Why Darwin BondGraham is Right About Nuclear Weapons Abolition
I have not seen the movie Countdown to Zero, a doco on nuclear weapons abolition, so I cannot comment about the specifics of the film. I have seen the promo, but one doesn't make conclusions about a book after reading the blurb and the same applies to promos for movies.
But I do know a bit about nuclear abolition and nuclear terrorism, which seem to be key features of the film. So, without endorsing Darwin BondGraham's specific charges against the film, which is creating a bit of a storm, I whole heartedly support the underlying thrust of his comments. I would actually go further than BondGraham, on the push for abolition not the film, and say that I do not support the abolition of nuclear weapons.
I don't support abolition for much the same reasons that Henry Kissinger and George Schultz support it. For them, nuclear abolition is meant to make the world a safer stage for the projection of conventional military power. We don't live in an ideal world. It is what it is. Given the way international relations is structured nuclear abolition would most likely lead to more military interventions by the world's sole remaining strategic superpower, and other great powers regionally. This, in turn, would create large strategic incentives for nuclear proliferation.
Just because nuclear weapons disappear does not mean that nuclear insecurity and nuclear proliferation disappears. Those who argue that we stand on the cusp of a major proliferation cascade, who tend to be pretty vocal in their support for going to zero, actually might well create a cascade should their policy preference be enacted.
BondGraham's piece appeared in the Monthly Review, so let me use some Marxist lingo; those in the peace movement who support nuclear abolition are "reckless adventurers".
They are also especially reckless when it comes to nuclear terrorism. For example The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons likes to repeat unduly alarmist rhetoric about proliferation cascades and nuclear terrorism. There is no difference between what they do and what the neoconservatives do when they spin alarming tales about nuclear security.
Why is it the same?
It's the same because the effect is the same. The neocons use nuclear alarmism to support a strategic policy geared toward the projection of military power. If the abolitionists get their way the US, and other regional powers, would have a greater margin of safety for the projection of power. Judged in terms of results there is no difference. That's what matters, not the moral posturing.
It's easy to parade in public as an idealist, but I think those who do so on the nuclear issue are not idealists at all. They are dangerous people.
I agree that mutually interacting nuclear command and control systems are a worry, but that's why I support minimum deterrence. This type of deterrence can significantly mitigate this problem without at the same time opening up another can of worms. Getting to minumum deterrence can serve as a springboard for a wider set of strategic reforms geared toward ameliorating the role of military power in international relations.
When we get to this point then we can go for zero. This would not be just "zero." This would be "sustainable zero." The difference between the two is huge.
Has Afghanistan Turned Into a War of Attrition?
For President Obama Afghanistan is staring to resemble the BP oil spill. It's looking like a real PR disaster for the Obama administration. Everybody is focusing on the extraordinary bust up between General McChrystal and the Obama White House following leaks of a forthcoming interview that the General gave Rolling Stone magazine. That interview was a real shocker.
If I remember correctly the White House replaced General McKiernan because he was seen as a latter day General McClellan. General McChrystal was seen as more of a gung ho commander. It looks like Obama made a big mistake in going for a wild card like McChrystal. Obama appointed him after sacking McKiernan and now he has to wear him.
But there is more happening on the Afghan front than this Korea like spat between the commander in chief and his theatre commander. For example Richard Holbrooke just visited Marjah, which seems to have been a disaster in itself. It looks as if the Osprey helicopter carrying Holbrooke came under Taliban small arms fire. Recall that Marjah was supposed to have been pacified
...According to ABC News, Taliban gunmen tried to shoot down the Osprey. Several suicide bombings were carried out after his departure, the report said.
Holbrooke was visiting Marjah for a first-hand assessment of US- led NATO efforts to take over a Taliban-controlled region that they had hoped would set an example for tougher battles to follow.
Troops have met with stiff resistance, which has delayed plans to take on the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar province this summer. Holbrooke was also to visit Kandahar...
