Averting Nuclear Proliferation In The Middle East
Nuclear proliferation prospects in the Middle East continue to attract attention. For anybody interested in the study of nuclear terrorism this is an important issue. Given this I was pleased to read an article by Mark Fitzpatrick, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the topic at Arms Control Today.
However, I must disagree with some important aspects of his recommendations. It is interesting that he does not mention the Baker-Hamilton report or Brand Obama's own "talk to your enemies" position, which is very much a flow on from Baker-Hamilton. At any rate, I have a comment on the article at the Arms Control Today blog, which I reproduce below
...It is an entirely laudable, indeed necessary, goal to avert further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. A case could be made, however, that some aspects of the argument made here will not avert this. In fact, it may encourage it.
Firstly, the underlying assumption of this article is fallacious on the author’s own terms.
The author clearly puts the framework of rising proliferation concerns within the context of Iran’s enrichment programme. That is, Iran’s Arab neighbours are jittery about Tehran’s enrichment drive, which may lead them to invest in sensitive fuel cycle technologies as a type of security hedge.
But consider the author’s own well known position on Syria’s alleged al-Kibar plutonium production reactor. The author is noted for his readiness to accept that Syria probably has a case to answer, a position which might well be correct.
Let us assume that Syria did try and build a plutonium production reactor.
Did Syria try and do so because Damascus was concerned about the nuclear programme of its ally, Iran? Surely not.
Surely Israeli and US regional strategic postures played a more important role for Syria than any concerns that Damascus might have about Iran.
As the military analyst Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, for good or ill is not the point here, the focus of US military power has shifted from Asia to the Middle East since the 1970s.
The author ultimately concludes that the “United States can reduce the motivations that states in the region might otherwise have to seek a nuclear hedge” by augmenting the security postures of Iran neighbours given their hedge strategy in response to Iran’s enrichment (and IR-40) programme.
If such a thing as the “security dilemma” operates in international relations, as realist analysts tell us it does, then such measures could be interpreted in Iran as signs of hostile intent helping to augment the case of internal pro nuclear weapon lobbies in the Iranian security apparatus. In this way the author’s recommendation may help to further entrench incentives for Iran’s programme, further leading to the observed hedge effect.
Notice that the author’s hedge effect works precisely because it is an instance of the “security dilemma”.
If it is the case that Iran truly seeks a nuclear programme to deter the US and Israel then perhaps the solution would be to re-assure *IRAN* through a comprehensive regional peace that would reduce “the motivations of Iran” which “might otherwise have to seek a nuclear hedge.” This strategy would deal with the underlying cause of concern, unlike the author’s recommendation.
I cannot think of a better example of a policy that would be both moral and of security benefit to all concerned, including the United States...
For the past 3 days straight the temperature here has been 43 degrees C. In Baghdad 50 Deg C is not unusual. Man, it must be tough being a soldier over there carrying along all that equipment with pants and all to boot.
Space Operations Doctrine Docs: Is DSP-23 Proximity Op An ASAT Test?
Two important documents have been released by the Pentagon on space warfare doctrine. The first is a joint doctrine document from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3_14> Space Operations. The second is a shorter document on United States Army Space Policy.
The JCS document is dated 6 January 2009. The Army document is dated 23 January 2009, i.e. 3 days after the end of Bush's term.
Both documents are consistent with Team Bush's National Space Policy and may well be superseded following Brand Obama's space policy review, especially if the review reaches conclusions on a par with the agenda statement that appears at the White House website.
In addition, both documents may have been released by the new administration as a part of greater transparency efforts.
I strongly urge you to take a look at what Joint Pub 3_14 has to state about satellite proximity operations. The doc states that they may
...include the potential to support a wide range of future US space capabilities...
This puts all that stuff about the AWOL DSP satellite, DSP-23, and a US proximity operation in context.
Has Team Bush now used two AWOL satellites to engage in ASAT related testing?
