US To Shoot Down North Korea’s Satellite Launch?
Speculation continues to swirl about a possible North Korean launch of a satellite bearing rocket, most likely the Taepodong 2 missile. Now we continue to hear further speculation about a possible repeat of "the shot." Reports are trickling in of a possible US attempt to shoot down the North Korean missile. I doubt very much that the US would want to shot down the actual satellite whilst in orbit by adding to space debris. A satellite is not a threat to national security, so the whole exercise would be of dubious worth.
The only shoot down scenario that makes sense to me is boost phase interception. Now, we are getting contradictory reports. One suggests SM-3 interception from the Sea of Japan. The other GMD interception from Alaska. The first comes from the following Washington Post report
...If North Korea launched another missile in the direction of Japan, it would enter airspace that is protected by Aegis anti ballistic missiles, which are deployed on Japanese and U.S. Navy destroyers in the Sea of Japan and designed to intercept incoming missiles in mid-flight. As a secondary layer of defense, Tokyo is also protected by a Patriot missile system.
These systems raise the possibility that a North Korean missile -- even one advertised in advance as a peaceful space probe -- could be destroyed in flight...
The other report comes from the Korea Times report and has a different focus
...Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense, was quoted by Yonhap News Agency during a Congressional hearing as saying, ``Based on the scenarios that we've tested three times, although it's limited and it's in the beginning, those scenarios overlay a launch from North Korea and a response out of Alaska. And so we have tested three times that scenario first, for obvious reasons. And that is the source of my confidence,'' in response to a question about whether the U.S. missile defense system could defend the American people from the current North Korean threat...
...``Second of all, our firing doctrine is that we have a significant number of missiles, so we can put a significant number of missiles in the air at once,'' he continued. ``And that each time significantly increases the overall probability that you are going to be successful.'' His remarks came after U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates hinted last week that the U.S. might intercept a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile should one approach American territory...
GMD interceptors are mid-course interceptors, as is the SM-3 system, so they are not really meant to be configured for boost-phase interception. If a shoot-down were to be attempted then perhaps the interception would be designed to try and intercept the satellite at the moment of separation, at the latest. But this risks failure, and is risky from a PR point of view. It would seem that if an attempted shoot-down occurs it will be probably be another gig for the SM-3 this time in boost-phase mode, or an upper-atmosphere interception at about the time when the payload separates from the rocket's third stage. Presumably an SM-3 launched from the Sea of Japan would be better positioned to catch the Taepodong 2 whilst in boost-phase.
One of the challenges of boost-phase interception is developing an ability for the BMDS to distinguish between the plume of the missile and the missile itself, one of the purposes of the NFIRE satellite launched in 2007.
A lot of analysis seems to put the mooted North Korean satellite launch in apocalyptic terms. Many have argued that the purpose of any satellite launch is to test the Taepodeong 2 under a civilian cover, and to try and undermine the six party talks process. Most likely, the North is trying to grab Obama's attention given that Pyongyang is doubtless keen to re-visit the diplomatic process that ended with the Clinton Administration in 2000.
Admiral Blair in the annual threat assessment to the Senate Intel Committee once again accused the North of having a covert uranium enrichment program. Hardliners have long used this allegation to beat the North with the verification stick, which hardliners always employ when dealing with an arms control process they don't like.
This probably had the North worried that Obama, who has a crowded agenda, might let the North Korean file slip his attention and, even worse, maybe just continue with Team Bush's policy given the contunity with the enrichment charges.
For the US a shoot-down is a joke. Daniel Pinkston, from the International Crisis Group (which is an adjunct of the Department of State), has stated that the security implications are "all bad" for the US should the North go ahead and launch a satellite.
A shoot down of any North Korean satellite bearing rocket would mainly serve to function as a belly-up for a BMD program that must be starting to feel the pinch. Many must be worried that a new administration, facing an acute economic crisis and protracted budget deficits, might be looking for a chunky line item veto.
If BMD gets the chop then the military-industrial complex companies deserve it. They hitched their stars to Team Bush whose "let future generations worry about it" approach to economic policy helped to create the current crisis.
The Feb 2009 IAEA Safeguards Report On Syria
The IAEA has released the latest Iran and Syria safeguards reports. Given that Iran is getting all the attention let's focus on the Syrian report.
In the previous report the IAEA was of the firm belief that the Syrian claim that the associated water pumping and power infrastructure for the alleged al Kibar reactor was not of sufficient size to be consistent with the alleged power levels of the alleged reactor was false.
In the latest report the most significant finding concerns the Syrian claim that the processed uranium particles found at the site must have come from Israeli bombs is also pretty much false
...The Agency’s current assessment is that there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles as the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles are all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions...
We stress that what is at play here is, according to the report,
...a significant number of anthropogenic natural uranium particles (i.e. produced as a result of chemical processing)...