Much more serious than these political issues is the status of Pakistan army counterinsurgency operations along the border with Afghanistan. According to a RAND Corp study
...PAKISTAN HAS failed to develop an effective counter-insurgency strategy, undermining efforts to tackle militants who roam the Afghan border, according to a new study by security analysts.
A report by the Rand Corporation, a non-profit research group frequently used by the Pentagon, concludes that Pakistan’s army and frontier corps have failed to hold territory regained from insurgents...
The Pakistani army is clearing insurgents from places like the Swat valley and Bajaur agency ,but the Government is finding it tough to hold ground and build alternative political, economic and social structures. This is a bit like Marjah. The strategy adopted is one of “clear, hold and build.” If you can't hold and build then you are waging an attritional strategy of "clear, clear, clear" until the insurgents are bleed white.
Who will crack first? The strategy for Af-Pak was supposed to be a classical counterinsurgency based strategy. It looks as if we have got ourselves into a war of attrition to me.
The Pakistan army is clearing, but according to the RAND report it is not so good at holding and building. You can't blame the Pakistan army for this. The cash strapped Government in Pakistan probably doesn't have the resources to both destroy the border areas and then rebuild them. Don't forget that Team Obama early on took to calling the Afghan theatre as Af-Pak. Strategic planners in Washington surely would be reading the conclusions of this RAND Corp study with deep concern.
Here in Australia I wonder for how long the Government will stomach a war of attrition. I think Canberra bought the McChrystal-Obama counterinsurgency strategy. But if Australia is finding itself in the middle of a war of attrition then maybe this might prompt a strategic rethink in Canberra.
Australia’s Mounting Casualties in Afghanistan Reignites Debate on the War
The recent multiple deaths of Australian soldiers in Afghanistan has reignited the debate on Australia's role in the conflict. Polls, according to media reports, suggest that public opposition to Australia's participation in the Afghan war is increasing as the human toll mounts.
It would come as no secret to anybody that has read my posts and articles on the Afghan war that I am firmly against Australia's involvement. However, I am troubled by the way the latest debate is being structured.
The argument now seems to be that the mounting death toll is too high a price for Australia to pay. Because the intensity of the conflict is increasing, and will continue to increase, more Australian casualties are to be expected. Given this, now is the time to withdraw. The strategic gains for Australia are not worth the human cost that our soldiers are paying, and can be expected to continue to pay in future.
These are bad arguments, and dangerous to boot. Consider. Australia's level of commitment is not strategically significant. But if Australia were to withdraw then the Taliban would thereby make a politico-strategic gain, namely the US led coalition losing another member state. This would be widely reported both in the region and globally.
The Taliban would be following the debate in Australia. If opposition to the war in Australia is allowed to be based on the mounting casualties then the Taliban will increase the level and intensity of its attacks against Australian forces in hopes of achieving a politico-strategic objective, namely the further withdrawal of a US coalition partner.
The debate in Australia needs to be framed in a way that does not expose Australian troops to extra risks. I myself oppose the war and continue to do so. I opposed the war when Australia was experiencing no casualties in Afghanistan. Let me explain my reasons, briefly, why I oppose the war.
Firstly, I do not accept that Australia should be assisting the US to set up a political regime and social structure that clearly does not have the support of the Afghan population, especially in the South where the troops are deployed. Outside forces do not have the right to do this. For example a recent report in The New York Times suggested that the US is seeking to maintain stability in Ourzgan province, where our troops are deployed, by working with a brutal and rapacious local warlord. In return the warlord is allowed to, effectively, rule over the province.
Australia's participation is usually framed in the context of nation building, and reconstruction, and the like. I am sure that our forces are doing their fair share of providing security for reconstruction and so on, but this is being done within the context of the US supporting the regional rule of a rapacious warlord. That is similar to what Afghanistan was like before the Taliban came to power.
Any good Australia does in Ourzgan province is being conducted within the context of this overarching regional strategy being pursued by the US. If the report in the Times is true then Australia is being effectively undercut by our ally.
As the NYT article pointed out
...In some cases, these strongmen have restored order, though at the price of undermining the very institutions Americans are seeking to build: government structures like police forces and provincial administrations that one day are supposed to be strong enough to allow the Americans and other troops to leave...
