Iraq SOFA Deters Democracy.
The Government of Iraq and the Bush Administration have reached a draft agreement on the status of US military forces stationed in Iraq, known as a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA, which still needs approval from the Iraqi Parliament to come into force. If Iraqi lawmakers abide by the wishes of the people they will reject this agreement or any other agreement that codifies the US occupation.
This agreement, and the long history of its negotiation, tells us a lot about the nature of the underlying rationale for the US invasion and the future of Iraq policy after November.
From the earliest moments of the US occupation, Washington has sough legal sanction for unlimited freedom of action to conduct military operations in Iraq, to retain the option of using Iraq as a springboard for enforcing US interests in the oil rich region and to essentially maintain a permanent military presence that would have included the right to detain Iraqis at will and to essentially do all this completely immune from Iraqi law.
We know this because earlier this year documents from US Central Command, the Coalition Provisional Authority and Coalition Joint Task Force-7, the official designation of the coalition high command in the Iraqi theatre of operations, dating back to 2003 demonstrate this without the slightest hint of ambiguity.
In fact, Washington sought to wrap up a Status of Forces Agreement prior to the establishment of an interim Iraqi government in June 2004 and the election of a transitional parliament in January 2005. In other words, the US wanted to set up a SOFA prior to the emergence of any authority in Baghdad the least bit subject to popular will.
Most likely the rising insurgency and the prospect of a Shiite revolt led by the Mahdi Army of Moktada al-Sadr deterred the US from wrapping up an all encompassing SOFA so early.
In November 2007 the Maliki Administration in Baghdad and Washington signed a Declaration of Principles that essentially codified these objectives. The Declaration called for the development of a security agreement that would "deter foreign aggression", which is an Orwellian phrase opening up the prospect of regional operations from military bases in Iraq, especially against Iran. At the time a possible large scale military campaign to degrade Iranian strategic capability, under a cover provided by Iran's uranium enrichment programme, was widely discussed.
The November 2007 Declaration also expressed an interest that the US should continue to "support" Iraq to combat "all terrorist groups". No definition of "all terrorist groups" is specified. However, the 2003 de-classified documents stipulate that CJTF-7 sought freedom to conduct military operations in order "to fight anti-coalition forces", a term that provides the real meaning of the phrase "all terrorist groups" in the 2007 Declaration.
An internal US military presence would be able to meet any domestic challenges to the US instituted order which would include, according to the 2007 Declaration, preferential access for US investors.
In June 2007 the Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, effectively let the cat out of the bag on a permanent military presence in Iraq for he stated that "what I'm thinking in terms of is a mutual agreement where some force of Americans -- mutually agreed with mutually agreed missions -- is present for a protracted period of time."
After the signing of the Declaration of Principles Washington and Baghdad embarked upon serious negotiations to complete a Status of Forces Agreement. Washington sought to complete these negotiations by the end of July this year.
Leaks to The Independent showed that the US sought the establishment of a permanent military presence through some 50 bases, the freedom to conduct internal and external operations from these bases, and to do so unhindered by Iraqi law. Terms which are entirely consistent with the de-classified 2003 documents.
The leaking of these provisions provoked a firestorm of opposition in Iraq, where the majority of the population, especially in Arab Iraq where US troops are deployed, opposes the US occupation. The highly respected and influential cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also expressed opposition in a rare political intervention. This forced the Maliki government to backtrack and dig in its heels, much to the displeasure of Washington.
The Maliki administration was able to do so after employing the Iraqi Army, essentially lead by the former Badr brigade, in operations against a rival Shiite militia in Basra and Sadr City in Baghdad. This lowered, but did not eliminate his dependency upon US forces, thereby marginally increasing his leverage in negotiations.
By the same token Iran maintains influence with the government in Baghdad as an important political partner of the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the driving forces in the Maliki Cabinet, even before the 2003 invasion and because of increasing economic ties subsequent to the invasion. Iran, naturally, opposes any security agreement with the US that would leave Washington with unlimited freedom of action in the region.
