it appears that we are heading for an escalation. If the UN Security Council adopts a 4th round of sanctions this aspect to the next IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran will make for interesting reading.
Watch for more Iranian stonewalling. Perhaps it will ditch the new safeguards regime at the pilot plant. This would tie into the inevitable scuttling of the Turkey-Brazil LEU deal should a fourth round of sanctions be enacted.
The Report has been spun as mandating another round of sanctions. The argument used though is pretty weak. Essentially the argument is that the May Report demonstrates that if the Turkey-Brazil LEU transfer deal is put in place Iran would still have enough LEU for one nuclear warhead.
As such the Turkey-Brazil deal cannot prevent “break-out.” The argument is weak because enough fissile material for one theoretical warhead does not take into account the matter of testing and reliability. This would be a pretty weak deterrent. It wouldn't be zero, but it definitely wouldn't undermine the credibility of western deterrence. Furthermore you have to be careful about “theoretical” arguments. We are talking here about industrial-experimental processes.
Also Iran appears to be having technical problems with its programs. It also appears to be signalling that any enrichment to 20% U-235, which might not happen if the Turkey-Brazil deal goes through (but is still at Iran's discretion), will go down at the two IR-1 cascades at the pilot enrichment hall. All of Iran's enrichment at any rate is under IAEA containment and surveillance. This means breakout cannot be covert and would follow a massive break down in Iran's relations with the outside world.
I agree that the Turkey-Brazil deal is not ideal and should not be the last word. But it's a bit of stretch to say that the May Safeguards Report strengthens the case for a fourth round of sanctions.
In fact you might want to argue the exact opposite. The sovereignty-verification trade-off that is a big part of the May Report could be construed as a good reason for not escalating the crisis further. More escalation could mean less knowledge.
That's a trade-off that seems to be implied by the May Safeguards Report.
The Turkey-Brazil Deal on Iran’s LEU is not Perfect, But it Can be Turned Into a Circuit Breaker
The previous week was a big one on the Iranian nuclear front, with a one-two punch consisting of an agreement reached between Iran, Turkey and Brazil on the transfer of Iranian lightly enriched uranium for enrichment to 20% U-235 outside of Iran and the circulation of a draft agreement, essentially reached between the P5 members of the Security Council and Germany, on a fourth round of economic sanctions against Iran.
The latter development came a day after the announcement of the Turkey-Brazil deal reached with Iran.
I would like to start with my own “two cents worth”, so to speak, by not focusing on Iran at all. It would be instructive to consider some other developments, most especially those on the North Korean front. South Korea has formerly accused North Korea of torpedoing one of its warships, killing 40 odd of its sailors. The accusation is based on a report drawn up by international experts. The report is highly credible and well argued.
A former US North Korea negotiator, Joel Wit, had also written up a very important op-ed piece at The New York Times on North Korea last week. It is worth reflecting upon. He states,
...In the 16 years I have worked with North Korea, I have made 18 trips there, and I remain convinced that sustained diplomatic engagement is the only way to encourage the North to moderate its threatening behavior. The alternative is far worse: an isolated North Korea that is heading down a path of defiance.
This lesson has been forgotten. When President Obama took office he pledged to engage rogue states in dialogue, but he didn’t follow through with North Korea. Confronted by its provocative nuclear and missile tests, he secured international sanctions, stepped up cooperation with South Korea and Japan and even garnered some support from China, the North’s closest friend. All that made sense as far as it went.
But then American officials neglected to re-engage Pyongyang. Instead of using last summer’s extraordinary meeting between former President Clinton and Kim Jong-il to jump-start dialogue, they lashed themselves to a set of hard and fast preconditions for talks, demanding that Pyongyang pledge to give up its nuclear arsenal and return to multilateral nuclear negotiations. Last December, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth was sent to North Korea to keep communications open, but his visit was wasted as Washington spent months debating about whether to hold another meeting...
The attack on the South Korean warship only reinforces the point that Wit makes. I believe that the same reasoning should also be applied in the case of Iran.
