Early Warning Satellite, DSP-23, Goes AWOL
A Defense Support Satellite, DSP-23 the latest one to be launched, is out of action.
...A Northrop Grumman Corp U.S. military satellite used to track enemy missiles stopped working in mid-September, underscoring the urgent need to keep a program for replacement satellites on track, a defense official and several analysts said on Monday...
...The defense official said it was unclear what caused the failure, but said the explanations could range from defective parts to natural phenomenon, and possibly, although unlikely, an intentional attack. There was also a chance that the problem stemmed from the satellite being hit by debris in space.
The U.S. government has launched 23 DSP missile-warning satellites into space since 1970, and experts estimate that six to 10 are still working, about double the number needed to watch the entire Earth at once...
Current DSP satellites are DSP-18, 19,20,21,22,23. Strike out DSP-23.
According to the Federation of American Scientists there are usually about 5 satellites in constellation as a part of the Satellite Early Warning System
...The Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) consists of five Defense Support Program spacecraft. Three of these provide frontline operational service, with two additional spacecraft available as backups should problems emerge with the primary satellites. The standard operating procedure is that primary reliance is placed on the three most recently launched satellites, with the two older satellites providing backup. Because of the critical importance of this mission, a replacement satellite will normally be launched around the time that the oldest of the five spacecraft on-orbit nears the end of its operational life. This newly launched satellite will assume frontline duty, the eldest of the three frontline spacecraft will assume backup status, and the oldest satellite will be retired......
Because DSP-23 was the most recently launched satellite we expect that it was deployed in operational service when contact was lost; DSP-18 or 19, most likely 19, should serve as backup.
Imagine if we still have launch on warning, space is weaponised with offensive and defensive weapons in space, there is a software glitch at STRATCOM HQ indicating massive attack and, oh, right at the same time a DSP satellite goes AWOL and some nut in Georgia attacks Russian forces.
Ouch, that could lead to what NASA calls a normal accident.
Adaptive (Tailored) Deterrence and Deterrence Of Nuclear Terrorism
Well, my wild speculations about NSPD-57 and 58 cannot possible be correct. NSPD-58 we have already come across. NSPD-57 is about the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
So what gives?
Well, notice that there is a very interesting NSPD namely NSPD-4 entitled Transforming Deterrence. The title and existence of this NSPD must have been just released.
Joy, sort of, because this comes right when I am doing some research on tailored deterrence. You would note that NSPD-4 is dated 15 February 2001. That’s early into Team Bush’s term of office.
NSPD-14 came out between February and June 2002. That means NSPD-4 is important, in fact, very important
That takes official policy expressions of tailored deterrence well before current thought and that, most likely, it has shaped NSPD-14 which is the key Guidance underpinning current nuclear strategy.
This confirms my hunch that I have stated a few times here and at the old blog and my comments about Brand Obama (Team Bush is gone and for Obama I’m using Brand Obama rather than Team Obama) and arms control and nuclear strategy.
Keep tailored deterrence = keep a lot of current nuclear strategy (i.e. NSPD-14)
This because,
NSPD-4 = NSPD-14.
Ok, what of the deterrence of nuclear terrorism?
Global Deterrence Joint Operating Concept v 2.0 has an interesting statement
…Because of the uncertain future security environment, additional vital interests may arise that are identified by senior national leadership. Detterrence strategy and planning must be sufficiently robust and flexible to accommodate these changes if and when they occur. Flexibility in our detterrence construct also hedges against the possibility that an adversary might incorrectly perceive their actions to be “below the radarscope” of US resolve and response…
In other words, if I was more observant and had known about NSPD-4 I would have known that a new NSPD would not be needed to cover the deterrence of nuclear terrorism.
You can see that in the above citation.
Tailored deterrence is also a form of dynamical deterrence and that is probably written into NSPD-4. Most likely, as strategic planners have been thinking about the issue, they have expanding what the “requirements of deterrence” require in the context of nuclear terrorism.
In the 1990s there were a number of reforms to the Strategic War Planning System designed to create what was called a “living SIOP”. The idea here was to have a system able to support adaptive planning rather than merely rely on pre-planned major and limited attack options. This was one reason why Team Bush changed the SIOP to OPLAN-8044.