The draft agreement that has finally been reached, the details of which are only publicly available in excerpt form and may not even be scrutinised by Congress, provides some limits to the maximal objectives long sort by the United States but it still provides wide scope for US military operations in Iraq and beyond.
It still gives immunity from Iraqi law for US military forces engaged in military operations. It does, however, set up a joint US-Iraqi body overseeing combat operations. How much teeth Baghdad will have within this body in practice is another matter. The Iraqi security forces are dependant upon the United States for logistical support and advanced firepower, dependence fostered quite deliberately by Washington. This will provide US commanders with great leverage in any joint military body, much as Hitler's Panzers did with Mussolini.
It is true that the leaked excerpts speak of a US military withdrawal by 2011, but careful reading shows that the agreement provides a springboard for the development of a follow-on agreement. It stipulates that after US combat forces are withdrawn an agreement can be reached so that Washington can "keep forces for the purposes of training and supporting Iraqi security forces."
None of this is any way inconsistent with statements coming from the Obama and McCain campaigns, suggesting more convergence with current policy than "change you can believe in" so far as Iraq is concerned. It should be clear that the presence of foreign military forces in Iraq, against the wishes of the populace, completely lacks legitimacy and can only proceed given the coercive leverage provided by the internal US military presence.
Democracy is as relevant in all this as was "weapons of mass destruction" in the lead up to the 2003 invasion.
Gates Further Confirms Expanded Deterrence.
Hmm, the plot thickens. You pretty much heard it here first and now the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has further confirmed that the Bush Administration has adopted an expanded or expansive conception of deterrence to encompass nuclear (WMD) terrorism.
But there is more here than just expansive deterrence to encompass nuclear terrorism. There is some more important stuff here about tailored deterrence and the future of nuclear strategy.
I will come back to that.
What you are also gonna hear here first is that if this has been adopted in a formal NSPD then it most likely would be NSPD 57. I have previously been of the belief that we were talking here of NSPD 57 or 58, but we now know that NSPD 58 is about all that neo-con stuff on “promoting democracy.”
The New York Times has a report on the comments of Gates, which he made in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. According to the report
…The statement was the Bush administration’s most expansive yet in trying to articulate a vision of deterrence for the post-Sept. 11 world. It went beyond the cold war notion that a president could respond with overwhelming force against a country that directly attacked the United States or its allies with unconventional weapons…
…His speech here before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was the latest signal that the administration was moving in its closing months to embrace more far-reaching notions of deterrence and self-defense…
Readers of this blog would be familiar with all this by now. I have written a paper on the topic, which shall be published in Arms Control Today, so I don’t want to go too far here.
I have much more on nuclear terrorism more broadly, but I have been holding my tongue given that I am writing a book on the topic. If I was to write this stuff here, like, who would actually buy the book?
The tailored deterrence angle is important here; this topic will be covered in the book. It will be a wide ranging survey of everything remotely related to nuclear terrorism.
The Gates speech is available at the Carnegie Endowment website. The relevant remarks on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism are
…We also still face the problem of weapons passing from nation states into the hands of terrorists. After September 11th, the president announced that we would make no distinction between terrorists and the states that sponsor or harbor them. Indeed, the United States has made it clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces and our friends and allies. Today we also make clear that the United States will hold any state, terrorist group or other non-state actor or individual fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts…
The second important part is
…To add teeth to the deterrent goal of this policy, we are pursuing new technologies to identify the forensic signatures of any nuclear material used in an attack, to trace it back to the source.…
The first comments clearly incorporate nuclear weapons in the new expansive conception of deterrence and the usage of the phrase “enabling” is entirely consistent with the negligence doctrine, which Joe Biden supports.
The second passage on nuclear forensics is interesting. It strongly implies that current nuclear forensic capabilities are not as robust as policy makers would like them to be. For the purposes of deterrence it is rational to over-play one’s forensic capability in order to foster ambiguity.
In other words, US nuclear deterrence policy is moving faster than, and out of step with, the nuclear science needed to back it up.
That is irrational from a policy making perspective. That’s nothing new for Team Bush.
