More On North Korea’s Second Nuclear Weapon Test.
We might also add that a yield of ~ 4kt tells us a lot about the North Korean test. Do not be fooled by the yield not being the same as the nominal yield for the Trinity device.
It is generally acknowledged that prior to the first test the North Koreans informed Beijing, about 20 mins in advance, that they were going to test. They had also stated, it is reported, that they aimed for a yield of 4Kt.
All things being equal the North Koreans have replicated the first test, this time successfully. We should note that this test, and the first test, does not leave the North Koreans with a heck of a lot of plutonium to play around with.
Escalation for North Korea would consist of concretely getting things at Yongbyon up and running again in order to increase the plutonium stockpile. If rational, external actors should attempt to freeze this process rather than escalate. A rational strategy would be to open up high level direct bilateral talks between the US and North Korea. Bosworth is a nobody, and everybody knows it.
This test is directly equivalent to a successful 2006 test. It's not that earth shattering. There still exists plenty of scope for diplomacy.
ABC Lateline And The Second North Korean Weapon Test
Oh, and by the way; I have just seen the interview with Mark Fitzpatrick, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the 2nd North Korean nuke test.
That interview was terrible.
Why does Tony Jones persist with Fitzpatrick, a former State Department official?
What was especially galling was Jones' reference to Fitzpatrick's "sophisticated analysis."
Man, that BS had me switching to Footy Classified. At least they know what they speak of.
North Korea’s Second Nuclear Weapon Test
The United States Geological Survey reports that on Monday, May 25, 2009 at 00:54:43 UTC they detected a seismological event at 41.331°N, 129.011°E. This, of course, was in North Korea. The Mb was 4.7.
The 2006 North Korean nuclear test was at 41.294°N, 129.134°E with an Mb of 4.2.
These numbers are significant because, according to the North Korean press release, as cited by the New York Times
...“on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control,” the agency said. “The results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.”...
This puts to bed the debate on the fizzle nature of the first test. We might recall that Sig Hecker, heavily influenced by the Chinese, saw that test as a kind of success. It was clearly a fizzle. Those who think jihadi terrorists could fashion a nuclear weapon successfully even if they had the necessary amount of plutonium should think about that.
The North Koreans have mastered first generation implosion. Selig Harrison relayed a North Korean boast of "weaponisation" earlier this year. We will have to wait for more on that.
It has also been reported that the North has test fired 3 surface to air missiles. I would like to know whether they were the SA-5. David Wright argued that one possible configuration for the Unha-2 was an SA-5 second stage; the Unha-2 flight failed due to second stage failure. Don't know if this angle means anything. Let's hang out for a bit on that one.
Of course, we must also wait for the radiochemistry news. Nuclear terrorism and Kim Jong iL have put the radiochemists back into business.
One important angle in the New York Times report was
...This month, one day after an American diplomat offered new talks on North Korea’s nuclear program, the North said it had become useless to talk further with the United States.
“The study of the policy pursued by the Obama administration for the past 100 days since its emergence made it clear that the U.S. hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K. remains unchanged,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry said, using the initials for the country’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
In comments carried by KCNA, the ministry said: “There is nothing to be gained by sitting down together with a party that continues to view us with hostility.”...
It has been pointed out, correctly, that Brand Obama is basically pursuing the same foreign policy as second term Team Bush. I believe that this test confirms the thesis of my On Line Opinion essay on North Korea published in April.
This nuclear test represents that foreign policy strategy's first failure. I suspect that in Afghanistan and Pakistan more will follow.
The Australian Defence White Paper: Force 2030
The last couple of months have been a bit of a blur, and the blog is suffering from a bad case of neglect. At any rate I have written an essay on the Australian Defence White Paper at On Line Opinion.
I have a co-author for this one. We are planning a website "Global Security and Arms Control" that will look at these issues from an Australian perspective. There exists no arms control website in Australia on a par with what we see in the US.
During this period of non-posting so much water has flowed under the bridge it's not funny...Post-START, the Congressional nuclear posture review, General Chilton and the vacuum tubes saga and the crisis in Pakistan especially. I have read Sanger's "Deterrence 2.0" in his book on US power and challenges for Obama. It's interesting, with some new detail. However it's flawed.
On Pakistan we need to be very careful. We must ask ourselves; what role does nuclear terrorism play in US foreign policy? One thing that has got me going is the issue of Pak-PALs and the latest Pakistan army offensive in the Swat Valley.
If the US has helped to institute a PAL system for Pakistan's nuclear weapons why the concern about loose nukes? All I am trying to say is that Brand Obama's story on Pak-nukes just keeps changing. One day they are concerned about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. But then on another day they express confidence that the security system is robust.
There exists the possibility that concerns about nuclear terrorism are being used to justify a military offensive for other ends. This offensive may backfire in which case the concerns, which act as a policy cover, may become real. That is, we use nuke terrorism as a rationale to force the Pakistani army to launch an offensive, this offensive aids the militants to develop critical mass for further political action, which in turn increases the threat that is being used as a policy rationale.
Not saying that is how it is, but it's a real possibility. We know that concerns about nuclear terrorism have been used as a cover to cloak policy pursued for other ends before.
Why not now?
Oh, one final thing. Notice that the Oz white paper speaks of Force "2030". What is it with the year 2030? Complex 2030 and RRW...even in space security discussion 2030 is an important time horizon. The year itself tells you something about the thesis of our article, does it not?
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.