Nuclear Security and Strategic Analyses Dr Marko Beljac

The Case for Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

The Case for Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

Dr Marko Beljac

The Bush administration probably had the most expansive conception of nuclear deterrence of any administration since the onset of the nuclear age.

Although the US operational strategic stockpile was reduced to 2,200 warheads, the Moscow Treaty upper-bound, this reduction obscured a much more fundamental expansion in the scope of deterrence. This expansion was under scored by the recent comments of General Kevin Chilton, the commander in chief of US Strategic Command, that he would consider a nuclear response following a large-scale cyber attack against the US.

As the new administration proceeds with its nuclear posture review we might imagine three scenarios for the future of US nuclear deterrence. Firstly, that the current posture of expansive deterrence is made to continue in its essentials. Secondly, a “great leap forward” should be made towards the rejection of deterrence through the abolition of nuclear weapons. Lastly, we might instead seek to develop a posture of minimum deterrence.

Of the three the wisest policy choice that can be made for now, from the perspective of global security and strategic stability, is minimum deterrence. To see why consider the consequences of the first two positions.

The muddled case for expansive deterrence

The key concept underpinning the expansion of deterrence in recent times has been "tailored deterrence."

On this view the US cannot have a "one size fits all" deterrence posture. That might have been a good idea during the Cold War when the main challenge was deterring the Soviet Union. Today, however, the US needs to tailor deterrence to varied adversaries and strategic environments, it is stipulated. In practice, tailoring deterrence means expanding its scope as the cyber attack example demonstrates.

The actual size of the US nuclear stockpile is also largely driven by the Bush administration's policy of "dissuasion". We might also add that another important factor is the continued adherence to the counterforce mission, especially with reference to Russia.

The three pillars of the current, maximal, nuclear posture of the United States are (1) tailored deterrence (2) dissuasion and (3) counterforce.

Given that the case for expansive notions of deterrence depends to a significant degree upon the first two concepts, and counterforce has been dealt with elsewhere, what might we say about them?

We might say plenty. Let us start with tailored deterrence.

There are two underlying premises that underpin the case for tailored deterrence. The first is that we live in a world characterized by a "second nuclear age." The second is that traditional notions of deterrence, essentially taken to be conceptual baggage left over from the Cold War, cannot and ought not to apply in the second nuclear age.

Not long after the fall of the Berlin Wall conservative strategic thinkers such as Keith Payne and Colin Gray, whose ideas have been influential, had argued that the end of bi-polarity has ushered in a new nuclear age that is shaped by nuclear proliferation amongst regional powers. However, it is not just any set of regional powers that have changed the strategic dynamic. In the second nuclear age it is the so-called "rogue states" whose proliferation is of most concern.

It is argued that rogue states are not amenable to traditional notions of deterrence based upon "mutually assured destruction." The comment in the controversial 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States that, “deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks”, encapsulated years of proselytizing on the inadequacies of deterrence.

It’s pretty clear that the main focus of attack rests upon a critique of the rationality criteria of traditional deterrence theory. According to the 2002 Strategy the Soviet Union was a “status-quo” and “risk averse” power. Rogue states are not nearly as risk averse because they do not share the same commitment to instrumental rationality as more “normal” states.

Of course, Payne, Gray and their acolytes never accepted MAD even during the Cold War. Their dim view of deterrence is hardly novel so the critique thereof really predates the onset of a "new nuclear age". Of course, the US never was bound by MAD in a real operational sense even during the Cold War despite the emphasis placed upon MAD in declaratory policy, which never guided strategic targeting plans. Of course, the strategic hawks in the post Cold War period were more concerned about the credibility of nuclear war-fighting and conventional compellence, rather than deterrence, in a regional setting given proliferation.

Even if we put aside these points, which are not mere quibbles, the case for tailored deterrence would be no less flawed. Moreover, even if we accept the notion of a second nuclear age the case for tailored deterrence would still remain deeply flawed.

This is because of an enduring feature of any state system. In the realist theory of international relations there is no correlation between the internal structure of a state and its external behavior. To be more precise this is an observation that realists seek to explain; the correlation itself is not the core tenet of the theory. Whatever we might say of the realist explanation surely no such correlation can be said to obtain.