Some Arms Control and Strategic Aspects Of Brand Obama’s Agenda Statement
Brand Obama has some cool stuff on the new White House website. The coolest thing about the new website is that it doesn't feature a picture of that stupid dim witted fuckwit. Having said that, we note a number of statements on the Obama/Biden agenda that has got plenty of people talking.
Of real interest is the stuff on space weaponisation
...The Obama-Biden Administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites. They will thoroughly assess possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them, establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack...
Notice the bit about seeking a global arms control regime banning space weapons. If Brand Obama is serious about this, and recall that the US has been the main obstacle on space arms control hitherto, then this is very very good. It has been pointed out, correctly, that a viable space arms control regime would require also sorts of crafty work on developing a formal definition of what constitutes a weapon and matters of verification. There are a whole host of issues here. This will provide plenty of work for the arms control community to ponder over the coming months.
According to a Reuters report Brand Obama will complete a review of space policy by September (the military aspects by Sept and the full space policy review due out by December). It will be interesting to see what attitude the Pentagon will take. Under Rumsfeld (who chaired the Space Commission just before Bush came into office) the Pentagon became hard core space hawks
Expect to hear more from the Heritage Foundation and so on about verification.
However, the issue of what constitutes a weapon may well pose serious problems given the passage that comes immediately above that just cited here
...The Obama-Biden Administration will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public...
BMD is an issue because BMD can have dual functions (recall The Shot) and also Moscow and Beijing will likely argue that defensive weapons should still be within the ambit of a formal space weapons definition.
Can Brand Obama have BMD and a space weapons ban at the same time?
Thus far, a good way to get into the thinking that lies behind Brand Obama is to go back to the Clinton Administration. So, Clinton's 1996 National Space Policy states
...Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services. The U.S. will maintain and modernize space surveillance and associated battle management command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence to effectively detect, track, categorize, monitor, and characterize threats to U.S. and friendly space systems and contribute to the protection of U.S. military activities...
Also,
...National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national security by...
...countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes;...
The Bush Space Policy strengthened the commitment to space control by formally stating that Washington would oppose space arms control. As you can see, the Bush policy was more in your face in the usual Bush style, but not terribly different from Clinton policy. You can appreciate that by the fact that Team Bush was happy to live with the Clinton space policy for quite a while during its period in office. Rummy was big on space security (recall that the joke that was General Myers was appointed a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs because he came up from space command) and if he felt that the Clinton policy was a big barrier to space weaponisation he would have ditched the 1996 space policy very early into Team Bush's term of office.
He didn't. However, he did on nuclear policy.
So, it could be possible that Brand Obama will take out the in your face statements on space arms control in the Bush policy but still leave over a commitment to space control basically along the lines of the Clinton policy. That would be consistent with the emerging Brand Obama style.
It would be better if there is an explicit commitment to space arms control written into the space policy itself; I hope that Brand Obama will use the exact words above in the formal space policy document.
Let's wait and see.
There is some good stuff that is not without its implications for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. It has been pointed out that Gates and Obama have differing positions on RRW and according to the White House website
...Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global...
Notice the "stop the development of new nuclear weapons" part. Again, that's great but details do matter. RRW advocates have always publicly argued that RRW does not involve the development of nuclear weapons for new military missions or with new capabilities. What matters here is what is meant by "new".
In fact, this statement, as it stands, could be made easily consistent with the emerging "Plan B" for RRW that is the "Reliable Refurbished Warhead" or something like LEP plus.
Let's wait and see, again.
The bit about a global INF treaty is great but fantasy.
The hair-trigger alert part is absolutely vital and would be the most important thing that Brand Obama could do in the nuclear field. As it stands, this sounds like a commitment to work on ending Launch-on-Warning which would be a major advance. It would require almost a mini-revolution in US nuclear strategy. I wonder whether Brand Obama actually realises this!
The commitment to BMD is also an issue. During the Clinton era the State Department had a talking points memo that argued that US diplomats could argue with their Russian interlocutors that BMD is not an issue because they can maintain their deterrent on a LOW posture.