That's not good enough.
Furthermore, it is commonly argued that it is necessary to stay in Afghanistan in order to prevent that country from being a terrorist safe haven, as it was prior to 9/11. This argument is very sloppy. Even if true that does not imply that only an outside western military presence can prevent this.
According to the head of US military intelligence in Afghanistan al Qaida has only about 100 fighters in Afghanistan. The Taliban don't have any need for tactical, let alone strategic, assistance from bin Laden.
The argument is also based on a misreading of the 9/11 plot. The 9/11 attack did not rely for its success on the Afghan safe haven as much as it is commonly assumed. Of course, the Afghan haven played a role. But this role has tended to become exaggerated in the public mind. Many terrorism analysts argue that al Qaida is now a loosely connected jihadi franchise. Fighting in Afghanistan, therefore, really amounts to us fighting yesterday's war.
If there is a terrorist threat to the Australian homeland then, I submit, that threat exists here in Australia not so much in Afghanistan. Indeed, al Qaida always was a jihadi franchise, rather than a jihadi central committee, to a significant extent, as pointed out by Jason Burke in his top class study of al Qaida.
Also western forces in Afghanistan have the freedom to conduct military operations as they see fit. This contributes to the rising civilian death toll in Afghanistan. Every day we read reports of scores of civilians being killed as a result of either western military operations or brazen Taliban attacks. It is not right that we are propping up illegitimate thugs in military operations that are killing too many innocent Afghans.
I agree that the Taliban are assholes, but that doesn't absolve us of our own moral responsibilities.
At the end of the day it is hard to disagree with Michelle Grattan's summation in The Age today
...In reality, we will be there as long as the United States wants us to be. Whatever its other reasons and justifications, this commitment is part of what we do for our American allies. For us to withdraw support would be a declaration that it is hard to see any Australian government making, whatever the public might say through polls. That is, unless the number of casualties really increases...
It is true that what Grattan states here is amazingly cynical. Namely, that our involvement in Afghanistan is just part of the insurance premium we pay to the United States. The deep thinkers in Canberra believe that so long as the premium in Australian blood can be kept down then Australia's role can be maintained politically.
That's brutal. But you can't blame Grattan for relaying to the public the facts of the matter. This is how the foreign policy making elite in Canberra thinks. Grattan does us all a service by openly showing this.
I myself do not consider this sufficient reason for supporting Australia's role. I don't accept the cynicism of Canberra's sophisticates and so I reject the policy that flows from it.
Remember one thing about insurance premiums. To loyally pay your insurance premium over a long time is by no means a guarantee that your insurer will pay you out when disaster strikes. We all know this. The bean counters in company headquarters will do the math and decide whether it's in their interests to pay you out.
The United States will act no differently no matter how high our premium may be and for how long we dutifully pay it.
That's tough. But that's what international relations is all about.
IAEA May Safeguards Report on Iran
The IAEA has circulated its latest safeguards report on Iran and Syria. Let us stick to the Iran report. I did not blog on the previous, more juicy, Iran safeguards report. This is because I want to write a small essay on a crucial aspect of it, but because I have been slack I haven't gotten around to it yet.
Anyway at the time reports made mention of what some regard as technical difficulties that Iran appears to be having in running large numbers of centrifuges in cascade. As The New York Times reported at the time
...It said the number of operating centrifuges had dropped to 3,772 from nearly 4,000. This was well under half of all the machines installed in Natanz, the report indicated. Analysts and diplomats close to the IAEA say Iran may be having serious mechanical problems in keeping thousands of antiquated centrifuges running in unison...
The May Report states that of 8528 installed centrifuges 3936 are being feed with UF6 gas. That's still under 50% of the total installed. Previously reports mentioned that the bulk of Iran's LEU was being earmarked for enrichment to 20% U-235. The May Safeguards Report nonetheless states that the Natanz plant continues to enrich to 3-5% as per its design specification. The May Report also states that Iran is connecting a second 164 IR-1 machine to the first 164 IR-1 machine cascade at the pilot plant. The second IR-1 cascade constitutes the last of the six 164 machine cascades at the pilot plant.
