Russia’s Strategic Doctrine and the Expansion in the Scope of Nuclear Deterrence
There are many nuclear policy documents and recommendations circulating around. As we approach the 2010 NPT Review Conference more will appear.
Of all these, only two will matter. Those being the US Nuclear Posture Review and Russia's Strategic Doctrine.
The rest is for children.
Today we have learnt a little bit more about the Russian Strategic Doctrine. According to a report in Russia Today
...The number of military threats listed in the document has also been enlarged, according to the 17-page draft document. Those will include other nation’s ignoring of Russia’s strategic security interests, attempts to tip the balance of power in the neighborhood of Russia and her allies, and moves to change the balance in “nuclear and missile sphere”, like deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system.
Also on the threats list is interference with Russia’s internal policies, territorial disputes, arms race and undermining of international measures on arms limitation and reduction, possible deployment of weapons in space, and military conflicts near Russian borders...
Russia appears to be expanding the scope of nuclear deterrence. This, in my opinion, is big news for it appears that the Obama NPR will do the same, in the sense that it appears that it will codify Bush era nuclear strategy on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. Perhaps it will also ratify tailored deterrence, which conceptually can cover anything.
The world's two leading nuclear powers, to repeat, are expanding the scope of deterrence whilst they are engaged in an arms control process that will lead to a cut in the number of operational nuclear wearheads.
Hardly anybody is looking at the implications that mutual expansion in the scope of deterrence will have on strategic stability. This must be a focus for research by analysts.
Now a report by Global Security Newswire has a quote from the Commander in Chief of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces, General Andrei Shvaichenko, on the up-coming strategic doctrine
..."(Today) one must take into account the occurring geopolitical and geostrategic changes that are not in Russia's favor," the officer said. "In the future, it cannot be ruled out that Russia, being a nation with unlimited natural reserves and resources could become a target of a large-scale military aggression"...
The timing is interesting, for me anyway, because I have just finished reading Marshall Goldman's book on the Russian economy. It's called Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia. We might remember the statement from the Kremlin following the resumption of Russian strategic bomber patrols that the security of energy trade routes played a role in the decision and the manner in which the patrols are to be conducted.
It seems to me, although I cannot be certain, that Russia might adopt a graduated deterrence type nuclear strategy in order to buttress deterrence in the context of energy security.
Which has me thinking. We know that China is concerned about energy security, a concern that can only grow as it further develops. We know that China adopts a minimum form of nuclear deterrence. It would not surprise me that if China does move toward a more robust US and Russian style conception of nuclear deterrence in the future energy security would have something to do with it.
What about India?
Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review and the Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism
I notice that the New York Times has an article providing some small insight into the Obama Nuclear Posture Review.
Given that I have written some on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism and that I am working on a book on the topic of nuclear terrorism, which will include a chapter on deterrence and nuclear terrorism, I can't help but comment.
According to the article,
...The Obama administration’s classified review of nuclear weapons policy will for the first time make thwarting nuclear-armed terrorists a central aim of American strategic nuclear planning, according to senior Pentagon officials...
Wow, when I read that opening line I almost fell out of my chair.
I have had to calm down, make a cup of tea, and then read the rest of the article a couple of times over to make sure I understand it properly.
Consider. The tenor suggests that the scope of nuclear deterrence is being expanded. But hang on, doesn't Obama want to go to zero nukes? Why is everybody still focused on numbers and not doctrine?
It goes on to state that the Obama NPR will place the deterrence of nuclear terrorism as
...a task equal to the traditional mission of deterring a strike by major powers or emerging nuclear adversaries...
The article has an Obama official as stating that the threat of nuclear terrorism has been increasing since 9/11.
If by nuclear terrorism one means an attempt to instigate a nuclear terror event by way of a true nuclear yield then I think we need to be careful. This constitutes the underlying premise behind the centralisation of this type of deterrence, the insider seems to imply.
I think that the threat has been decreasing since about 1998-1999. From what I have seen, for example, al Qaida is facing a funding crisis. No bucks no Buck Rogers.
The article does state that other approaches, such as layered defences, play the "primary" role in countering nuclear terrorism not nuclear weapons. Indeed, but primary does not mean exclusively.
The devil, as always, is in the details. How will this declaration affect actual war planning? That remains to be seen.
The article is a bit unfair on the Bush administration. It states,
...While similar goals have been expressed before, no previous formal review elevated the threat of nuclear terrorism to a central element of the government’s strategic blueprint.