The same thing was done with concept of deterrence it appears. NSPD-4 may have given us a living deterrence or adaptive deterrence. In other words, tailored deterrence is also adaptive deterrence.
See what I mean?
Boy, I would have loved to have known about NSPD-4 before (hey, that rhymes).
Doesn’t matter. That’s what academic blogs are good for. You can make speculations that you wouldn’t dare in a paper. That’s how you learn how the world works.
Ooops, I almost forgot; Global Deterrence Joint Operating Concept v 3.0 was due in June 2008.
Come on General Chilton, where is it already?
Syrian Uranium; Al Kibar Was A Plutonium Production Reactor
I am willing to concede on al-Kibar.
There are two aspects of the IAEA Safeguards report on Syria that, taken together, tend to paint a disturbing picture. That is, it would seem that we may well be talking here of not just (a) a nuclear reactor but (b) a plutonium production reactor.
We have already seen the stuff about uranium found at al-Kibar, to which we return. The first bit I want to focus on is the water pump and energy supply
The International Atomic Energy Agency states in the report
...During the meeting on 24 June 2008...Syria stated that the destroyed building could not have been a nuclear facility because of, inter alia, the unreliable and insufficient electricity supplies in the area, the limited availability of human resources in Syria and the unavailability of large quantities of treated water...
The IAEA quite categorically states that this is false and, on a par with the Israeli nuclear analyst who wrote a report on the feasibility of estimating the power output of al-Kibar, the Agency goes on to make an interesting point about the associated water pumping infrastructure
...As part of its assessment, the Agency has conducted an evaluation of the water pumping infrastructure observed by it during the June 2008 visit to Dair Alzour. The results of that evaluation indicate that the pumping capacity is adequate for a reactor of the size referred to in the allegation
(25 MWth). During its visit to the site, the Agency observed sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping system...
Two things here; firstly, the Syrian explanation has been shown to be bullshit. That is, the stated electricity and water supply defence offered by Syria in the 24 June meeting is crap. Secondly, the pumping system is adequate to support a 25MW thermal reactor.
Following Ian Bellany (Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons pp8-9), we may state that a nuclear reactor of this type produces 1g of plutonium per day per MWth so a 25MWth reactor produces 25g of plutonium per day. Assuming a 300 day operating year that comes to ~7kg of Pu per year. That's 1kg less Pu than the IAEA's SQ, but that would be sufficient plutonium production for a nuclear weapon.
It would still be on the low side because, although one could imagine constructing a nuclear weapon with 4kg of Pu, we should expect that the Syrians would need about 6kg for a first generation device. To have one nuclear weapon would require 2 years worth of production, assuming the need for a test.
However, if Syria's objective was to deter Israel one could argue that 1 weapon, say for Tel Aviv or Haifa, would be enough of a strategic deterrent. On this basis, al-Kibar would be a reactor capable of producing plutonium (assuming 25MWth) sufficient for a strategic arsenal.
But, given the relatively small size of the reactor this places delivery constraints for any Syrian Army commander. An Air Force delivered package would be ruled out because of the lack of redundancy. The Syrians would need a warhead to fit on its missiles, and that would require relatively sophisticated warhead design. It seems that just such a design has been floating around because of the activities of the AQ Khan network.
Could this design accommodate 4kg of Pu for the fissile core?
Recall the point about the uranium. The Syrian defence here also has no legs. As I speculated initially it is almost certain that the uranium found is processed uranium metal, as discussed at this intriguing ACW post which must be read by all concerned. The interesting thing about this post is the possible North Korean angle.
The Syrians would have forgone uranium milling and fabrication and gone straight for North Korean uranium metal for the fuel rods. That means al-Kibar could not be about a programme to master the fuel cycle for civil energy purposes; it was Pu production through and through.
That's disturbing.
However, Syria would still need a hot cell facility (if not a reprocessing plant) and a place to fabricate plutonium metal, which is much more challenging than fabricating uranium metal.
We are starting to get more clarity on al-Kibar, but I am willing to swallow my pride and concede that this was supposed to be a plutonium production reactor. Let's follow the IAEA and not make the final call yet.