The deal that was drawn up by Turkey and Brazil is hardly ideal. It involves the transfer of 1,200 kg of lightly enriched uranium, 3-5% U-235, (LEU) to Russia following an initial transfer to Turkey for enrichment to 20% U-235 (the highly enriched, HEU, level) and its further fabrication into fuel rods for Iran's medical reactor, which is used for the production of medical radioisotopes (120Kg of U-235). It is in this sense a renewed version of a previous agreement that Iran scuttled, ostensibly on grounds of assurance of supply. For Iran the inclusion of Turkey and Brazil in the terms of the agreement doubtless is seen as a measure that increases Tehran's sense that supply is assured.
Just prior to the successful negotiation of the Turkey-Brazil deal the US, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reportedly demanded that Turkey back-off from concluding a deal. The original accord that Iran backtracked off from was not in fact welcomed by the Obama administration either, we might recall.
The purpose of the original deal from the perspective of interested outside parties was that it constrained Iran's "break out capacity" and thereby was seen as buying time for further negotiations on Iran's nuclear activities.
There are a few issues that now arise given the passage of time. Firstly when the original deal was first hatched the amount of LEU to be transferred constituted two-thirds of Iran's total supply. Now the amount to be transferred constitutes about a half. Originally the transfer deal envisaged that Iran would not enrich uranium to 20% U-235. Enriching uranium to 20% U-235 increases break-out capacity, because enriching to weapons grade level, i.e. 90% U-235 and above, becomes much easier. Although since the last IAEA safeguards report on Iran was released reports continue to indicate that Iran's enrichment program appears to have met technical difficulties. In the wake of the Turkey-Brazil deal this latter aspect has not been emphasised. This is important because so far as we are aware Iran's stock of UF6 gas, the feedstock for gas centrifuges, is contaminated with molybdenum. Such impurities impose technical hurdles for enrichment to weapons grade that Iran probably cannot yet overcome, this is especially so given the reports on the current state of enrichment activities in Iran.
Although Iran would now retain 50% of its current stock of LEU, rather than a 1/3 as previously, under the terms of the Turkey-Brazil deal we should be mindful that the remaining amount would be sufficient, theoretically, to build one bomb. Given the technical difficulties in enrichment to weapons grade, in addition to Iran's current enrichment status and the matter of impurities, this imposes very tight constraints for a theoretical Iranian break out. Furthermore even if successful that theoretical bomb could not be tested, for the test would require using up all the subsequently produced fissile material. Given Iran's missile capabilities the only conceivable target for that one bomb, of uncertain reliability, would be Israel. One bomb would not destroy Israel, but any Israeli and/or US response would be curtains for Iran. That's an important strategic asymmetry to consider. I don't believe that concerns about "break out" constitute sufficient reason to reject the terms of this arrangement outright.
To be certain the Turkey-Brazil deal does not preclude Iran enriching to 20% U-235. Some statements from Iranian officials, initially carried by the Xinhua news agency, suggested that Iran would enrich to 20% U-235 regardless. Other subsequent statements suggest otherwise. Regardless of this, it remains the case that under the Turkey-Brazil deal further enrichment is left to the discretion of Iran. Critics of the deal in the US are correct in pointing out that this is a significant downside to the agreement, but we should be mindful of the above points on "break out."
President Obama has asserted that nuclear terrorism is the leading security threat to the US homeland. Many supporters of strong action against Iran point to the possible transfer of fissile materials by Iran to terrorist groups. I do not know how much knowledge the US has of Iran's nuclear materials. The IAEA regularly conducts inspections, although how closely the Agency guards its information in house is anyone's guess.
Presumably transferring Iranian nuclear materials to Russia for enrichment would enable the thorough analysis of Iranian nuclear material and Iranian industrial processes therein. This could be highly useful for US nuclear scientists working on nuclear forensics, which would probably lead to any future terrorist devices using Iranian origin fissile material being positively attributed to Iran following a terrorist attack. Following this potential transfer of UF6 enriched to 3-5% U-235 to Russia, and if the above analysis should be correct, Iran would be deterred from direct support for nuclear terrorism that involves transfer of fissile material.
This angle has not been adequately addressed in commentary. One would feel that any development that would make deterrence so robust would be welcomed, given the emphasis put on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Perhaps we ought to conclude that despite the rhetoric nuclear terrorism is not really a policy priority in Washington.
