Nuclear Security and Strategic Analyses Dr Marko Beljac

31May/080

37kg Of Plutonium For North Korea?

Information is slowly leaking out on what the 18,000 pages of documents on North Korea’s plutonium production campaigns tell us about the amount of plutonium produced by North Korea at Yongbyon.

According the New York Times the documents reveal that the North separated 37kg of plutonium in two production campaigns those being in 1994 and 2005.

The US has claimed that in fact the North also removed plutonium from Yongbyon’s fuel rods before 1992.

Earlier North Korea, as a part of the six party talk’s framework, indicated that it had a stockpile of 30kg of plutonium. The US alleged that this was too small a figure that in fact the correct figure was something like 50kg. In analysis I have by and large went along with the US figure.

In going along with this amount I was influenced by the estimate provided by ISIS. In a report whose tone, but not overall statement, was largely sceptical on the North’s 30kg Pu declaration ISIS surmised p2,

…ISIS has reported on this issue previously, most recently in February 2007. ISIS estimated then that North Korea had produced a total plutonium stockpile of between 46 and 64 kilograms, of which 28-50 kilograms could be in separated form and usable in nuclear weapons. This assessment was based on a study of how much plutonium could have been produced in the fuel in the five megawatt-electric reactor and how much plutonium was subsequently separated in the Radiochemical Laboratory. North Korea has stated that it unloaded the core of this reactor twice—in 1994 and 2005. The IAEA discovered evidence of a possible earlier unloading, prior to 1990. In addition, some of the separated plutonium was used in the 2006 test explosion. There is also the plutonium in the current core. The assessment that North Korea could have a separated plutonium stockpile of between 28 and 50 kilograms includes the two core unloadings in 1994 and 2005, and the possible unloading prior to 1990, less five kilograms for the explosion in October 2006…

If the 37kg figure is accurate this would suggest that the IAEA belief on the possibility of a pre 1990 unloading was ultimately inaccurate. It’s not just the US IC that might well have got things wrong here.

The head of ISIS, David Albright, has interestingly been cited as stating,

…David Albright, a former United Nations nuclear inspector who consults frequently with the U.S. government, said the reactor records turned over by North Korea are "consistent with what they've said."
The CIA's contention that Pyongyang extracted plutonium prior to 1992 "is not supported in the record," said Albright, the president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. The trove of documents "is internally consistent, and to forge it would be tremendously difficult," he added…

It is of note that the NYT is citing a figure of 37kg which may mean that the North’s declaration of 30kg earlier this year might well be telling us that the North used 7kg of Pu for the October 2006 test. That would correlate with the Nagasaki “Fat Man” device which used about 6kg.

Oh, you just gotta know that I can’t help but notice the “consults frequently with the US government” part.

One oft mentioned reason for the al Kibar Syrian nuclear reactor briefing was to get North Korea to 'fess up to producing more than 30kg of plutonium. Could very well be the case that they had nothing to 'fess up to.

31May/080

Another Trident D5 SLBM Test?

The US Navy may well have conducted a successful flight test of the Trident II D5 SLBM. The interesting thing about this flight test, if the story is accurate, would be that it was an unannounced test.

My early warning radar was set off on seeing this because I know that the Navy conducted two flight tests in May from the USS Nebraska.

Why the surge in activity on Trident II D5 testing? This latest test, if true, would mean that the missile has been tested successfully 123 times in a row. Surely, the tempo on testing in May, especially in relation to the apparent third test, owes little to concerns about the reliability of the D5 to meet the damage expectancy criteria of OPLAN-8044 (formerly known as the SIOP).

The earlier May test was a Commander Evaluation Test which means that it involved the simultaneous launch of more than one missile, in this case two Trident D5’s. This time last year the Navy conducted a Commander Evaluation Test consisting of two SLBMs as well.

Could the apparent latest test be a Life Extension Test Bed-2 related measure (see my blog entry below)? Could this be related to RRW? It is interesting that the Navy should have conducted an unannounced test so soon after the Commander Evaluation Test.

The Guam story on this starts by stating,

…Two days ago, part of a missile washed up on the Island of Yeew in Yap, about 500 miles southwest of Guam. The front "nose fairing" is from a Trident II D5 missile, expended in a routine flight test from an Ohio Class submarine, according to Lt. Donnell Evans, public affairs officer for U.S. Naval Forces Marianas…

Are these missile parts in fact the parts from the Commander Evaluation Test? I do believe we need more information to really nail that the Navy has conducted a Trident II D5 test in addition to the earlier Follow On Commander Evaluation Test.

This story is not enough to make a proper conclusion.

I think we need a blog on US strategic nuclear forces of the sort that Podvig maintains on Russian strategic nuclear forces. He documents every test and even every satellite launch that he comes across that is in any way shape or form related to the Strategic Rocket Forces.

It is a shame that there isn’t one that does the same for the US. In fact, I have a better idea. Why not a collaborative project on a Podvig style blog on global strategic nuclear forces that would monitor developments very closely, like semi-daily, in the nuclear weapon states?

Actually, I have just got my own domain name and space so this blog is getting a major boost and upgrade. I’ve decided to get a little bit more serious about this. I will reveal all at the appropriate juncture.

In the meanwhile I promise an Iran entry (I see that ISIS has leaked the latest IAEA safeguards report) in the near future.

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30May/080

Latest IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran

I know I have promised to blog on the latest weaponisation development regarding Iran but I’ve been swamped with other stuff. However, semester ends this week so I expect to get the time to review this.

At any rate the IAEA has drawn up and is circulating to the UNSC and the Board of Governors the latest safeguards report on Iran which is eagerly anticipated both for what it has to stay about what is usually referred to as the “alleged studies” on RV development for nuclear warheads and related weaponisation developments and reports that Iran is developing a new more advanced IR-3 centrifuge (i.e. a successor to the Pakistan P-2 design). Anyway, the IAEA has released a press release which states that

…The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the report when it next convenes in Vienna on 2 June. The report´s circulation is restricted and cannot be released to the public unless the IAEA Board decides otherwise…

Hopefully we won’t have to wait as I am sure ISIS will leak it as usual. It would seem as if someone has leaked it already for AFP reports that

…The report, to be discussed by the IAEA's board of governors at a June 2-6 meeting, said intelligence from a number of sources suggest Iran has conducted the studies. Iran has repeatedly dismissed the allegations as "baseless" and the intelligence as "forged".

The IAEA demanded that Iran, which already faces UN Security Council sanctions over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment, disprove the allegations.

"Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension," the report insisted.
"The alleged studies ... remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme."

The IAEA "is continuing to assess the information and explanations provided by Iran. However, at this stage, Iran has not provided the agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran's statements."

The IAEA "is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile-related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with age…

For its part Iran is claiming that it has answered these allegations but it would seem not. It seems, given the citations of the US ambassador to the IAEA in the AFP report, that it was the US delegation that leaked it.

Hopefully, ISIS will leak the thing in the next couple of days. It would be a shame if we have to rely on AFP.

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