I have one major wild speculation; the Israeli air strike was tacitly supported by Syria.
I am willing to wage a mad bet that Israel or the US or both showed the Syrians what they had on al-Kibar and told them that they were going to bomb it before fuel was introduced into the reactor core. Because Syria is engaged in talks on the Golan, Lebanon and Iran the last thing they wanted was to be brought before the UN Security Council and go through a protracted Iran style process that would impede these peace talks.
Having had their little secret exposed it was better for everybody, including Syria, to just let the Israeli's bomb it.
The dickhead neo-cons like Bolton leaked the story to try and kill the North Korean talks.
Any takers?
(Yes, I see the nuclear terrorism angle but I'm not talkin' about that subject until I finish my book on the topic. As Bart Simpson would say, "eh, eh suckers".)
(Yes, more on the Iran report later.)
National Security Agency Reveals 3 Soviet Alerts During The Cuban Missile Crisis
Bruce Blair writing in the book The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War stated that (p22)
…Central to the arguments advanced in this book is the thesis that rival strategic command and control organizations in the course of their evolution acquire a sense of vulnerability that causes them to adopt rapid reaction postures…
He then goes on
…But the thesis seems to founder for want of evidence showing this kind of alerting interaction between the US and Soviet nuclear forces during the Cuban missile crisis or any other moment of acute cold war tension…researchers have reported no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union ever initated a nuclear alert or ever reacted with an alert to any of the alerts insistuted by the United States…
Scott Sagan has a very good book on nuclear safety and deterrence, which mostly focuses on the US for lack of evidence on the Soviet record.
However, the National Security Archive at George Washington University has just published a de-classified (and heavily redacted) official history of the National Security Agency. According to this study the USSR alerted three times during the Cuban missile crisis
…. Disclosed for the first time in the NSA account is that U.S. intelligence tracked the readiness condition of Soviet air defense and strategic forces during the Crisis. What has remained secret for years is that Soviet forces went on high alert three times during September and October 1962. The first was on 11 September 1962, when for ten days “Soviet forces went into their highest readiness stage since the beginning of the Cold War,” perhaps because the Soviets believed that U.S. intelligence had learned about the missile deployments. Especially telling is that also on 11 September, the Kremlin publicized its apprehension that President Kennedy’s request to Congress for stand-by authority to call up reservists foreshadowed an attack on Cuba, which the Soviets said was grounds for war. (Note 3) Another alert of a more “precautionary, preliminary” nature began on 15 October, perhaps also because Khrushchev supposed that the missiles had been discovered. Finally, after Kennedy’s speech, Soviet forces went on an “extraordinarily high state of alert,” with the emphasis on air defense forces. Significantly, “offensive forces avoided assuming the highest readiness stage, as if to insure that Kennedy understood that the USSR would not launch first.” (Book II, p. 331)…
That last bit is of interest. What role did this play in US policy at the time? That’s a good question for a historian to look into. It surely must have played some role.
To be sure at the time Soviet ICBM capability was relatively rudimentary, and these forces would not have been at the highest level of alert. However, it is clear that both command and control organisations were involved in a most dangerous interaction. This tends to support the Blair thesis.
Finally, the NSA history has some stuff on Australia
…The discovery of high-level Soviet spies operating inside the Australian government in 1947 led the U.S. to cut off Australian access to classified U.S. government information for two years. Full U.S.-Australia SIGINT cooperation did not resume until 1953, with Johnson noting that the rift “had a deleterious affect on early U.S. SIGINT efforts against the Peoples Republic of China.”…
Operation Lionheart: Joint US-Pakistan Army Offensive?
US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan Army forces in the border region have launched a joint offensive against militant Islamic forces, known as Operation Lionheart. The existence of this operation was broken by the Wall Street Journal.
…U.S. forces have begun working with Pakistan's military to take on Taliban and al Qaeda fighters along the Afghan border, a development American officials say reflects Islamabad's new willingness to go after Islamist militants.