It should be stressed that the above analysis rests on "break out" scenarios that have been oversold. Break out, as this blog has argued, is not the real issue with respect to Iran. The real issue is the possibility of, and potential for, a parallel military fuel cycle. The Turkey-Brazil deal does not address this issue at all.
It is clear that Iran seeks to avoid a further round of sanctions without suspending its enrichment activities. Many analysts have, rightly, focused on this aspect. However, we cannot also neglect the internal political dynamics. The announcement of the Turkey-Brazil deal came a day before the announcement of the draft sanctions resolution. One of the main criticisms of the liberal opposition to the hard-line leadership in Tehran is that it has pursued irrational external policies to the detriment of Iran's interests. If the Turkey-Brazil deal is rejected, and a further round of UN sanctions are enacted, then the hard-liners will use this against the liberal opposition, further cementing their grip on power. The hard-liners will argue that they sought to lower tensions by offering concessions, all to no avail. This would be used to blunt the main line of attack previously used by the liberal opposition.
I believe that we need to be mindful of the North Korean case. I suggest, along with the brilliant realist analyst Stephen Walt, that the Turkey-Iran deal be accepted with a view to engaging Iran on nuclear diplomacy. Mindful of the higher value to be attached to a parallel fuel cycle, rather than a theoretical break out capability or enrichment at Natanz, this diplomacy should be focused on getting Iran to adhere to the additional protocol as a matter of the highest priority.
The adoption of the additional protocol will enable the IAEA to learn more about Iran's entire nuclear activities. This will require taking the threat of force, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, off the table. So long as the threat of force remains, a very real one given reports that Washington would like to transfer the Massive Ordnance Penetrator to Diego Garcia, Iran has zero incentive to adopt the additional protocol.
I do not know how successful diplomacy with Iran would be. I suspect that Washington's position would be to have Iran blunt the political power of Moqtada al Sadr in Iraq, for Iran to disarm Hezbollah and to support the US position on the peace process which is based on a rejection of Palestinian national rights and thus the wishes of the international community (the real one that is). In other words, Washington would demand of Iran that it acquiesce to US plans for the region and the fact of US hegemony therein; a return to something like the regional pillar of order under the Nixon doctrine. Iran would like to limit diplomacy to its nuclear activities and the dismantlement of all multilateral and bilateral sanctions.
The best quote, funny enough, that I saw all last week came from Henry Kissinger. He stated that the Obama administration appeared to be pursuing sanctions "as an end in themselves." He has a point. Although Obama during the campaign stressed that he would open up diplomacy with Iran what has happened is pretty much similar to what Wit describes with respect to North Korea. I believe that the perceived success of the surge in Iraq played a very important role in this reversal. Though the political success of Moqtada al Sadr in Iraq must be concentrating the mind in Washington nowadays. The fallout following the disputed elections in Iran probably has Washington viewing the regime in Iran as being susceptible to a graduated "squeezing" policy that could lead to regime change. Sanctions on Iran would be pursued in the context of such a strategy, not because of Iran's nuclear activities. I believe Kissinger's comments should be seen in that context. This, again, immediately brings to mind North Korea.
The proposed sanctions are interesting enough. They contain a pretty serious arms embargo. This matters. Iran's ability to conduct large-scale military operations will erode over time if these sanctions are adopted. It will weaken Iran's ability meet any US military action against it. Prior to the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq military sanctions played an important role in degrading the military capabilities of these two states, this is especially the case in regard to maintenance and spare parts. For instance I recall watching a documentary on the 1999 bombing, produced by Serb TV, which made the point that the Yugoslav air force's fleet of MIG29's were required to undergo general maintenance years before the outset of the war. The first designated MIG 29 to take-off could not do so for it lost contact with ground control whilst still on the runway!
The draft sanctions resolution calls for the banning of sales to Iran of main battle tanks, heavy artillery and so on and their associated spare parts. Media attention has focused on whether these provisions also include the sale of S300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran. That's appropriate, but don't forget the rest. Consider this. Iran's military planners will know that if the draft UN resolution is adopted then Tehran's conventional strategic capabilities will erode over time . Given that it appears that Tehran and Washington are on a collision course, it follows that the salience of nuclear deterrence for Iran can only grow as Tehran's conventional capacity declines.