One must avoid here a repeat of the experience with Clinton's Nuclear Posture Review. At the outset all sorts of great ideas were floating about but in the end the national security bureaucracy managed to get a hold of the process with the end result being that the NPR was pretty conservative.
The contradictions that appear in the above could easily be exploited toward these ends.
Finally we must note that Brand Obama states
...The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes...
I wouldn't mind seeing more critical analysis of this oft repeated claim.
Australian Parliamentary Nuclear Treaty Review And That Tailored Deterrence Paper.
The Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties is conducting a review of Australia's nuclear treaties with respect to non-proliferation and disarmament. I have written up a 9,000 word submission, which has kept me away from a paper that I was writing on tailored deterrence and US nuclear strategy.
I had mentioned before that I was working on tailored deterrence and that this is important because Brand Obama will now get the ball rolling on a nuclear posture review in the United States, the review that matters.
Actually, I have written the tailored deterrence paper up, but it is all over the place and requires a good edit job. Hopefully, that won't take too long.
Some Info On China’s Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Released By Beijing.
China has released some info about its nuclear weapons employment policy in an annual national security report. The info is pretty sketchy and kinda Delphic, but it has been described, nonetheless, as the most detailed official exposition. The key passages revolve around China's "no first-use" pledge and crisis strategy.
According the chapter devoted to the Second Artillery Force
...The Second Artillery Force sticks to China’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, implements a self-defensive nuclear strategy, strictly follows the orders of the CMC, and takes it as its fundamental mission the protection of China from any nuclear attack. In peacetime the nuclear missile weapons of the Second Artillery Force are not aimed at any country. But if China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services...
The interesting part is the stuff about a "nuclear alert" and "getting ready" under a "nuclear threat." This most likely means that China would alert, and thereby put its strategic nuclear capability in a launch ready posture, if Beijing should finds itself in the midst of a crisis with a nuclear weapon state.
The second part is important. It states that China would launch the alert force if it comes under attack, but we must notice that what constitutes an attack is not defined.
As it stands something akin to launch-on-warning would be consistent with this statement. This is because one could interpret the positive indication of an attack by the warning system, and then launching strategic missiles, as being consistent with "no first-use."
To be sure "no first-use" is something we associate with launch-under-attack, which means that a counter-attack would be launched after incoming evidence of actual nuclear detonations. Also, LOW is something that we associate with strategic forces on constant alert.
Second Artillery Force planners are undoubtedly concerned about the survivability of its missile force and this concern would suggest a bias toward launch-on-warning.
However, the capability of actually implementing a posture of launch-on-warning is no trivial task. The US did not develop LOW until the 1970s and it is still debated amongst analysts whether the USSR ever really did manage to successfully achieve a LOW posture based on integrated space and terrestial capabilities.
We cannot be certain either way what NUWEP China has adopted on the basis of the information in this report. We can only speculate.
Personally, I'd be more concerned about China using its growing independent space capabilities to make a bid to replicate an integrated LOW posture than all the stuff we hear about Chinese force modernisation.
There are two reasons for this concern. Firstly, this likely would increase the probability of accidental nuclear war. Secondly, the Indian military-industrial complex would likely demand that Delhi follow suit in which case we would end up with a nuclear weapons complex consisting of the US, Russia, China and India characterised by LOW postures or the attempt to fashion LOW.
Notice also that the document has some stuff that appears similar to US Strategic Command's prompt global strike
...The conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range
precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the enemy...
OK. The medium precision strike refers to regional strategic contingencies. But, what's with the "long-range precision strikes" part?
Are the Chinese following STRATCOM's lead and making a dash for conventional long-range missile strikes? How far is long-range? What's up with "operational targets"? Is that a reference to conventional counterforce? If so, this would be more a statement of intent rather than capability, at least in the "long-range precision strike" context.
Also, notice the stuff about Second Artillery Force units passing safety tests and the like.
That's a none too subtle dig at STRATCOM.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.