To take a neutral example; Athens and Sparta differed in their internal makeup, yet both behaved similarly.

No form of state can be considered to be more prone to use nuclear weapons than any other. The propensity to use nuclear weapons does not depend upon a state’s internal political structure or its internal cultural makeup. India and China both maintain a minimum deterrent yet in their internal political structure and cultural makeup they differ greatly.

There exists nothing about the internal structure of a “rogue state” that invalidates the rationality criteria of traditional deterrence theory. That being so there can be no case for a posture of "tailored deterrence" that considers "rogue states" to be somehow irrational and beyond traditional notions of strategic choice. This applies even in the case of North Korea, the hawks' poster state for irrationality.

The case for tailored deterrence thereby is flawed. A “one size fits all” deterrent is sufficient to deter any nuclear threat posed by states.

Such a deterrent need not be compatible with the “counterforce mission”. The strategy of counterforce is not really related to deterrence. The ability to strike first against nuclear forces, including command and control, lies at the core of counterforce. Counterforce is closely related to the war-fighting strategies of escalation control and escalation dominance.

If deterrence were to become the raison d’etre of nuclear weapons first strike counterforce would be instantly rendered superfluous.

The concept of dissuasion is much more amorphous. If the United States can maintain strategic superiority, credible defenses and a responsive weapons complex, then other states would be so dissuaded from seeking to exceed Washington’s nuclear capabilities.

Dissuasion is a mandate for quantitative and qualitative superiority, and formed an important motivating factor behind such programs as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Advanced Concepts Initiative and the Reliable Replacement Warhead.

If the purpose of the current posture is to dissuade other states from catching up or surpassing the United States then it has been a dismal failure. In the case of China the concept does not even apply. If China is dissuaded from engaging in a nuclear arms race with the United States the dominant factors would be internal.

In the case of Russia dissuasion has hardly prevented Moscow from seeking to maintain strategic parity with the US. Indeed, one might well argue that the US strategic posture places a greater incentive for Moscow to try and maintain strategic parity. By developing a modified Topol-M ICBM Russia is signaling that it will do what is necessary to keep a cost effective posture of parity with Washington. It is programs such as Ballistic Missile Defence, which fall within the ambit of dissuasion, that provide an incentive to maintain parity at relatively high weapon numbers. The same might well apply in the China case if the desired capabilities mandated by dissuasion are earnestly pursued.

Nobody is interested in “surpassing” the United States. The objective is to maintain mutual deterrence with the United States. Dissuasion is more reflective of a US desire to deny such mutual deterrence. Trying to deny mutual deterrence encourages mutual modernization programs.

From the standpoint of deterrence dissuasion is irrelevant. If deterrence were the goal there would be no need for the force levels, warhead and infrastructure characteristics, and supporting strategies that are required for dissuasion. It takes a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, say 200, to deter states like Russia and China. Given adaptive planning United States Strategic Command could safely deter both simultaneously with 200 weapons.

In the 1980s the US had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. China would have had about 20. From the perspective of Beijing that was enough for deterrence. The same would apply if the numbers were reversed.

How about going to zero?

The case for nuclear abolition is also flawed. There are two types of argument made for nuclear abolition. The first, by elder statesmen and former senior military officials, essentially revolves around the utility of nuclear disarmament. The second is made by various civil society groups concerned with global security.

The first is very important for it displays some of the problems with the abolitionist case.

During the Cold War the purpose of nuclear weapons was to provide a shield behind which the US was able to employ conventional firepower during regional conflicts. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in the context of the "revolution in military affairs", serves to undermine this traditional function of US nuclear weapons.

One of the pillars of US strategic primacy has been nuclear weapons. For the elder statesmen a world with no nuclear weapons would be a world where nuclear weapons would not "cramp our style" as Kenneth Waltz, the dean of academic international relations, puts it.

This case is flawed because no state that is potentially on the receiving end of US attack would want to voluntarily make itself vulnerable. This is not an inhibiting factor just in the case of regional “rogue states.” The Russians and Chinese greatly fear that "conventional counterforce" could make them more amenable to US coercion.