In comparison, the previous nuclear review, completed under President George W. Bush, called for new nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers, including those that might hold unconventional weapons, in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya...
The Bush NPR was completed before 9/11. It could hardly place the deterrence of nuclear terrorism at its centre given that the prospect of nuclear terrorism and the role of deterrence in countering it was not on too many peoples minds. Well, it was to a degree. People tended to speak of it as a counter to the centrality of Ballistic Missile Defence in early Bush era thinking.
My view is that there is no need for these type of declarations, but I'm not gonna talk about that here.
Since 9/11, believe me, the question of nuclear war planning and nuclear terrorism did figure highly in Bush policy. For instance when "tailored deterrence" came out of the closet officially in 2006 nuclear terror was front and central.
This article suggests to me that tailored deterrence is staying. Let us see what happens.
There is some stuff here on other issues. The article strongly implies that something like the Reliable Replacement Warhead is a go, but then it states towards the end
...Even as the review enters its final stages, two important issues remain unresolved, officials said.
One is the proper approach to maintaining and modernizing the stockpile of nuclear warheads, which would lead to a decision on whether current warheads should be reused and refurbished, or whether they should be replaced by a new generation of weapons...
The debate is between refurbishment and replacement. The debate might be fierce, but the difference isn't really major. Both go beyond stockpile stewardship in my opinion.
It seems, though, that there is a debate on no-first use. That's interesting. Obama has vetoed a UN resolution on de-alerting. This came after his much reported visit to the UN Security Council, a visit devoted to nuclear issues. The visit and the Obama spin was much reported, the UN veto was hardly reported if at all.
I think that the 2010 NPT Rev Con will probably be like the Copenhagen climate change summit.
All talk and little action.
The Iran UD3 Neutron Trigger Story and Two Point Implosion
The Iran UD3 based neutron trigger story seems to suggest the following. China used such a trigger to generate neutrons for its early nuclear weapons programme. It would seem that China then passed an early nuclear design over to Pakistan. This would, of course, have included an integrated design for an entire nuclear weapon. We know that China passed on such info to Pakistan and that in turn the AQ Khan network would have passed along some, if not all, of that info on to Iran (and Libya).
In commentary on the UD3 story a nifty little photo of AQ Khan in front of a blackboard showing a crude schematic of a nuclear weapon is depicted. In the photo you will see that a UD3 neutron initiator is depicted at the centre.
This has attracted a lot of attention for its suggests a design heritage for an Iranian bomb; from China to Pakistan and from Pakistan to Iran via the AQ Khan network.
However, let's take a look at that photo again. You can see it at the ISIS analysis on the UD3 story and at a blog post at the ArmsControlWonk
See the reference to UD3? It's hard to miss.
What I would like you to focus on is something else. Look at AQ Khan. Actually, look at what he is holding. He is holding a soccer ball (football; I don't know how Americans can get away calling NFL "football").
Why a football?
As the ACW explains
...AQ Khan graces the cover, holding a soccer ball (which is basically the size and configuration of the shell of high explosives in a nuclear weapon), standing in front of a blackboard showing a nuclear weapon diagram. The most shocking detail is the notation “Uran Deuteride Initiator.”...
Wiki has a good little discussion on this
...The Fat Man bomb had two concentric, spherical shells of high explosives, each about 10 inches (25 cm) thick. The inner shell drove the implosion. The outer shell consisted of a soccer-ball pattern of 32 high explosive lenses, each of which converted the convex wave from its detonator into a concave wave matching the contour of the outer surface of the inner shell. If these 32 lenses could be replaced with only two, the high explosive sphere could become an ellipsoid (prolate spheroid) with a much smaller diameter...
There might be a bit of a contradiction in all these leaks about Iranian weaponisation.
I am referring to two-point implosion. Global security.org has a good little primer on two-point linear implosion. The football reference here is to what Americans call a "football".
...The two ends of a cylinder, or an ovoid, could be driven toward each other to create a high-density sphere. This two-point detonation greatly reduced the diameter and the weight of the primary.
A linear implosion allows for a low density, elongated non-spherical (football shaped) mass to be compressed into a supercritical configuration without using symmetric implosion designs. This assembly is accomplished by embedding an elliptical shaped mass in a cylinder of explosive. The explosive is detonated on both ends, and an inert wave shaping device is required in front of the detonation points. Extensive experimentation was needed to create a workable form, but this design enables the use of Plutonium as well as Uranium...