The tailored deterrence issue is important, meaning the Gates speech goes way beyond just the deterrence of nuclear terrorism.
I have been meaning to write something on tailored deterrence, especially after the Department of Energy and Department of Defense paper to Congress on the Reliable Replacement Warhead, but that paper was so disappointing I didn’t bother. Like, it didn’t even really mention tailored deterrence let alone go into the concept.
This is what Gates stated in his speech,
…I spent most of my time talking about our nuclear arsenal. Before closing, I want to take a step back and discuss briefly some of the broader implications of deterrents in the 21st century. There can be little doubt that the post-Cold-War world offers a new strategic paradigm for nuclear weapons, and particularly for the concept of deterrence.…
That puts tailored deterrence into the framework.
The Times points out, correctly in my view, that
…By law, the new president must conduct a review of the nation’s nuclear posture, and Mr. Gates’s address could be viewed as advocating a specific agenda for the next occupant of the White House.…
Tailored deterrence here is important for if you buy the argument that the security environment of the 21st century required that deterrence be tailored then it is but a simple logical step to argue that the cold war era stockpile is out of sink, and that what is required is the sort of capabilities spoken of in the context of RRW.
So we get a syllogism Aristotle style
(1) We are now into the “second nuclear age.”
(2) Traditional conceptions of deterrence, of “one size fits all”, are no longer relevant. What is required is that deterrence be tailored.
(3) The nuclear weapons stockpile and the weapons complex backing it up needs to reflect a strategy built around tailored deterrence given that the current stockpile is a legacy of bi-polarity.
Elaine Bunn wrote a good paper on tailored deterrence. This paper asks, “can deterrence be tailored”? That’s a good question but a bigger question is should deterrence be tailored?
If the next administration buys the tailored deterrence argument then I am afraid that something like RRW is basically a sure bet.
Let us now concentrate on whether deterrence should be tailored; notice that this pre-supposes the validity of the notion of nuclear deterrence, which we should not pre-suppose by any means.
Congress Funds Leg Up For Space-Based Missile Defense
As pointed out a few times before the most hawkish supporters of Ballistic Missile Defense are especially interested in space-based missile defense. They have received an important leg up with Congress approving funding of a study, previously rejected, on space-based missile defence, which the Pentagon will out-source. The push for this came from Sen Jon Kyl, who is an uber-Hawk that employs some serious twisted logic, as can be seen from this post at the ACW blog
I was made aware of this by reading a report in The Washington Times by Bill Gertz
…Congress voted recently to approve $5 million for a study of space-based missile defenses, the first time the development of space weapons will be considered since similar work was canceled in the 1990s. Appropriation of the money for the study was tucked away in a little-noticed provision of the Continuing Resolution passed recently by Congress and followed two years in which Congress rejected $10 million sought for the study…
…A defense official said space-based missile defenses were last considered during the first Bush administration as part of its Global Protection Against Limited Strike, or GPALS, a missile-defense plan focused on then-Soviet missiles using a combination of ground-based interceptors, sea-based missiles and space-based interceptors. The Clinton administration canceled all work on space-based missile defense and focused instead on tactical defenses against short-range missiles.
The current Bush administration's missile-defense program is limited to the deployed ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California and ship-based interceptor missile defense.
The defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said space-based defenses are needed for global, rapid defense against missiles. "It's really the only way to defend the U.S. and its allies from anywhere on the planet," the official said…
Generally there are two types of space based BMD that we can talk about those being space based interception in the boost phase or space based exo-atmospheric interception in the midcourse phase. The latter would involve the use of directed energy interception such as lasers and is way off.
The Bush the Elder space based BMD was called “brilliant pebbles” and was a form of space based boost phase interception. This study will focus on the boost phase primarily.
A number of things can be said about this, following the Union of Concerned Scientists report on The Physics of Space Security especially section 9 on space basing.
The first is that even for a very limited capability we are talking big bucks. As the trainee Mercury astronauts stated in The Right Stuff, “no bucks, no Buck Rogers”.