A replay of the Georgian/South Ossetian conflict in a nuclear free world might well have had a different result for Moscow. The potential impact that a nuclear free world would have on Beijing’s ability to unify Taiwan with the homeland might well be no less stark.

Moreover, conventional counterforce would surely not be a welcome prospect given increasing concerns about energy security. There is a nexus between the overall nature of the US strategic posture and nuclear weapons that is not addressed in the elite case for nuclear abolition.

To the extent that this nexus is unaddressed the case for abolition will remain flawed. None of the former senior state and military officials show any sign of wanting to blunt US conventional military superiority and the forward operational doctrines that under gird this superiority; to the contrary abolition serves to promote such a strategic posture.

On the other hand nuclear abolition once again finds increasing support amongst a raft of non-governmental organizations. Their case for abolition is different from the elder statesmen position. It cannot be accepted that they are interested in a world where the employment of conventional military power can be made more effective.

They first argue on emotive grounds, pointing to the massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons. More importantly they also argue that current nuclear policies threaten a great calamity that can only be ultimately addressed by abolition.

We must concur with their prognosis. Strategic developments increasingly appear ominous.

From the end of the Second World War all the way up until the Cuban Missile Crisis it could be argued that the probability of nuclear war was a function of the probability of preventive war. Following the advent of mutual deterrence and postures of launch on warning especially, although whether the Soviet Union had a true launch on warning posture is much debated, the probability of nuclear war shifted to become a function of the probability of an accidental exchange.

Advocates of nuclear abolition argue that the risk posed by nuclear weapons have not decreased despite the end of the Cold War. The position makes some sense when we take into account the above factor. This view has been neatly encapsulated by the recent movement of the famed "doomsday clock" closer to midnight.

An important study by a group of climatologists has concluded that an exchange at Moscow Treaty force numbers between Russia and the US would create global soot levels on a par with levels simulated to arise assuming an exchange between the Soviet Union and the US during the nuclear weaponeers hey day of the early 1980s. Given this both scenarios would lead to similar effects on the global climate system.

The reason for this is overkill; the effects on the global climate, and thereby on the broader society and population, are at about the same level in the two scenarios because there would be little extra fuel to ignite firestorms after a certain threshold of destruction has been reached. No amount of additional heat can ignite a wildfire when a wildfire has already ravaged its way through a forest.

The risk posed by current weapon numbers and strategic doctrines is very similar to one of the key underlying causes of the global financial crisis. At the heart of the crisis lies what economists have come to refer to as "risk externalities" In this case the risk that financial institutions took on was far too high from the point of view of society. The existence of large risk externalities opened up by financial liberalization and globalization led to the real prospect of systemic collapse in the financial system. But for the bailout the financial system would have indeed collapsed in 2008.

Nuclear proliferation can also be seen in the context of risk externalities. An un-regulated nuclear industry would pose a number of security risks, from proliferation to terrorism, the existence of which are unacceptable to society. Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are risk externalities the mitigation of which is supposed to be achieved by regulatory measures such as safeguards, export controls and physical security protocols.

The possibility of regulatory takeover cannot be dismissed, for instance the Bush-Singh deal on nuclear trade displays some elements of regulatory takeover given the role of the nuclear industry in the whole affair. The deal also has brought to relief the contradictory charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency whose purpose is to both promote and regulate the global nuclear industry.

From the point of view of risk externalities such a dual charter is most problematical. The IAEA has been a prominent supporter of the Bush-Singh deal despite its impact on the non-proliferation regime. Do we want a Federal Reserve that promotes and regulates derivatives?

Nuclear war can best be seen as a form of risk externality. Nuclear weapon states must recognize that nuclear deterrence carries with it a certain probability or risk that an exchange may result due to accidental or inadvertent use. Despite this risk states nonetheless calculate that nuclear weapons serve to promote state policy and are thereby prepared to bare this risk.

However, from the perspective of society as a whole this risk is far too large given the consequences that are associated with nuclear weapons employment. During the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy reportedly exclaimed that the risk of war was one third to even. Khrushchev must have known he was taking a huge risk in sending nuclear missiles to Cuba.