For two-point spherical implosion, which is actually more relevant, see the link to Wiki above.
It has been alleged that Iran has a two-point implosion based weaponisation programme.
The Guardian had a good story on Iran and two-point implosion
...The UN's nuclear watchdog has asked Iran to explain evidence suggesting that Iranian scientists have experimented with an advanced nuclear warhead design, the Guardian has learned.The very existence of the technology, known as a "two-point implosion" device, is officially secret in both the US and Britain, but according to previously unpublished documentation in a dossier compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iranian scientists may have tested high-explosive components of the design. The development was today described by nuclear experts as "breathtaking" and has added urgency to the effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis...
...Documentation referring to experiments testing a two-point detonation design are part of the evidence of nuclear weaponisation gathered by the IAEA and presented to Iran for its response...
The Guardian also notes
...The first implosion devices, like the "Fat Man" bomb dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, used 32 high-explosive hexagons and pentagons arrayed around a plutonium core like the panels of a football. The IAEA has a five-page document describing experimentation on such a hemispherical array of explosives...
If the UD3 story is true, that Iran might have resumed an active weaponisation programme, then the two-point implosion story might be false. This is because this story basically alleges that Iran is working on a nuclear weapon initially designed by the Chinese and handed down to Pakistan which in turn was handed to Iran.
AQ Khan is holding a football/soccer ball (the number of panels in the actual Chinese design is irrelevant).
That's not two-point implosion.
Perhaps Iran has dabbled with both and has given two-point implosion away as being too risky. Perhaps Iran is using a UD3 trigger for its own design based on two-point implosion or perhaps the two-point implosion story is false.
If the latter, then at least one of the documents much discussed in the context of Iranian weaponisation is baloney.
As matters currently stand we are in no position to determine which of these possibilities is correct.
Iran’s Alleged UD3 Neutron Trigger Program
I've got a new desktop, so have had some teething problems.
I am sure that we have seen all the jazz about an Iranian UD3 based neutron initiator program, the same type that China assisted Pakistan with. At the centre of this story are leaked planning documents on "special neutron related activities." The original story, which appeared in The Times of London, had these documents as being drawn up in 2007. That's just at about the time that the Fordow v 2.0 enrichment plant started construction.
The original story has the 2007 date coming from an "Asian intelligence source". Take your pick; Asia is a big place. The Israeli's, however, have been a pretty vocal "Asian" advocate for the notion that Iran has resumed weaponisation work post the alleged 2003 halt. The other states that have been dismissive of the 2007 US NIE are European.
There are statements in these documents that allude to previous efforts, suggesting this is a kick-start to a previous project. Israeli disinformation is possible, given it neatly matches with claims coming from Tel Aviv.
I would just like to emphasise that this story, even if true, does not invalidate the theory of "minimal latency" in relation to Fordow. This is point made in the ISIS analysis
...Some have characterized this document as a smoking gun on Iran’s weaponization activities. It might in fact be that. But ISIS urges caution and further assessment of this document, in particular to confirm the document’s date and with how the document fits with other information regarding Iran’s nuclear weaponization activities both prior to 2003 and any work afterwards. The document could describe work to develop and maintain a capability rather than being part of a program authorized to build nuclear weapons. The document does not mention nuclear weapons and we have seen no evidence of an Iranian decision to build them...
The documents themselves do not carry any letter head nor any information suggesting that it is secret or that its circulation be restricted. This document, if it is what it appears to be, would be one of Iran's most prized state secrets. Notice that the documents are also not dated.
If you read the original story you will see that it carries disgraceful commentary from Mark Fitzpatrick, a former State Department officer now working for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. We might recall this organization's "net assessment" prior to the US invasion of Iraq on Saddam Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction programmes." In the midst of the UKs Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war, one would expect more sober public statements from IISS analysts.
What is the proper procedure in relation to such documents? Is it (a) that they be passed on to the IAEA, which then investigates them and reports upon them in its safeguards reports or (b) leak them to the media at critical moments in Iran policy?
Obama’s Afghan-Pakistan Surge
I have written a short article on Obama's AfPak surge. It can be read at On Line Opinion.
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Marko is also interested in philosophy, especially the theory of knowledge, and science, especially physics, and considers himself to work within the naturalist and enlightenment tradition. He is writing a book on nuclear terrorism.