That's a curious feature of last week's developments rarely discussed.
Some of the potential nasties, such as energy sector sanctions, were alluded to in the draft's preamble. I ask; is this Russia's response to Obama putting BMD in the preamble of New Start, in violation of the Obama-Medvedev Memorandum of Understanding?
Various reports focused on two aspects of the draft text in particular; the first is the potential boarding of cargo ships to and from Iran and potential financial sanctions. The draft text does not specifically mandate multilateral measures on these two fronts, but they are seen as providing a cover for further action on these fronts unilaterally by member states. Do not under estimate the power and possible consequences of such actions. Aggressive boarding of North Korean cargo surely has played a role in increasing Pyongyang's belligerency at sea. Furthermore, the emplacement of unilateral financial sanctions on North Korea by the United States right after a key agreement was reached in six party talks played a crucial role in North Korea's overt adoption of nuclear deterrence.
If the US acts upon this resolution expect trouble ahead in the Persian Gulf. Iran might play spoiler by harassing shipping through the Straits of Hormuz which could hit world oil prices. This would come at a crucial time in the fragile economic recovery. Nouriel Roubini has argued that high oil prices played an important role in pricking the US housing bubble. Authorities in China are concerned that they now have an asset price bubble on their hands, and the last thing they need is imported inflation. Serious conflict could tip a finely balanced global economy into a double dip recession.
One annoying aspect to last week developments was the endless mantra about "the international community." The P5+1 (Germany) do not constitute "the international community." Brazil is probably the most highly regarded state in the G77, the non-aligned states, and that probably is an indication of the prospects that the draft sanctions resolution would have if sent to the General Assembly.
So the bottom line is; the Turkey-Brazil deal is hardly ideal, it doesn't even address the real issues, but nonetheless it does constrict Iran's ability to break out to a militarily useful nuclear capability (i.e. more than just one bomb) and would be better if it included an express provision precluding any enrichment in Iran to 20% U-235. The main value of the deal is that it could be made to act as a circuit breaker, lowering tensions and opening up the prospect for further talks on Iran's nuclear program especially on adoption of an additional protocol.
I myself believe that we are on a collision course. As I have stated previously, things going a tad pear shaped in Iraq, a potential third intifada in Palestine, the offensives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with an escalation in the Iran crisis are very,very serious strategic developments. We stand on the cusp of a major crisis in the Middle East; the US faces the prospect of a regional insurgency that must have al Qaeda planners licking their lips in anticipation.
There is still time to reverse course on Iran.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the Scope of Deterrence
One of the things that I was hoping to see in the 2010 nuclear posture review was a discussion of tailored deterrence and dissuasion. Both were very important aspects to the Bush approach to nuclear strategy and need to be considered when thinking about the scope of deterrence.
This applies especially to tailored deterrence. For example see how tailored deterrence is interweaved into the narrative of the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review
...Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries...
This citation is significant because it shows two things; (1) how tailored deterrence, which is what the last sentence is about, influenced the way in which the Bush administration viewed the scope of deterrence and (2) the role that tailored deterrence played in the RNEP, ACI and finally RRW and Complex Transformation.
We associate an expansion in the scope of deterrence with the Bush administration because of tailored deterrence. That was the key concept that opened the flood gates, so to speak. Those who adhere to tailored deterrence think that deterrence is “hard” so it needs to be tailored to various adversaries and contingencies. Realists think that deterrence is easy. That's why tailored deterrence sits very neatly within constructivist theories of international relations.
The Obama 2010 nuclear posture review doesn't even discuss the concept. It is in the 2010 QDR, however. So I can only infer that tailored deterrence continues to obtain. Others like to grade the NPR with respect to transparency.
Completely keeping us in the dark about the fate of a central strategic doctrine that was introduced by the previous administration is pretty poor transparency.
See if you can find any arms control analyst that looks at that when speaking of the 2010 NPR's transparency. Don't bother wasting your time.
Now the 2010 NPR has a chapter on “strengthening regional deterrence”, which is mostly about extended deterrence. I thought maybe there would be something here. Alas the chapter is pretty bland. The 2010 QDR actually had a more useful line on regional deterrence
...To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely with them on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent...