These risks were taken despite the potential consequences.

Attempts have been made to quantify this risk, for instance Ian Bellany draws a link between the number of weapon states in a strategic complex and the probability of accidental use.

The quantification of risk is necessarily imprecise; the doomsday clock might well be our best measure. But there does seem to be an intuitive relationship between deterrence and safety. This relationship has been borne out by more empirically minded analysis by Scott Sagan and Bruce Blair. The greater the salience that a state places upon deterrence, for example by maintaining high alert postures, the less safe do nuclear weapons become.

Pakistan reportedly does not mate warheads with delivery vehicles. However, in an acute crisis we would expect that for Rawalpindi deterrence would trump safety and this policy would be abandoned by the Army high command. This would increase the risk of inadvertent use.

Every improvement in the effectiveness and doctrinal scope of deterrence adds to the risk of accidental exchange because opposing states would need to react accordingly to maintain the effectiveness of their deterrence postures. The greater the scope of deterrence the greater the risk of use given the inevitable strains and frictions of international relations. If nuclear weapons are to deter everything then anything can escalate to nuclear war.

The difference between the abolitionist and minimum deterrence position boils down to a difference as to what constitutes the most effective response to our risk externality. Abolitionists would argue that the proper approach is to eliminate the risk altogether by repudiating deterrence.

The minimum deterrence school rather points to the presently impractical case for abolition. By focusing on a politically impractical goal, which would require a large re-ordering of global political structures, this school argues that the abolitionist case, though well meaning, would effectively do little to eliminate the risk externality associated with nuclear weapons absent such wholesale political reform.

The abolition of nuclear weapons by the extension of the current nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime into a nuclear weapons convention, on a par with the biological and chemical weapons conventions, is not as simple as commonly stated given the baggage that nuclear weapons bring with them. For instance, are safeguards as currently constituted robust enough to apply in a disarmed world?

A biological weapons convention did not prevent massive Soviet cheating. Although a convention is in place the advent of biotechnology and genetic engineering poses a raft of issues for verification that are not currently adequately addressed. Besides, biological and chemical weapons are nowhere near as effective as nuclear weapons.

To abolish nuclear weapons, as matters currently stand, would lead us to eliminate one risk externality at the cost of severely magnifying the risk externalities associated with nuclear proliferation.

It would be far more practical to focus on mitigating the risk of nuclear war by seeking to significantly lower force levels; by decreasing the explosive power of nuclear warheads; by developing declaratory policies consistent with negative security assurances; by adopting a formal "no first-use" pledge and, not least, by lowering the alert levels of nuclear forces and rejecting tout court the counterforce mission.

All of the above are the defining features of minimum deterrence. If adopted they would greatly lower the emphasis placed upon nuclear deterrence in international relations and thereby greatly increase nuclear safety.

All these actions would not require a radical transformation in the structure of international relations. Given this it would be the most appropriate means to address the risk externality posed by current nuclear postures rather than abolition. It is precisely because the risk exists that urgent concrete action must be taken now where feasible.

It would still remain the case that abolition must be the ultimate goal, for the simple reason that mitigating the risk of war does not eliminate it. But everything has its proper time and place.

It is interesting to observe that studies of public attitudes on nuclear policy and strategy indicate that there is a big difference between the views of the public, who do not accept the traditional staples of nuclear strategy, and elite opinion.As pointed out by the eminent theorist of democracy, Robert Dahl, nuclear policy has been dominated by the politics of "guardianship."This applies in every nuclear weapons state.

The elimination of our risk externality, like with any externality that arises from inherently political causes, requires greater public participation in policy making. If the public had a role in framing financial policy then doubtless the risk externality that lies at the heart of the global financial crisis would not have been allowed to arise.

Democracy is the best way to internalize such risk externalities. The mitigation, indeed elimination, of the risk of nuclear war is no different.

The appropriate way to ameliorate the role that nuclear power plays in international relations is to work for a posture of minimum deterrence. We should do this while also seeking to address the underlying causes of excessive conventional force postures and working towards the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Only then would abolition begin to have viability.