…Similar to the ground attack system analyzed above, the structure of the missile defense constellation would depend on what parts of the Earth the system was intended to cover. Truly global coverage would require some satellites in polar orbits. A system using satellites in orbits with inclinations less than about 45° would not be able to defend against launches from locations
with latitudes above about 45°. Such a system would cover the Middle East and almost all of the United States and China, but would not cover Russia or northern Europe. The Brilliant Pebbles system proposed as part of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system in the early 1990s by the first Bush administration was intended to include 1,000 SBIs for global coverage of one or two missiles launched simultaneously from a single site.…
Moreover,
…A technical analysis of boost-phase missile defense published by the American Physical Society (APS) in July 2003 found that a similar number of interceptors were required.16 The APS panel considered a constellation of SBIs in orbits at an altitude of 300 km that would place a minimum of one and occasionally two interceptors within range of any launch site between 30° and 45° latitude (which includes North Korea and the Middle East), but would provide no coverage above 45° and somewhat limited coverage near the equator. They determined that this system would require roughly 1,600 SBIs to engage solid fueled missiles (with a boost phase of 170 seconds), and roughly 700 SBIs to engage liquid-fueled missiles (with a boost phase of 240 seconds). Increasing the regions of the Earth covered by the system would significantly increase the number of SBIs needed; global coverage would roughly double the number required.…
Indeed,
…Using these assumptions, a constellation of 1,600 SBI needed to defend against solid-fuel missiles would require a total mass in orbit of nearly 2,000 tons. Assuming a launch cost of $20,000 per kilogram (see Section 8), the launch cost would be roughly $40 billion. A constellation of 700 SBI needed to defend against liquid-fuel missiles would require a total mass in orbit of 850 tons, leading to an estimated launch cost of $17 billion. Recall that these systems could engage only one or two missiles launched simultaneously from a single site. Placing 1,000 tons in orbit would require the equivalent of more than 100 Delta or Atlas II/III launches or more than 50 Atlas V launches.…
However an interesting point, that would no doubt be discussed in the Pentagon report, may mitigate this cost
…These total mass figures could be decreased by reducing either the number of interceptors or the mass of the SBI. The issue of how light the SBI can be made is controversial and depends, in part, on the timeline considered. The APS study based its model of the SBI on the technologies it judged to be realistic in the next decade. It considered further possible reductions in the mass of the SBI that might reduce it by about 60%. Other estimates have raised the possibility of even lighter SBIs—considerably lighter than the lightest APS model—although the timeline and other details of these estimates have not been made public. Reducing the SBI mass may make it possible to increase its dV without a prohibitive increase in propellant mass, and this increase in speed may increase the optimal orbital altitude and decrease the number of interceptors required in the constellation. For example, a July 2004 Congressional Budget Office analysis considered a fast, lightweight SBI having a dV of 6 km/s rather than the 4 km/s assumed by APS, a fueled kill vehicle mass of 30 kg rather than the 136 kg assumed by APS, and a garage mass of 90 kg rather than the 440 kg assumed by APS. CBO found that if such an SBI could be built, it would reduce the total number of interceptors in orbit compared with the APS values by roughly a factor of three (for defending against solid-fuel missiles) to 4.5 (for defending against liquid-fuel missiles). In addition, it would reduce the total mass of interceptors in orbit compared with the APS values by roughly a factor of seven (for defending against solid-fuel missiles) to ten (for defending against liquid-fuel missiles)…
We can say a few things about the impact that space based interceptors would have on strategic stability. Firstly, such interceptors would be in LEO and would be highly vulnerable to ASAT capabilities as the UCS report points out
…A key technical difficulty of a space-based missile defense is the vulnerability of the system to attack. The SBI could be tracked from the ground and their locations would be well known. Because the SBI would be in low-altitude orbits (300 to 500 km), they could be attacked by ASATs on short-range missiles with ranges of 600 to 1,000 km. Such missiles would burn out too low for the SBI
to intercept them in their boost phase. If the SBIs were programmed to ignore short-range missiles, the SBI would be vulnerable to attack while in their orbits. But because an SBI must be launched quickly after detection of a missile launch, the SBI might have to launch before it could determine the range of the missile. Causing an SBI to be launched would remove it from orbit and deplete the constellation as effectively as destroying it with an ASAT. Since short-range missiles are much less expensive than long-range missiles, a country could launch enough ASATs on short-range missiles to create a hole in the constellation. The attacking country could launch a long-range missile through this hole when it reappeared after an orbital period of roughly 90 minutes or could even plan to launch from a location the hole passed over shortly afterward.…
This will lead to a need to provide for “force protection.” One could easily see here how an action-reaction dynamic may emerge leading to the overt weaponisation of space by the world’s leading strategic powers.