My guess is that we will hear more about tailored deterrence in future. One way this might happen is in the context of stockpile stewardship. You can see that RRW was all about tailored deterrence from the above Bush era quote, which nobody in the RRW debate cites from, so as the debate on stockpile stewardship picks up we will tend to learn more about tailored deterrence I think.
In the absence of doctrinal clarity a good analytical strategy is to infer doctrine from capabilities.
The big thing in so far as the scope of deterrence goes, in most commentary, is not tailored deterrence at all but rather negative security assurances. Maybe I'm missing a brain cell or few, but tailored deterrence matters more.
The 2010 nuclear posture review offered up the following NSA
...the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat...
This is how the NSA previously read
...The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state...
Despite this NSA it is widely viewed that the US did in fact include chemical and biological weapons within the scope of deterrence. It is often stated that this was enabled by this NSA, given its commonly ascribed ambiguous nature. But notice that it isn't all that ambiguous. The old NSA states that the US will not use nuclear weapons against a non nuclear weapon state party to the NPT unless such a state carries out an attack, it need not be nuclear, against the US, its forces or allies if that attack is carried out in association with a nuclear weapon state.
Don't be fooled by commentary on this topic. The old NSA is stronger than the 2010 assurance. This is because the new assurance speaks of a non-nuclear weapon state in good standing with the NPT. Good standing is not defined so could include safeguards violations, but it need not be so formal. Good standing is ambiguous. The new assurance does explicitly mention the case of chemical and biological weapons, but we need to consider the above caveat and the one that appears in the last paragraph of the new assurance.
The old NSA had no ambiguity and no caveat, other than the allied attack caveat, yet the US still expanded the scope of deterrence regardless. In a realist world the unipolar strategic power will do what it feels it must when it feels it must, period. Assurances like this carry little weight in international relations, as the realist scholar Stephen Walt has pointed out. What is given can be taken away.
One way in which the unipolar power could be better constrained would be through a binding NSA, but that is very much off the agenda.
Now readers of this blog will know that I have always felt that a lot of what Obama is doing on the nuclear front are political moves to get multilateral agreement for non-proliferation reforms favourable to the US.
Even Iran is calling for strengthening the NPT, but most of Iran's proposals are not on compliance. They are directed toward formalising the NPT's disarmament provision. That suits Iran. The US is doing the same, only, naturally, US proposals focus on compliance.
Both parties are not interested in enhancing the NPT as such. Again, the realist world intrudes.
But let's get back on point. You will see that my long standing and very much lone view is actually affirmed in the very text that I have cited. I of course refer to this bit just in case you missed it
...persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime...
Recall my point about the US and Iran above. The NSA is offered up in order to garner changes to the NPT favourable to the US and in a way that does not really constrain the US strategically. It is like Iran calling for movement on the disarmament provision, but rejecting efforts to constrain a states ability under the NPT to be a latent nuclear state in the meantime.
The NSA is part and parcel of that campaign. If the campaign fails, then forget about the NSA. This can be taken to be an unspoken corollary. Again, the realist world.
It is at the this point that we should make a few points about strategic nuclear targeting, even though I would like to treat this on its own in a subsequent blog post. Consider the 2001-2002 nuclear posture review again
...In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected...
...North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have long standing hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs...
These are the states that figured, including Russia and China of course, in US nuclear strike planning during the Bush administration until Saddam was ousted and Gaddafi changed tack.
That makes North Korea, Iran, Syria , Russia and China as being Bush era nuclear strike targets. Notice that all of these are not covered by the NSA, but Iran and Syria should not have been so targeted according to the old one. They are both party to the NPT and are not allies with a nuclear weapon state.
Because the above 5 states are not covered by the new NSA that means the new NSA doesn't really impact US nuclear war planning a jot. The NSA is an interesting twist in declaratory policy, but the active policy, i.e. war plans and attack options, are not affected by this NSA. Perhaps Walt's use of “nuclear public relations” to describe the NPR is accurate.
The manner in which these states are targeted hasn't been changed by the 2010 NPR either. You can see this when you take on board the following citation from the text
...Detailed NPR analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, conducted in spring 2009, concluded that the United States could sustain stable deterrence with significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads, assuming parallel Russian reductions. The NPR analysis considered several specific levels of nuclear weapons, all below current levels of approximately 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Its conclusions, approved by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, formed the basis for U.S. negotiations with Russia on New START. Because New START is intended to be only an initial step in a continuing process of bilateral nuclear reductions, this initial analysis used conservative assumptions to determine acceptable reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons...