The Agency clearly is not happy with the level of Syrian cooperation, but nor is it too happy with the level of cooperation from the US and Israel.
There is more here than meets the eye. Another issue is the graphite from the alleged moderator. There was a good Reuters report on an IAEA background briefing on this. We should hear more about the graphite soon, perhaps at the next IAEA Board meeting.
According to the Reuters report
...The first word that graphite particles had turned up came with the release of the International Atomic Energy Agency's second report on Syria in three months. But U.N. officials familiar with it said the IAEA inquiry remained inconclusive.
Still, one senior U.N. official said the discovery of additional uranium traces was "significant." That, together with graphite traces that are undergoing more tests, raised pressure on Damascus to provide evidence for its denials of wrongdoing...
...He said some graphite traces had been found around the alleged reactor site and also by a water treatment plant 5 km away where equipment for the complex that was bombed to rubble by Israel had been stored temporarily."We are sure it is man-made graphite but not yet sure if it has specifications of nuclear-grade graphite," he said...
The background briefing also sheds light on the reasoning behind the appearance of the term "significant number" in relation to the uranium particles
...The U.N. official said further analysis of swipe samples since November turned up around 40 more instances of processed uranium particles, adding to 40 registered three months ago...
..."If you find 40 uranium particles and then 40 more, this constitutes for us a significant finding, because we are now sure this is not just a simple contamination from a person who went to the site for a visit."...
The latest graphite reports have Syria denying that any graphite was found
...Syria rejected Tuesday a claim by a UN watchdog that traces of graphite, a key element used in the core of nuclear reactors, had been found at a suspect site allegedly housing a covert nuclear facility.
"There was no graphite at all," at the remote desert site, the head of Syria's Atomic Energy Commission, Ibrahim Othman, told reporters after a closed-door briefing of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"There was ... no reason for graphite to be there," Otman said...
OK. The graphite story will be interesting to follow as it proceeds.
The Syrian story on the ancillary infrastructure the IAEA has rejected.
The Syrian story on the processed uranium particles the IAEA has rejected.
I'm not an American so I don't know terribly much about that favourite American pass time, Baseball, but I know that "three strikes and your out."
Critically Assessing The Role Of Tailored Deterrence In US Nuclear Strategy
I have finished up on my 9,500 word paper on tailored deterrence. I suppose I will have to think of a home for it now. I reckon I can get away with providing the abstract
...Tailored deterrence, in the context of a second nuclear age, was the strategic concept that formed the core of the Bush Administration’s approach to nuclear strategy. Despite its centrality, tailored deterrence has rarely been the subject of critical analysis. This paper will critically asses tailored deterrence and shall conclude that its assumptions do not hold. Moreover, there is nothing about the second nuclear age that challenges the fundamental pillars of traditional approaches to deterrence. Minimum deterrence postures may apply even in a nuclear age characterized by nuclear multipolarity. Should the Obama Administration accept the tenets of tailored deterrence a strong measure of continuity will obtain in US nuclear strategy...
The Political Economy Of Post-SORT Strategic Arms Control
There exists good reason, now coming from the Russian side, to expect that the post SORT arms control accord will have operational strategic nuclear warheads in the 1,000-1,500 range.
This analysis is based on the work of Pavel Podvig who stated in an article at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and at further analysis on his blog, that (the hereafter are taken from The Bulletin article)
...Specifically, recent promises and commitments that Moscow has made regarding the future buildup of its strategic forces put Russia on a trajectory that's incompatible with substantial nuclear reductions...
That's an important point. He goes on
...More directly, if all of the currently scheduled programs materialize, Russia will find itself in a situation where its strategic arsenal will start growing. In fact, it already is growing--although that growth is masked by the dramatic reduction of old missiles with multiple warheads...
Also,
...But getting rid of the new Russian missiles, submarines, and bombers that are being built today will be much more difficult, presenting a potentially serious obstacle to cutting the number of nuclear warheads in Russia's arsenal much below 1,500...
Podvig points out, correctly, that the hardest aspects of strategic arms control involve the military-industrial complexes of the two sides.
Of course, arms control accords have lower and upper bounds. The spread with SORT is 500, so a lower bound of 1,000 (as discussed in a previous blog entry below) would give us an upper bound of 1,500 assuming consistency. Podvig speaks of a 1,000-1,200 spread, but that seems to me too close (these figures may not actually be a spread. It could mean a singular figure in between these two numbers).
The US is currently at the upper bound of SORT (2,200).
He also points out
...Nothing, of course, is set in stone. Plans can be changed. After all, the point of having arms reductions is to cut back on weapon development programs. But it would be much harder to do this once these programs gain a momentum--making a new U.S.-Russian disarmament agreement much more urgent...
That is indeed true. Strategic arms control has had a very poor record in controlling technological developments. Never have mature developmental programmes been axed by an arms control accord.