If the UCS analysis on the high costs of the system is correct then we would have here a very expensive system, one that is highly vulnerable and that provides very limited capabilities in terms of the number of missiles to be engaged.
Not very rational from a strictly security or strategic perspective given the ability to achieve space security through arms control.
The other issue with space based BMD is the ability for the interceptors to move from LEO to higher orbits and engage strategic nuclear early warning satellites
…Assuming it was designed with sensors that could detect a satellite in orbit, an SBI designed to intercept a boosting missile would have more than enough maneuverability to intercept a satellite in orbit. Moreover, the large dV the SBI would possess for accelerating out of orbit would also allow it to change its orbit to attack satellites in orbits significantly different from its own, including geosynchronous orbit. The orbital speed of the SBI would be roughly 8 km/s; adding the 4 km/s it would need to reach a boosting missile, it could reach a total speed of up to 12 km/s. Our calculations show that such a speed would allow it to travel from low earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit in an hour and a half and still have a speed of nearly 7 km/s at that altitude. Ground observations could determine the location of the satellite to be attacked with sufficient accuracy to launch the interceptor and allow the onboard sensors to detect the satellite when it was close enough. Whether a kill vehicle designed solely for missile defense could be used to attack satellites in this way depends on details of its design, such as the type of sensors it contains and the length of time it is designed to operate (a matter of minutes to reach a boosting missile versus an hour to reach geosynchronous orbit). It is clear, however, that these are design decisions and that these capabilities could be built into the SBI to give them the capability to also serve as high-altitude ASATs. The sensors that are designed to enable the SBI to detect the missile plume during the boost phase may not be suitable for detecting a satellite, but lightweight sensors exist that could be added for the ASAT mission. Since geosynchronous satellites are in the sunlight during all or nearly all of their orbit, they would reflect sunlight and would have a relatively high surface temperature, both of which could be used for homing…
Adding all that into the mix we may then have the following; a very expensive system, one that is highly vulnerable and whose vulnerability invites ASAT deployment by other strategic nuclear powers, which has an intrinsically limited capability against the number of long range (strategic) missiles it can engage and that would have a deleterious impact on strategic stability (enhancing the salience of strategic deterrence) because of potential high orbit ASAT capabilities.
In short, if the security of the continental United States is your overwhelming priority then space based interceptors should not be of much interest to you.
To return to The Right Stuff. Given the current fiscal situation of the United States, especially following the Wall Street bailout and future counter-cyclical spending, could the US be able to fund such a large scale space launch capability as well as increasing NASA space launch capacity to “return to the Moon” and engage in a mission to Mars?
“No bucks, no Buck Rogers” indeed.
B61-12 LEP or WR-2?
As a part of the new Reliable Refurbished Warhead concept Team Bush is proposing a new Mod for the B61, the B61-12 or B61 Mod 12.
The story was first developed by Global Security Newswire. We are talking here of replacing all the B61 Mods other than the B61-11, the EPW much discussed during the Clinton Administration especially post PDD-60.
What got me interested was the whole issue of how the new Mod would incorporate the safety and reliability features that have been packaged as part of the original concept.
Debate seems to be focused on trading either modification to the casing of the B61 <11 Mods or to the yield.
As can be seen in the above report by GSN and in the following blog post at ACW the idea with the casing, we are told, is to change its size or shape to incorporate the much sought after reliability and safety features.