The May Safeguards Report states
...In reply to Iran’s letter of 10 March 2010, the Agency informed Iran, in a letter dated 12 March 2010, that the introduction of the second 164-machine cascade and its interconnection with the first 164-machine cascade would constitute a new and significant development in the design and operation of PFEP that required a full revision of the previous safeguards approach proposed by the Agency and communicated to Iran in February 2010...
On this it is further stated that
...Following meetings held in Iran in April 2010, the Agency provided, in a letter dated 6 May 2010, a revised safeguards approach to Iran, to which, in a letter dated 12 May 2010, Iran agreed. The approach takes into account, inter alia, the enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 and the installation of the second cascade, and includes the following measures: a monthly interim inventory verification (IIV), a monthly design information verification (DIV), and two unannounced inspections per month; the application of seals on all possible exit routes for UF6 and on all pipework connections between the areas used for testing new centrifuges and the areas used for the production of uranium enriched up to 20%; an enhanced surveillance system in the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal area; the use of load cell data; and the taking of destructive analysis samples, including from the cascades. On 24–25 April 2010, the Agency applied all the seals and installed all the surveillance cameras as required under the revised safeguards approach. As of 15 May 2010, the Agency has been implementing the revised approach, and has, since then, conducted two unannounced inspections...
So the issue does not appear as stark as presented earlier. We might say this because enrichment to 20% U-235 will occur in two connected 164 IR-1 machine cascades at the pilot plant. The Natanz plant continues to enrich per its design specification. What's more Iran has accepted the revised safeguards arrangements for the pilot plant and those revised arrangements appear to be going into place.
Iran has enriched to 20% U-235 in the first cascade. According to the report Iran has produced 5.7kg of UF6 enriched to 20%. It is under IAEA containment and surveillance, as is all of Iran's enriched uranium.
However, there are a number of matters for concern that are interspersed throughout the May Safeguards Report. Media accounts are right to focus on it. You can see throughout the document that Iran is adopting a more hard line approach to its safeguards obligations in a range of areas. Even my old pal the Code 3.1 gets a run in the Report. Iran is interpreting its safeguards obligations in ways that the IAEA considers to be contrary to its safeguards obligations.
With safeguards there is always a sovereignty-verification trade-off. The greater the emphasis on sovereignty the less on verification. That's why the classical model of safeguards was pretty crap. You can see in the May Report that Iran is putting more emphasis on sovereignty in the above trade-off in a range of areas.
We can only speculate as to why this is so. I personally would not be surprised if this is a manifestation of a tendency towards escalation in the underlying air of crisis between the US and Iran. As US-Iran relations deteriorates perhaps Tehran is putting greater emphasis on sovereignty in the above trade-off as a result. This might be one way that Iran counter-escalates.
The IAEA stresses in the May Report that this emphasis on sovereignty on the part of Iran means that the Agency cannot verify the peaceful nature of Iran's past and current nuclear activities. That follows given the sovereignty-verification trade-off. However, if this is a manifestation of the underlying escalation in the US-Iran conflict then we might have a predictable consequence of that escalation, namely decreasing knowledge of the scope of Iran's activities.
If external actors have non-proliferation as their priority numero uno then the implication is clear; try and de-escalate the underlying conflict. However, it appears that we are heading for an escalation. If the UN Security Council adopts a 4th round of sanctions this aspect to the next IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran will make for interesting reading.
Watch for more Iranian stonewalling. Perhaps it will ditch the new safeguards regime at the pilot plant. This would tie into the inevitable scuttling of the Turkey-Brazil LEU deal should a fourth round of sanctions be enacted.
The Report has been spun as mandating another round of sanctions. The argument used though is pretty weak. Essentially the argument is that the May Report demonstrates that if the Turkey-Brazil LEU transfer deal is put in place Iran would still have enough LEU for one nuclear warhead.