There are a couple of issues here, however.
Firstly, it is widely reported that the Russian budget assumes global oil prices of about $80 a barrel. Given the economic crisis global commodity prices have declined significantly, with the latest figure for the NYMEX crude price at $36.87 a barrel.
That has to have an effect on the fiscal outlook for Russia's strategic programmes. The government in Moscow has greatly benefited from rising commodity prices and the deep reverse in commodity prices now must have many in the leadership concerned for social stability (the protests in Moscow led by the KPRF provide a demonstration of this).
In the United States we have seen the massive TARP and fiscal stimulus packages put the budget further into deficit. The deficit has now grown out to be a super-sized whopper. That will have an affect on defence spending.
These observations are important because although the respective military-industrial complexes have clout (they are both vital features of the respective political economies) nonetheless this clout is at its lowest when the business cycle turns toward recession.
During the 1980s the USSR suffered from what Marshall Goldman called a supply-side depression. The US suffered from the large twin-deficits occasioned by Reagan's supply-side economics. It is for this reason that at the time the respective military-industrial complexes were not able to resist the pressure for arms control, which partially acted as a mechanism to control and overcome these economic problems.
The influence of the respective military-industrial complexes must now be in decline given the place we find ourselves along the business cycle.
Arms control could become a means for both sides to maintain numerical parity with each other and superiority against others in the context of the economic crisis.
This used to be done at much higher numbers. I suspect that if China wanted too it could soon put itself in the position to catch up.
We note that this is another issue. The economic crisis and the large twin deficits completely undermines what the Bush Administration called "dissuasion."
This is ironic. The Bush Administration introduced dissuasion, but then it completely undermined it through its wildly reckless economic policies.
If some form of accord is reached on BMD in the context of the global economic crisis, I rather suspect that an arms control treaty could be reached in the 1,000-1,500 range.
Admiral Blair’s Annual DNI Threat Assessment To Senate Intel Committee
Brand Obama's DNI, Admiral Blair, has delivered the annual threat assessment to the US Senate Intel Committee. These assessments are required reading, especially in this case as it provides us with some hints as to how the new administration views global security developments. There is plenty here to keep us busy, and time being tight for now I concentrate on the WMD terrorism aspects.
This should be seen in the context of a larger theme. We may say that this assessment is characterised by contradictions. An interesting report on Blair and Congress can be found at DN!.
As I say, take WMD terrorism. You will note that, as I have cited previously, Brand Obama's White House agenda statement quite categorically states that the leading security threat to the US is nuclear terrorism. Contradiction 1. Not according to this Senate testimony it ain't. Admiral Blair states here that
...The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications...
That's an important topic in its own right, but notice that the statement, at least for now, puts nuclear terrorism on the back burner. For geopolitical implications read China and Russia, and in my opinion also Japan. I have seen a figure suggesting that Japan's GDP growth is -9% and industrial production at a whopping -20%. If continued such figures could lead to significant structural political changes in Japan, including Tokyo taking a more assertive line on the US-Japan Alliance. Could Japan shift closer to China? If so, that would wipe out much of the gains that the US accrued in the Pacific War during WW2.
As I say that's another topic.
OK.
Admiral Blair states, in so far as WMD terrorism goes, that
...In particular, we assess the terrorist use of biological agents represents a growing threat as the barriers to obtaining many suitable starter cultures are eroding and open source technical literature and basic laboratory equipment can facilitate production...
This clearly implies that bioterrorism is a bigger issue than nuclear terrorism, but this contradicts the White House agenda statement.
That's contradiction 2.
The annual threat assessment also states on WMD terrorism that
...Over the coming years, we will continue to face a substantial threat, including in the US Homeland, from terrorists attempting to acquire
biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and use them to conduct large-scale attacks...
OK.
In some of the most reported sections of the threat assessment Admiral Blair states (on a par from previously surveyed comments from States' counter-terrorism official)
...Because of the pressure we and our allies have put on al-Qa’ida’s core leadership in Pakistan and the continued decline of al-Qa’ida’s most prominent regional affiliate in Iraq, al- Qa’ida today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago...
...The loss of these and many other leaders in quick succession has made it more difficult for al-Qa’ida to identify replacements, and in some cases the group has had to promote more junior figures considerably less skilled and respected than the individuals they are replacing...
Now there is a big contradiction. This is our contradiction 3.
On the one hand Admiral Blair states that the US will continue to face a substantial threat of WMD terrorism, on the other hand we are told that the al-Qaida hardcore has never been as stressed or degraded since the post 9/11 ousting of the Taliban.
The degradation of al-Qaida's capabilities seems not to have affected the WMD terrorism threat assessment a jot. How can there be a continued substantial threat when al-Qaida faces the level of strategic stress that Admiral Blair states it does?
Surely the threat has decreased.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.