Nuclear Security and Strategic Analyses Dr Marko Beljac

Obama’s Draft UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Resolution; The Link with RRW and Nuclear Deterrence.

The United States has drawn up a draft resolution on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Politico has published that draft, and an earlier draft that has been superseded by this particular draft. Obama is due to attend a meeting of the UN Security Council in due course. This draft resolution will be tabled in an official manner at that time.

Let us concentrate on the second draft.

There is much here that is good and worthy of support. For instance, those parts on safeguards, the additional protocol, multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle (but if Obama means the GNEP we can cross that one out), a FISSBAN and so on. They are good, but that doesn't mean we can't engage in some objective analysis.

There are two interesting passages on nuclear disarmament. The first calls upon all states to abide by Article VI of the NPT, i.e. the disarmament article. It then goes on, which was not really in the first draft, of calling upon all states to cooperate at the 2010 NPT Rev Con so that "achievable and realistic goals" on non-proliferation and disarmament are set.

We should note usage of "calls upon" and "achievable and realistic".

Consider the first. The draft resolution goes on to speak about the "current challenges" to the NPT regime and demands that the parties concerned, i.e. Iran and North Korea but especially Iran, abide by the relevant UN resolutions. In itself that is not earth shattering. That is a re-affirmation of current UN resolutions, but the contrast is nonetheless interesting.

Where US obligations are impacted the draft resolution uses calls upon, but when it comes to Iran and North Korea we see usage of demands.

I submit this is important because the Reliable Replacement Warhead lives on. According to a good report by Global Security Newswire it seems that the Obama Nuclear Posture Review will head down the RRW path by simply replacing "reliable" with "effective".

Much of the discussion is couched within the concept of nuclear deterrence. This can be dismissed. The emphasis on "reliability" and "effectiveness" is not a feature typical of countervalue deterrence. Rather, these are staples of counterforce. Notice that we have good scientific studies showing that plutonium pits have long lifetimes, some 90-100 years. That's why Stratcom has been bull shitting about non-physics package stuff like vacuum tubes and such.

The current US nuclear arsenal is "reliable" and "effective" and will remain so for many, many years under the science based stockpile stewardship philosophy.

Perhaps a timetable for nuclear abolition less than 100 years is not "achievable and realistic" we might thereby conclude.

The most important part of the GSN report may well be the bit at the end which shows that Obama will continue with the policy of utilising multiple warhead types in the US arsenal. This is presented as a measure designed to hedge against failure of a single warhead.

Rubbish.

Multiple warheads are used for the multiple target set in the US nuclear war plan given the damage expectancy numbers that those targets are given.

You keep the set of warheads - you keep the nuclear strategy that you have inherited from the previous administration.

It's as simple as that.

Multiple warhead types might also be an early indicator for the continuance of tailored deterrence. Let's wait and see. I am holding my paper on this topic until the NPR is done.

Going into the 2010 NPT Rev Con and beyond it would be expected that the world's unipolar strategic military power would seek to enhance non-proliferation by calling for a FISSBAN, for a CTBT, for a multilateral fuel cycle design favourable to the P-5 and the like. Such an expansive agenda could not succeed diplomatically without making noises about Article VI, but what the heck we need an effective "deterrent" for 90 years plus.

That's all perfectly consistent with the realist conception of international relations. The first set of measures in the absence of the latter enhances US strategic posture. The question for those interested in arms control is whether such an approach can deliver broad multilateral outcomes in the absence of the unipolar power constraining its strategic options.

Oh, and while we are on the topic of deterrence.

General Cartwright made an interesting statement in his press conference on East European BMD. Most of the attention, and it is indeed important and worthy of further discussion, has been directed at the alternative SM-3 based architecture.

But he stated, kinda in passing, that

...I mean, if this system emerges the way we think it is, if the testing bears out, what you really are doing here is providing another form of deterrence, credible deterrence, that is an alternative to an offensive-only capability...

That's very important. It shows how far we have come. That idea will be enshrined in Obama's strategic reviews, including the BMD review.

Look at Team Bush's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review

...Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve...

That is now locked in. It's the first pillar of Team Bush's nuclear strategy that we are pretty sure now will be carried over into the new administration.

Of course, the US draft UN resolution makes no mention of the impact that BMD has on non-proliferation.