As such the Turkey-Brazil deal cannot prevent “break-out.” The argument is weak because enough fissile material for one theoretical warhead does not take into account the matter of testing and reliability. This would be a pretty weak deterrent. It wouldn't be zero, but it definitely wouldn't undermine the credibility of western deterrence. Furthermore you have to be careful about “theoretical” arguments. We are talking here about industrial-experimental processes.
Also Iran appears to be having technical problems with its programs. It also appears to be signalling that any enrichment to 20% U-235, which might not happen if the Turkey-Brazil deal goes through (but is still at Iran's discretion), will go down at the two IR-1 cascades at the pilot enrichment hall. All of Iran's enrichment at any rate is under IAEA containment and surveillance. This means breakout cannot be covert and would follow a massive break down in Iran's relations with the outside world.
I agree that the Turkey-Brazil deal is not ideal and should not be the last word. But it's a bit of stretch to say that the May Safeguards Report strengthens the case for a fourth round of sanctions.
In fact you might want to argue the exact opposite. The sovereignty-verification trade-off that is a big part of the May Report could be construed as a good reason for not escalating the crisis further. More escalation could mean less knowledge.
That's a trade-off that seems to be implied by the May Safeguards Report.
We’re Imperialists! Is NATO Going to Come Out of the Closet?
The "group of experts" has released their much anticipated report on what they consider should be NATO's new Strategic Concept.
Most of the attention in commentary has been devoted to the issue of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This is a sideshow. The Report's recommendations on this are conservative. I don't want to dwell on that too much, in fact not at all; that has been well covered elsewhere. I'll just say one small thing. If there are no US nuclear weapons in Europe then what would be the purpose of the trans-atlantic link in this domain, i.e. the nuclear planning group? I suspect that Washington is saying behind closed doors to their West European partners; you want a planning group on nukes, but you don't want the nukes. Keeping US nuclear weapons in Europe is probably a way for NATO to maintain this institutionalised role in the framing of nuclear weapons policy even though this body's role is probably not that great. Of course, there are more issues involved here but let's leave that for another day.
So far as I see things the basic thrust of this document is a call for NATO to become openlya global imperialist organisation. It was always defacto a key pillar of US global hegemony, but this document wants NATO to go further.
But before discussing this let's get something straight.
Now I can't help but notice this comment in the opening passages
...In the 1990s, NATO’s primary goal (in association with the European Union (EU)) was to consolidate a Europe whole and free. For the first time, it engaged in military action, putting a halt to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans...
That's a double lie. In the 1990s NATO's primary goal was to lock in the gains made by the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the expense of Russia. Realism 101. In this sense the primary goal was to cement an anti Russian division in Europe and to prevent Gorbachev's "Europe, our common home" alternative vision from reaching fruition.
Secondly it is a big, huge lie to claim that NATO put a halt to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Firstly NATO facilitated, especially the US, the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia during Zagreb's "Operation Storm" and secondly ethnic cleansing continues under NATO auspices in Kosovo. In Kosovo under the noses of NATO the ethnic cleansing of non Albanians has occurred and continues to this day, recall the recent "pogrom" against Serbs in Kosovo.
Kosovo is just about the most ethnically cleansed state to have emerged from the wars occasioned by the destruction of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia was destroyed; it did not collapse). This was a direct consequence of the 1999 NATO led war.
NATO previously was widely viewed to be a defensive alliance covering a specific geographical jurisdiction. This document seeks to turn NATO into an instrument of global "forward defence", which is technical phrase meaning global offence
...However, NATO must also cope with hazards of a more volatile and less predictable nature -- including acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other advanced weapons technologies, cyber attacks directed against modern communications systems, the sabotage of energy pipelines, and the disruption of critical maritime supply routes. Often, an effective defence against these unconventional security threats must begin well beyond the territory of the Alliance...
This is justified by something I have blogged about before, namely the use of globalisation to justify postures of forward defence. This has been a staple of Australian defence planning in recent times. So the document states,
...Globalization has shown a tendency to empower some while marginalizing others, and has at times heightened the combustible tension between individual and group identity. Although it contributes to a steady rise in shared economic interests between and among countries, globalization provides no sure remedy for international suspicions and rivalry. From a security standpoint, the most salient aspect of our era is that events in one part of the world are far more likely than in the past to have repercussions elsewhere...