The U.S. and Pakistan are waging a coordinated military campaign known as Operation Lionheart, which involves American strikes on insurgent targets in the Kunar region of Afghanistan and a full-scale Pakistani campaign in the tribal areas of Bajaur, a longtime extremist stronghold, according to senior American officials…
According to the Washington Post the underlying planning foundation for Operation Lionheart was set in September, which puts that Naval vessel meeting between The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (along with his Operational Commander, now serving as chief of the ISI) in perspective.
The Post seems to be trying to hint at a connection with that Heli-borne raid across the border,
…The arrangement coincided with a suspension of ground assaults into Pakistan by helicopter-borne U.S. commandos. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said in an interview last week that he was aware of no ground attacks since one on Sept. 3 that his government vigorously protested…
The Post article tells us something very interesting about the nature of US ground operations in Afghanistan, which could well provide a hint for the type of capabilities that the US Army brought to bear in Iraq during the surge (remember Bob Woodward spoke of some “Manhattan” type techno-wizardry thing)
…Current and former U.S. counterterrorism officials said improved intelligence has been an important factor in the increased tempo and precision of the Predator strikes. Over the past year, they said, the United States has been able to improve its network of informants in the border region while also fielding new hardware that allows close tracking of the movements of suspected militants.
The missiles are fired from unmanned aircraft by the CIA. But the drones are only part of a diverse network of machines and software used by the agency to spot terrorism suspects and follow their movements, the officials said. The equipment, much of which remains highly classified, includes an array of powerful sensors mounted on satellites, airplanes, blimps and drones of every size and shape…
This sounds like a JSTARS for tracking insurgents.
The Post article speaks of supporting Pakistan, but what the article fails to mention was that Pakistan was forced to go to the IMF as a result of the financial crisis; Islamabad would have preferred a bi-lateral arrangement to avoid IMF conditionalities. No dice.
They had to swallow an IMF package.
…Pakistan has sought an emergency bailout from the International Monetary Fund, a humiliating step forced on Islamabad after allies refused to come up with the cash needed to prevent the country going bust.
The U.S., China and Saudi Arabia have all rebuffed Pakistan's urgent money-raising requests, despite Islamabad telling its allies that it should be rewarded for its key role in the "war on terror."
Relations with Washington may have been damaged as a result, analysts said. A separate political development in Pakistan on Wednesday may test the U.S. alliance further……The IMF funding would stave off bankruptcy for Pakistan, which would've nudged it closer to instability as the nuclear-armed country fights an Islamist insurrection at home and reinforces the U.S.-led coalition in neighboring Afghanistan. However, Pakistan's leaders had been desperately trying to find other sources of funding. Finance minister, Shaukat Tareen, recently described going to the IMF as his "Plan C.”
In Pakistan, the IMF programs of the past had been deeply unpopular, requiring the country to agree to strict austerity measures. The previous regime, led by former President Pervez Musharraf, had trumpeted its break from this source of finance.
"Musharraf, everyone, celebrated that Pakistan had graduated out of IMF programs. He said he had 'broken the begging bowl,'" said Faisal Bari, a professor of economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. "Going back to the IMF means that the country is carrying the begging bowl again, that it is not on a path of sustainable growth."
The IMF on Wednesday confirmed that Pakistan asked for funds, "to meet the balance of payments difficulties the country is experiencing." A deal is expected to provide $5 billion or more for the coming year, with billions more for subsequent years.
Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves will run out in about seven weeks, meaning that it won't be able to meet external debt payments and will be bankrupt. The restoration of democracy with elections last February coincided with an economic collapse that's sent inflation soaring and led to a nosedive in the value of the rupee…
The interesting thing about that is that
…Against expectations, a special debate in parliament on counter-terrorism policy, which had lasted nearly two weeks, resulted in an agreement between all the parties that demanded "an urgent review of our national security strategy." It said that negotiation, not military action, would be the policy used to tackle extremism…
Jason Burke has a very good report on the Pakistan Army offensive, he points out
…The battle of Bajaur has huge local and international implications…
…Not only will its result determine who controls the supply route that crosses the Khyber Pass just to its south - where militants hijacked a 60-vehicle Nato convoy last week - but it will also show if the semi-autonomous 'tribal agencies' that line the mountainous zones on the Pakistan side of the frontier can be stabilized…
The battle in Bajaur is
…the biggest single clash of conventional forces and Islamic militants anywhere…
It seems, from these sketchy reports, that the objective of Operation Lionheart is twofold.