In other words the 1550 New Start number is consistent with NSPD-14, the Presidential Guidance that the administration inherited from the Bush era. States not covered by the NSA, which just so happens to be those states that figured in previous planning, will be targeted in the manner in which they were targeted by Bush. Absent further arms control accords, which is not likely (more on that later), this is locked in. That means no change to active policy.
The 2010 nuclear posture review reaffirms one noteworthy Bush era expansion in the scope of deterrence. I speak of the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction terrorism. The NPR states,
...Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts...
“Enables” is a direct reference to the so-called negligence doctrine. That is what “enables” means in the lexicon of US counterterrorism policy. To appreciate this you need only consider Paul Pillar's, a former senior counterterrorism official, book on the topic and the book by Daniel Byman on state sponsorship of terrorism. You can also throw in the mix the 2010 QDR
...Improving our ability to attribute nuclear threats to their source can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as deter state and non-state actors that may provide direct or indirect support of nuclear terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker...
Notice the NPR emphasis on "any state". That is a further caveat to the NSA.
When it comes to the scope of deterrence nothing much, so far as I am concerned, has really changed. You might want to argue that the Obama administration has made the right statements about the low likelihood that the US would really use nuclear weapons and the role of conventional capabilities in lowering the role of nuclear weapons in US defence policy, but that isn't really that much of a big change either.
So the Bush NPR stated, to quote from the excerpts
...U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes.” A “new mix” of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities “is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades...
The 2010 NPR statements are on the same wavelength.
It is not accurate to state that the 2010 nuclear posture review has instituted “sweeping” changes to the scope of nuclear deterrence.
US Discloses Warhead Stockpile Number, But Just Don’t Mention The Targets
The US has released its nuclear warhead stockpile number, as at 2009, in a brief fact sheet. The disclosure was made in the context of the NPT Review Conference that has just started. The objective is to demonstrate Washington's commitment to Article VI of the Treaty, i.e. the disarmament provision.
According to the Fact Sheet
...As of September 30, 2009, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons consisted of 5,113 warheads. This number represents an 84 percent reduction from the stockpile’s maximum (31,255) at the end of fiscal year 1967, and over a 75 percent reduction from its level (22,217) when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989...
The best analysis of the disclosure can be found at the FAS Strategic Security blog, which has a good in-depth overview posted by Hans Kristensen.
I want to very briefly just make one additional point. During the Cold War we had what US Strategic Command planners now call “a weapons rich environment.” The idea was well expressed by the then Strategic Air Command which stated that, basically to the affect, “if you can deter the Soviet Union, you can meet all potential threats.”
The US had a lot of weapons covering a narrow class of targets in the Soviet Union primarily, indeed overwhelmingly. The class of targets would have been set by Presidential Guidance and were set out in detail in a number of Single Integrated Operational Plan attack options.
As the fact sheet correctly points out, as does everybody else, the warhead stockpile numbers have sharply declined in the post Cold War era.
The focus on the warhead stockpile, however, obscures one crucial point. Though the number of warheads declined the class of targets increased. China was put out of an SIOP hiatus during the Clinton era. Rogue states, including rogue state weapons of mass destruction capabilities, were added in and now terrorist groups and their “enablers” are a part of the mix.
Nobody, not nobody, has told you the latter part; warheads down, targets up. That is why Stratcom planners state that though the Cold War was a “weapons rich environment” we now have a “target rich environment.”
Obama's nuclear posture review has been hailed as leading to “sweeping”changes in the scope of US deterrence. These, however, are more apparent than real. As I will show in a blog post on the NPR and the scope of deterrence in due course.
The warhead disclosure is a welcome transparency measure. However, a demonstration of an underlying commitment to Article VI it is not.
It is highly misleading to look at this disclosure in the way in which most are doing. The White House wants you to focus on the numbers, but the expanding target set that occurred at the same time is a relevant thing to consider in any analysis.
Even Bush, recall, was reducing the numbers.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.