It is because of this connection that I use the phrase "globalised forward defence" to describe this document. Now in the relevant part of the text that I cited the document speaks of forward defence "well beyond the territory of the Alliance." It then in another part of the text speaks of this in a "regional" not a "global" sense. Now Madeline Albright is not a deep thinker. I don't now what "regional" means (it can't mean the Euro-Atlantic area because that is not "out of area"), but I suppose that could be a combination of the areas of responsibility covered by the Pentagon's European and Central Commands. It's clear that the greater Middle East is the big reference point here, i.e. NATO should be further geared towards intervention in the Middle East.
But the emphasis put on globalisation also furnishes forward defence with a potential globalised component. If globalisation can have such widespread effects then a forward defence concept that revolves around it cannot be geographically limited.
You can see this at play in the document's first recommendation
...At the same time, NATO planners must recognize that the potential sources of Article 5 threats have broadened and now include dangers that could arise either inside or outside the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO must be prepared to defend against (and deter) such threats regardless of their point of origin...
The reader should note that this is not presented even within this text in purely defensive terms, i.e. the globalised forward "defence" is admittedly not limited to defence. For the text states that NATO must
...Deploy and sustain expeditionary capabilities for military operations beyond the treaty area when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members...
Of course this means that member states would need to make the investments and changes to their military forces needed in order to gear them for offensive power projection. Although the US, Washington is really pushing this and the text discusses the issue, should be careful of what it wishes for; such capabilities could easily become the core of an autonomous European strategic capability. I don't know what role the thrust of Global Trends 2025 is playing here. Could this be a way for the US to ease the fiscal burden occasioned by a relative decline in economic power by sharing the burden of maintaining global order with perceived free riders?
I suspect such political economy considerations are important. As the official history of the CIA stated after World War Two the US took responsibility, in its interests, for maintaining what it called "the world capitalist system." Washington might be saying to the Europeans; given increasing economic multipolarity the burden for maintaining this mutually beneficial system of world order should be shared more because we are labouring under twin deficits.
The document also calls for the reaffirmation of its "open door" policy on new members. That leaves open the eventual expansion of NATO to cover Ukraine and Georgia. In fact this document seemingly calls for this. As the text states
... Further enlargement has been under consideration in the western Balkans and with respect to Georgia and Ukraine. Consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles for enlargement, the process for states that have expressed their desire for membership should move forward as each state fulfils the requirements for membership...
If this open door policy is enacted fully, especially if a Yushcenko type government comes to power in Ukraine and a Georgia joins NATO which is recognised by the Alliance to include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then Obama's "New Start" is dead. Unless Russia adopts a neo-Yeltsinite foreign policy, of course.
NATO would need to formally adopt this Strategic Concept draft at the next NATO Summit for it to become formal NATO policy. It will be interesting to see what happens; Afghanistan et al not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier?
Make no mistake about it, this is a call from Washington for NATO to become a global alliance increasingly structured for imperial military interventions. At recent European Social Forum gatherings NATO has increasingly drawn the attention of European social movements. So it should.
NATO should be abolished, not further strengthened into a global interventionary force. In 1989 George HW Bush and Helmut Kohl decisively rejected Gorbachev's vision for European security, recently revived by Dmitri Medvedev, even though Gorby's vision had the support of most of the population of Europe both East and West. Even the population of Eastern Europe has largely opposed the neoliberal order that Kohl and Bush gave them, and opposition to the invasion of Iraq was actually higher in the East and than in the West (just like there was no real resistance movements against the Nazi's in the West despite all the myth making; Western Europe was largely collaborationist; in fact Yugoslavia was the only place where a resistance started anywhere in Europe, ex USSR, before it was clear that the Nazi's would lose, according to Oxford historian Richard Evans).
Europe's social movements are correct to suppose that that alternative is both feasible and remains appropriate for Europe.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.