Firstly, to control the Khyber Pass to cut off a logistical route for Taliban re-supply and a coordinated thrust alongside both sides of the border to encircle militants.
There are a number of points that could be raised here. Firstly, why has this joint offensive been so publicised by Washington? One would have felt that it would have been better to keep it under wraps. A joint US-Pakistan offensive against militants publicized like this could easily lead to political problems for the government in Pakistan, especially when Washington has hardly been so forthcoming on a bailout of the Pakistani economy.
This offensive has lead to severe human costs as pointed out in a Pakistani paper
… According to official figures, around 250,000 people were displaced. But agencies involved in relief operations say the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is more than 400,000.
Unofficial figures reveal that around 50,000 people have taken refuge in slum houses, tents and in houses of their relatives or friends in different areas of Peshawar…
That may have consequences for future militancy.
That also demonstrates that re-building Bajaur and the NWFP following this offensive will not be easy, especially when Pakistan may be forced to swallow an IMF package.
An interesting report in The Asia Times suggests that this offensive may in fact be sowing the seeds for Taliban offensives in the next campaign season in Afghanistan.
…With the winter snows fast approaching, Pakistan's security forces face a race against time over whether or not to pull out of the Swat Valley in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where for the past one-and-a-half years they have been fighting a losing battle against militants.
The militants occupy about 80% of the strategically vital area near the border with Afghanistan and have managed to choke most supply lines. General Headquarters in Rawalpindi realizes that should the more than 10,000 troops there not be pulled out, they will face a dire war of attrition, but if they leave, the militants will gain strength…
…The dilemma for the army is that if it does retreat under the guise of a peace treaty, it will allow the Taliban to strengthen its bases even further in preparation for the next offensive in Afghanistan in the spring. The anticipation is that the Taliban will receive an unprecedented boost in recruits…
…This opening of a new front against powerful commander Abdul Wali had a cascading effect. Much of the population moved to the capital of NWFP, Peshawar, and other places, allowing the Taliban to open up fronts in the towns of Sabqadar and Michini, situated on the northern edges of Peshawar.
In the past few days the Taliban have infiltrated into Peshawar, where they have killed a worker of USAID, the American government's development arm, and abducted an Iranian diplomat.
In Khyber Agency, unmanned US Predator drones have targeted the Tera Valley, but have failed to hit any targets of significance. However, in the process, pro-government, anti-al-Qaeda militants belonging to the Vice and Virtue organization of slain Haji Namdar have agreed to join hands with the local Taliban to fight against foreign troops in Afghanistan.
The drone attacks were carried out last week, and since then North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply convoys have been looted frequently. Pakistani newspapers have published pictures of militants moving around in NATO armored personnel carriers.
This new alliance will strengthen militant attacks in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, which has been quiet for the past several months. On Thursday, the Taliban attacked a NATO convoy in Nangarhar near the city of Jalalabad. NATO said that several Afghan soldiers were killed while the Taliban claimed the killing of five NATO soldiers.
It's going to be a very long winter for the Pakistani army, whether it stays in the tribal areas or whether it retreats, while next spring could be the hottest ever in Afghanistan…
If Obama surges in Afghanistan and this analysis proves correct, we can expect some of the most serious engagements in the Afghan, and perhaps also Pakistani, theatre of operations next campaign season.
Pakistan is on the edge and the leaking of a joint US-Pakistan campaign, on top of its human effects in the tribal areas, and an IMF austerity programme won’t exactly help matters.
One thing that works against the militants, especially al-Qaida, is that their brand of austere Islam is despised by just about everybody; whenever they implement it there is a severe backlash.
The interesting thing is that the wider campaign they launched on September 11, indeed before then, is one they can never, ever, win. They can only rule by way of tyranny, and get into power by feeding off misery. By their actions they try and create as much misery as possible, for that is there only hope.
Why should we help them any?
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.