But I was deeply sceptical of this when I first read the report and remain so. The casing got me interested. Take this comment on what constitutes a Mod from the GSN report
…The Air Force defines a “mod” as a change to a weapon that reflects new or different performance standards, such as explosive power or destructive capability against reinforced targets. Smaller changes, called “alterations”, replace a part or subsystem but do not involve a change in performance. Life-extension efforts typically constitute only an alteration.…
This is not really a B61 LEP.
We must bear in mind that the RRW concept flowed on from the failure of the RNEP and the Advanced Concepts Initiative, which in turn developed from the nuclear weapon employment policy following the NPR.
Reliability and safety are covers given the failure of these initiatives in Congress.
The casing is noteworthy because this is the real guts of an EPW. The B61 casing got me interested because of the following about the B61 and NATO nuclear strategy
…U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in June 12 remarks to the press during the NATO defense ministers council, said that "there was talk about modernization of both policies and capabilities" within the alliance. He argued that NATO had already reduced its nuclear forces substantially and maintained that among alliance members "there was no dissent from the fact that we needed a nuclear deterrent in NATO and needed to keep it modern."
In his Arms Control Today interview, Roberts provided further details of options to renew U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. He argued that NATO member states will have to make some difficult choices about modernizing nuclear forces. "There is a recognition by member states and NATO that dual-capable aircraft are aging. The B-61 is a weapon that will need to be upgraded or replaced if NATO wants to maintain a credible and capable nuclear deterrent." (See ACT July/August 2006. ) Roberts said that the proposed so-called reliable replacement warhead (RRW) is currently the only option to replace aging U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, beyond 2015. "If the RRW program is not going ahead, there will be a need for a life extension program for the B-61."…
[Roberts is a senior NATO nuclear planner]
Do you see where I am coming from on this one? Gates here is talking about modernising both NATO nuclear policy and capabilities. NATO nuclear strategy still reflects PDD-60 not NSPD-14; in other words NATO strategy is still pre Bush-NPR.
The whole talk about modernising the B61, the US nuclear warhead deployed as a part of the trans-Atlantic link, is spoken of in the context of the new strategy and that means new missions.
Take this from the GSN article
…The initial concept for the B-61 Mod 12 grew out of plans for an RRW-2 weapon, a provenance that might not sit well with lawmakers who have opposed the replacement warhead.
The RRW-2 variant was to replace not only the B-61s but all air-delivered nuclear warheads, including cruise missiles, the official said.…
It's just the RRW-2 or WR-2 and that would have had to include replacing the B61-11, the most effective EPW which put the punch into PDD-60 let alone NSPD-14.
According to Gates the current B61 warhead types need to be modernised to reflect NPR missions; we know this because he has effectively stated that these warhead types, deployed in Europe as a part of NATO, are not in sync with NSPD-14 missions.
Notice that in Europe that the US deploys the B61 Mod 3, 4 and 10 i.e. not the B61-11 and thereby all the Mods slated to be axed by the B61-12.
See what I mean? Gates has said it loud and clear “modernize both policy and capability.”
The issue with the casing is not really size, it is enhanced ground penetration. I believe I have good grounds to be sceptical about the B61-12 as an instance of LEP.
Where Now For Western Strategy In Afghanistan?
I have written an essay on the strategic state of play in Afghanistan and Pakistan at On Line Opinion.
The current economic crisis, although it is helping to push down commodity prices, should bury any talk of an air campaign against Iran. That, and its likely consequences, would require money. A projected surge in military operations in Afghanistan also should put the brakes on.
But then again, anything is possible with Team Bush.
The Bush Administration is very similar to the Reagan Administration. During the first term all the talk was of "imperial hubris". Those who have sought to use Washington's "unipolar moment" to lock in US post Cold War strategic gains in the Administration's first term, using "democracy" as an ideological cover (which even the most hard headed realists buy into), have met the limits to US power in the second.
A bit like the Reagan Administration that was forced to backpedal in the second term due to massive twin deficits brought on by supply side economics and excessive military spending.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.